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Preface – ‘Arcticness and change’
Ingrid A. Medby, UCL Department of Geography
Like a teacher’s red pen, the jagged line underneath my writing gave 
me an uneasy feeling. I  tried to ignore it, but the overly conscientious 
primary school pupil in me would not let it rest:  The word processor 
indicates a spelling error; it’s unacceptable to continue, my own internal 
voice nagged.
‘Arcticness’ is a term, though; and a highly useful one – as I told my 
word processor with the click of the mouse, ‘Add to Dictionary’. Adding 
the suffix ‘- ness’ denotes a state or quality – in this case, the quality of 
being Arctic.
For those of us interested in the Arctic and, in particular, how peo-
ple relate to it, a word for the ‘quality of being Arctic’ is a potential cause 
for agonisingly many jagged red lines. Although my software clearly dis-
agreed, I am, of course, not the first to see the need for it – something to 
which this book bears testament. As the world is increasingly looking 
northwards to a region undergoing rapid change, identifying what, who 
or where has the ‘quality of being Arctic’ is high on the agenda; for actors 
from both near and far, their ‘Arcticness’ becomes a potential asset as 
they position themselves for Arctic futures.
But what does it really mean, ‘Arcticness’; what are Arctic ‘qual-
ities’? Unlike placating a spell- checker, defining what ‘is’ Arctic (or 
feeling, believing, thinking, imagining that someone/ something/ some-
where is) is not as straightforward as it may seem. The region itself is 
defined in numerous ways depending on topic, context and even inter-
est; and so, determining the qualities of a region that cannot itself be 
fully determined provides a challenge.
Given that claiming an Arctic identity may serve an instrumental 
purpose – for example adding to political actors’ or private stakeholders’ 
credibility – the ambiguity of Arcticness is also in part why the concept 
is so fascinating, not to mention so important to explore. In relations 
between the Arctic and non- Arctic, the claim to Arcticness potentially 
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becomes a political one; indeed, it may decide who falls on either side of 
Arctic and the prefixed ‘non- ’. In turn, Arcticness becomes a question of 
who holds rights, who holds responsibilities, and who holds ‘true’ knowl-
edge of a space in rapid flux …
Arcticness does not only matter for political decisions and resource 
extraction; it seems to have become exotic, interesting  – it sells. With 
northern lights tours and midnight sun cruises, Arcticness is increas-
ingly commodified. With ‘Arctic’ labels on anything from bottled drinks 
to cleaning companies, it has become a brand so ubiquitous that it is now 
simply part of the everyday.
This has not always been the case. Having grown up in Northern 
Norway, the change is clear  – not just climatic or economic change 
in the region, but a change of label. What was only a decade ago 
Northern Norway is now frequently referred to as ‘the High North’ 
[‘ nordområdene’ in Norwegian, translating literally as ‘the north-
ern areas’] or the Arctic. A  northern identity may now be an Arctic 
 identity – just like our tap water is now ‘Arctic water’.
Rebranding the north as ‘Arctic’ is not for those in the Arctic, 
however, but rather for the outside spectator – tourist, visitor, investor 
or politician. Speaking of what is Arctic or not, who is Arctic or not, is 
hardly consequential when you are there – it is simply less relevant, less 
interesting, less exotic. Nevertheless, it is primarily northern communi-
ties who face the challenging consequences as the ‘frozen’ Arctic thaws. 
What is important to remember here is that these communities have 
never themselves been ‘frozen’ (in time), but have always been evolv-
ing, moving, changing. Saying that voices from the Arctic are  important 
is not enough  – they must also be listened to, and finally, engaged in 
conversation. That is, voices (and ears!) from north and south, east and 
west, are all important in this process of change. Just like a ‘new’ label, 
an identification as or with something comes about through negation; 
and so, Arcticness too takes on meaning through relations and encoun-
ters with the constitutive other.
Perhaps then this is more than simply an exercise of marketing 
or rhetoric; perhaps our concept of ‘Arcticness’ itself is undergoing 
change? Could it be that a region which has historically been seen as far 
away – peripheral to the centre of society – is now being ‘drawn closer’ 
due to its accelerating importance to questions of climate change and 
globalisation?
Interrogating why something is now considered ‘Arctic’ is highly 
important; as is attention to who claims so, or who is now themselves 
considered Arctic: these are questions of power – as noted, power both 
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to speak and to act. But more than this, Arcticness under change may 
point to a more profound change in our relations to a region, to our-
selves and to each other. It may be symptomatic of ever more people feel-
ing that the Arctic matters – also to those living far south of the Arctic 
Circle. As the adage goes, what happens in the Arctic does not stay in 
the Arctic; and vice versa, Arctic change does not have its origins in the 
Arctic either. In other words, it points to a realisation of our intercon-
nectedness – one that has always been there, of course, but which is now 
far more visible and felt thanks to satellites, the internet, travelling and 
globalisation writ large.
In the end, Arcticness cannot be easily defined; no more than the 
region itself can be neatly placed within latitudinal lines. It is as much 
about relationality  – both at the level of diplomatic negotiations and 
that of daily life. And indeed, Arcticness perhaps should not be limited 
to semantic boundaries, should not be rendered static on the pages of 
a dictionary. Rather, it should be kept open – open to interpretation by 
those to whom it feels relevant.
The above ‘challenge’ of determining Arctic qualities is also an 
opportunity: An opportunity to think beyond boundaries – or without 
them altogether; to think and imagine anew for alternative ways of 
understanding. The Arctic is, as the following chapters will discuss, 
undergoing profound change due to climate change, globalisation and 
many other influences – and so is, and should, our concept of Arcticness. 
It is through interaction, through relating to each other, that the ‘ness’ – 
the quality of being anything at all – takes on meaning.
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1
Editorial Introduction: Shall I compare 
thee to an Arctic day (or night)?
Ilan Kelman
Arcticness as a home
People and communities, lives and livelihoods. These define the Arctic, 
just as with all other populated areas on the planet. Is there, then, any-
thing special, specific, exceptional or unique about the Arctic? To the 
peoples in the Arctic, the answer is ‘of course’.
Because it is home.
As Arctic literature is fond of stating, there is no single Arctic. 
Definitions abound, from being a region or place to being an idea or 
phenomenon. The Arctic is delineated by latitude, tree lines, national 
and subnational borders and indigenous territories, among many other 
suggestions. All these elements vaguely concentrate into the northern 
areas of Canada, Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden along with all of 
Alaska, Greenland and Iceland.
This is the Arctic as a place – and the Arctic as place. The Arctic 
is also characterised, perhaps more so, by its people. Depending on 
where boundaries are set exactly, the Arctic’s population is anywhere 
from approximately 4  million to approximately 13  million people. 
About 10 per cent of Arctic inhabitants are indigenous, belonging to 40 
 different groups, examples of which are Saami, Inuit, Nenets, Yakuts 
and Aleuts. In some jurisdictions, such as Nunavut and Greenland, 
indigenous  peoples are the majority. All Arctic areas have  comparatively 
low population density.
Arctic indigenous peoples are partly defined by the way in which 
they were colonised from the south. Iceland is the only Arctic country 
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without designated indigenous peoples. The other seven countries have 
never fully addressed their post- colonial legacy which included active 
suppression of indigenous languages and cultures, forcing nomadic peo-
ples to settle, and taking indigenous children away from their families 
for the purpose of ‘education’ and ‘acculturation’.
As part of aiming to re- connect Arctic peoples and places, and 
to redress past mistakes, each post- colonial Arctic country apart from 
Russia has, to a large degree, settled land claims with Arctic indigenous 
peoples. The settlements occurred in different ways and in different 
time periods, with implementation, monitoring and enforcement still 
not fully functional in many instances.
The generational context adds complexity. The generation of lead-
ers who grew up under colonialism and who negotiated the settlements 
are now in the process of retiring. They are giving way to a new gener-
ation of leaders who did not experience similar difficulties or frontline 
fights for autonomy and the recognition of indigenous cultures. They 
face other challenges, such as low educational attainment, high rates of 
substance use and abuse, and high suicide rates.
They are also looking to connect to the world beyond their (mis)
governing state through the internet and social media to define and 
re- define, and to be proud of, their indigeneity, their peoples and 
their places; that is, their Arctic. The battles are not over. Greenland’s 
independence is still a possibility. Racism against indigenous peoples 
remains. The peoples are not homogeneous groups, such as the Saami 
who have different livelihoods including reindeer herding, fishing, both 
and neither.
Non- indigenous Arctic peoples also represent the Arctic, not just 
Icelanders but also those born and/ or living in the north but without 
an Arctic indigenous heritage. One class of Arctic peoples, most nota-
bly in Scandinavia, comprises immigrants from around the world, 
including refugees, who fully settled in the Arctic and who are now 
raising first- generation, Arctic- born families with diverse, interna-
tional heritages.
Within this Arctic rainbow, what is the Arctic? How do Arctic peo-
ples relate to their places? The ways include living, livelihoods, environ-
ments and movements. In many locales, movement means the typical 
commute by private or public transport to a nine- to- five office job. In 
many locales, it is the typical subsistence hunting, conversing with the 
wind, feeling the sea, traipsing the land and traversing the ice.
Water (solid and liquid) and wind flow, bringing with them life 
and death. The Arctic peoples flow with them. Movement, survival and 
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thriving are choreographed within the elements and within the colours 
of the seasons:  blue, grey and white melding with brown, green and 
splashes of colour in summer flora and fauna. The ever- changing kalei-
doscope of weather and skies, of animals and oceans, of plants and the 
Earth, creates Arctic flows and ebbs.
Transitions and boundaries are prominent but fuzzy. Snow melds 
into land shifts to water becomes ice, drifting lazily under the dazzling 
dome of the summer sun and the scintillating stars of the wild winter. 
When the ice roads thaw making transport difficult, inland communi-
ties are spoken of as being landlocked. When the ocean is too rough for 
boats and the wind is too dangerous for planes, island communities are 
seen as being entrapped.
What vocabulary suggests being icelocked? The ice can be too thin 
on the water or too crevassed on the land, or just too slushy everywhere. 
The transition between seasons can be harsh when the land  ice and 
sea  ice mixtures do not permit safe transport. Then, one’s Arctic place 
becomes evident, as an islander or not, as someone who enjoys being 
indoors or not.
Movement and entrapment mean that Arctic placeness is not 
 contentedly fixed. In any case, the glaciers, the ice, the snow, the water 
and the wind are always in motion. The rivers and the seas emote rip-
ples and waves. The tides breathe for the water and the wind for the air. 
Coasts erode and accrete –  with both ice and sediment.
Arctic changes are expressed in other ways. From colonisation to 
self- determination, the Saami have created their parliaments, referenda 
supported autonomy for Greenland and Nunavut, and Russian regions 
and territories have various levels of self- governance. Exceptionalism 
identifies many Arctic place traits –  including the internationally unique 
Svalbard Treaty and the central Bering Sea having its ‘donut hole’ 
which is an enclosed polygon of international waters surrounded by 
territorial seas.
The scale of Arctic territories is sometimes forgotten. From 
Murmansk to Chukotka, the time difference across Russia is nine hours. 
Alaska has only two time zones, an artificial construction, but as the 
largest American state more than twice the area of its nearest rival, it 
is almost as wide and as tall as the entire contiguous states. Ottawa– 
Iqaluit flights travel more than three times as far as the London– 
Edinburgh route and are still shorter than Greenland’s full north– south 
distance.
Current national borders across the Arctic are poorly reflective of 
indigenous cultures. The Saami are partitioned among four countries. 
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Only modern politics draw a line between Alaska and Yukon. The 
Canada– Denmark dispute over Hans Island is meaningless for peoples 
who use the land, sea, ice and wind to live.
Many of these Arctic placeness discussions are characterised 
by islands and archipelagos including the Aleutians, Hans Island, 
Greenland, Iceland and Svalbard. Nunavut’s capital sits on Baffin Island 
rather than the mainland. Many of Norway’s principal Arctic settle-
ments are on islands including Tromsø, Harstad and Hammerfest.
Island studies has evolved over the past generation, exploring the 
natures and personalities of islands, island communities and islanders. 
Much debate and critique has centred around what it means to be an 
island or an islander, defining and examining the essence of islandness. 
These and similar questions and explorations have emerged for the 
Arctic, Arctic communities and Arctic peoples.
Thus, we generate and query the term Arcticness through the 
chapters in this book.
Arcticness as a book
The chapters here birth, live and quash Arcticness in differing tones 
and styles. Disciplinary and non- disciplinary examinations range from 
geophysics to law, from anthropology to engineering and from art to 
resource management. Personal experiences and internal realities sit 
alongside technological investigations and external observations and 
representations. The transitions among the chapters can be as jarring as 
Arctic weather changes, as mismatched as some northern and southern 
views and as manifold as the Arctic landscape.
The Arctic breathes diversity and Arcticness embodies variety. 
The chapters in this book reflect this range through poetic interludes 
alongside detailed social and physical science interspersed with images 
confiding more than a thousand words meshed with lengthy policy grill-
ings. Some chapters dive deeply, unearthing (or deicing?) the authors’ 
tiny yet vast Arctic worlds. Others prefer breadth, traversing continents 
and disciplines to comparatively analyse locations within and outside of 
the Arctic of Many Definitions.
Consequently, the chapters Arctic- hop  – around, through and 
within longitudes, latitudes, ideas, modes, genres and especially peo-
ples. The Preface and Afterword frame this collection through personal 
reflections of being Arctic.
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As an ensemble, these contributions  – but, more so, the peoples 
penning them – probe Arcticness, including technical and place- based 
standpoints, involving northern and non- northern viewpoints (and 
their combinations), and incorporating science, policy and practice – but 
all with the fundament of the human perspective. Because Arcticness 
and all the chapters herein are still a human construct, emerging from 
and being forced on people, and occurring within a human context.
Arcticness as a context
Phrases other than Arcticness are feasible. The term ‘islanders’ questions 
why ‘Arcticers’ does not exist, instead referring to Arctic peoples along 
the same lines as island peoples. Arctic provides both a noun and an 
adjective, with other terms such as Arcticesque and Arcticite not being 
considered, appearing both awkward and vapid, even platitudinous, 
trying to construct something Arctic which mirrors little. Translation 
difficulties, particularly into Arctic languages, would also result from 
these artificial constructions.
Yet artificiality itself is not necessarily disingenuous or disad-
vantageous. Humans have a right and a need to create ideas regarding 
their places, their movements, their livelihoods, their peoples, their 
environments and their homes. The challenge and opportunity, as with 
Arcticness, is whether or not the artificial creation has real and useful 
meaning.
We should not Arcticise for the sake of finding, generating or 
discussing Arcticness. Where potential exists for substantive idea and 
action, it deserves examination. This is the case with Arcticness.
Arctic imaginaries, Arctic realities and their intersections in and 
outside of the Arctic pervade numerous historical, contemporary and 
future discussions. From the establishment of Arctic peoples to explora-
tion and colonisation from the south to re- establishing sovereignties and 
Arctic peoples’ control over themselves, Arcticness displays tangibility 
and ephemerality. Meanwhile, non- Arctic peoples try to wrest control 
and make Arcticness relevant for themselves, from the construction of 
‘last- chance’ tourism to tropical countries seeking observer status at the 
Arctic Council.
The authors in this book recognise this gamut. They accept what 
they understand and do not understand, what they have and have not 
experienced. They have reached into their science and reached into 
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their soul, writing from the head and writing from the heart. Their chap-
ters show how Arcticness portrays and betrays the Arctic, its places, its 
peoples and its homes. Even when they do not come from the north, the 
authors seek its power and voice – to understand, learn about, explore, 
compare, apply and critique Arcticness.
  
PArt 1
Arcticness Emerging
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Maintaining my Arcticness
Heather sauyaq Jean Gordon
My name is Heather Sauyaq Jean Gordon. My Iñupiaq name, Sauyaq, 
means drum in Alaska Seward Peninsula Iñupiaq. I was given this name 
as an adult, when I was 31 in 2016. My Great Aunt Peggy Perry (Aunt 
Peg) died, and my Grandmother passed her name on to me. I work daily 
to speak out, be heard and carry the beat of my culture in my heart. My 
Aunt Peg was an opinionated and hilarious woman. I strive to keep her 
alive in me.
Aunt Peg was a beader. She beaded for around 15 to 20  years 
before she died. She beaded earrings, necklaces and bracelets, as well as 
a few other ventures that she tried out when interested. I always loved 
her beading. When I was in my late teens, she taught me to bead a strap 
to hold glasses around my neck. I never finished that project. However, 
I always wanted to be able to bead like her.
In 2015, I was six years into graduate school and struggling with 
knowing who I  was, and who I  wanted to be. I  felt detached from the 
original reason I went to graduate school, to become a professor. I won-
dered if that truly was a way to best help the Iñupiaq people. I was feeling 
that being in school was potentially a selfish endeavour and was con-
cerned about what route I should take. In the fall of 2015, I came across 
the Indigenous Studies programme at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. 
This programme reinvigorated my interest in self- determination, sus-
tainability and well-being in the lives of Iñupiaq people. Yet, I  still felt 
something missing. I now knew what I wanted to be, an advocate for self- 
determination and well-being. I still did not know who I was.
I knew I was an Iñupiaq woman of mixed heritage. I knew I grew 
up in Homer, Alaska, outside of Iñupiaq lands. Yet, I did not feel sepa-
rated from the land, as I grew up raising reindeer and living a subsis-
tence lifestyle. I  travelled to Alaska Native villages to do construction 
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work while I was in high school. In the villages I was exposed to Alaska 
Native beading. It was beautiful.
I conducted my master’s research in Greenland from 2010 to 2012. 
While there, I met fantastic artists. The women beaded beautiful National 
costumes, earrings and even coasters for coffee mugs on the table. Their 
art was inspirational. These women were my Inuit cousins who had 
travelled from Alaska many years earlier to settle in Greenland. I  felt a 
connection with them and their art. I also was able to eat Native food in 
Greenland: seal, whale, fish and much more. These experiences brought 
back my tie to the Arctic and the Arcticness I shared with Indigenous peo-
ple in the circumpolar North, made me miss Alaska, and made me ques-
tion what it meant to me to be an Inuit woman.
Now, in 2015 I was living in Madison, Wisconsin, as I had been 
since 2009 for my master’s programme. I knew few Native people and 
no other Alaska Natives in the area. Facebook seemed like my main 
connection to Alaska, except for the trips home I  would make in the 
summer for fishing and berry picking. I sought help from a Ho- Chunk 
trained non- Native counsellor and she taught me about the four aspects 
of a healthy life: spiritual, mental, physical and emotional. My life met 
the mental, physical and emotional but not the spiritual aspects. I had 
little connection to my Iñupiaq culture and felt disconnected from 
Alaska while living in Wisconsin.
I looked back at my knowledge of Iñupiaq culture. I thought of the 
beading I  learned from my Aunt Peg, the women in the rural villages 
I  visited while doing construction and the women in Greenland. I  felt 
that beading was my connection to Alaska and being Iñupiaq. It was my 
connection not only to my Indigenous identity but also to my sense of 
Arcticness while living so far from the North. So, I began beading earrings.
In the spring of 2016, my Aunt Peg died. It was then that I  was 
given her name. I  felt her spirit within me and wanted to continue on 
her legacy of beading. When we were going through her home, I  was 
given the opportunity to go through her beading room. Her beads were 
everywhere. There were patterns, needles and just everything. I felt her 
presence and it made me so happy that I could continue doing for her 
what she loved. I chose beads that would allow me to do work similar 
to what she had been doing. It was then that I  came across a beaded 
glass ornament. It was absolutely stunning. When I came home I started 
beading ornaments in addition to the earrings I already made. I want to 
keep her memory alive.
I had begun beading in the fall of 2015. After my Aunt died, bead-
ing became very important to me and is now a part of my life that I reg-
ularly practise (Figures  2.1 and 2.2). It calms me, makes me feel the 
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Fig. 2.1 Beaded forget- me- not earrings (Source: author). 
Fig. 2.2 Beaded glass ornaments (Source: author).
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Arcticness I have, even though I live far from Alaska, and makes me feel 
connected to my Aunt Peg. I have started selling the art, like she did. 
It makes me happy to see my spiritual connection to the Arctic make 
others excited and happy. I  feel they are spreading Arcticness to each 
person they meet as they share my beading.
I enjoy giving away my art to family and friends. I feel a connec-
tion with each person who wears my art. The time I put into the piece, 
the spiritual connection to being Iñupiaq, and working in the memory 
of my Aunt makes every piece I produce special and unique. My bead-
ing spreads the beauty of Arctic lifeways and artistic patterns across 
the world.
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Conversations in the Dark
Larissa Diakiw 
(publishing as frankie no one)
Conversations in the Dark is the first in a series of graphic essays that 
follows Frankie as she explores history. In this comic she reads the food 
chapter in Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a report 
that details the abuses that took place under the residential school 
programme.
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Tracking the Arctic
Wrenched white vista winds
Knead them black, turn it around
Tracks were stretching south
Funsho Martin Parrott
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Tracking the Arctic
funsho Martin Parrott
Background
Haiku is a Japanese poem of 17 syllables, in 3 lines of 5, 7 and 5. Haiku 
traditionally evokes images of the natural world. The purpose of Haiku 
is to create a poetic form which has the brevity and intensity of the 
moment. The rigour of Haiku ensures that only the most essential parts 
of an idea or moment remain.
Rationale
The theme of this Haiku is irreparable change and crossing a point of 
no return. The first line speaks about the damaged landscape, with 
the repetition of ‘W’ representing the ice caps and glaciers of north-
ern terrains. The second line seeks to illustrate the unforgiving nature 
of the Arctic climate with the ‘Knead’. ‘Knead’ is a double entendre. If 
read as ‘need’, the line becomes about our insatiable need for ‘black’ or 
oil, while ‘knead’ describes the forceful folding and distorting one can 
experience within Arctic winds. The last line also has a double mean-
ing. It speaks about the footprints that Arctic wildlife would have left 
in the ice and snow, had it not been for the damage to their habitats; 
hence, their description in the past tense. It also references the work of 
Arctic organisations and places it alongside the art of tracking, a skill 
belonging to many First Nations people. They track within the Arctic; 
we track the Arctic itself.
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Radar observations of Arctic ice
rachel L. tilling, tun Jan young, Poul Christoffersen, Lai bun Lok, 
Paul v. brennan and Keith W. nicholls
Background
To many observers, the Arctic is synonymous with snow and ice. For 
example, the Arctic Ocean spans just over 14 million km2 – an area larger 
than that of Europe – which is variably covered in frozen ocean water, or 
sea ice, throughout the year.1 The Arctic Ocean is almost completely sur-
rounded by land, which can often be covered in snow, permafrost (fro-
zen soil, rock or sediment) or land ice. Observing how different forms 
of ice in the Arctic are changing, and understanding how they have 
evolved in the past, is crucial. Radar technology provides us with a tool 
to do this and allows us to visualise the glacial environment beneath the 
ice surface. This chapter provides an overview of modern radar- based 
observation methods and describes how measurements from them have 
contributed to a scientific understanding of ice with an emphasis on 
Arcticness.
Over the past few decades, radar technology has significantly con-
tributed to our understanding of the Arctic landscape. It has become a 
key tool in observing changes in the Arctic snow and ice cover. For exam-
ple, data from radar satellites have been used to document changes in 
the thickness of the sea ice that covers the Arctic Ocean, by measuring 
the elevation of the ice and ocean surfaces separately. These data are 
now available in near real time (NRT) and will allow us to assess Arctic 
environmental change as it is happening. They also have the potential 
to help industries such as tourism and transport to navigate the polar 
oceans with safety and care. Radar- based measurements can be used to 
constrain the physics of ice flow within models that predict the future 
state of Arctic ice and global climate.
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By using a growing suite of satellite, airborne and ground- based 
radar data, scientists are able to study the past Arctic climate, provide 
information on the present state of the Arctic and aid future predictions 
of Arctic climate change. Communicating such Arctic science – to other 
scientists, the media and the public – and integrating the physical sci-
ences and engineering with Arctic action on the ground raises further 
challenges which need to be overcome to deal with Arctic change. As sci-
entists, it is this ever- changing, physical landscape that on first thought 
embodies the concept of ‘Arcticness’, and the ability to use scientific tools 
to observe and quantify these changes. On reflection, this is a rather 
remote and emotionless connection – like the connection between a sci-
entific instrument and the landscape it observes.
One must consider Arcticness internally and not just externally, to 
truly feel a connection to it, and realise that the Arctic is so much more 
than a distant land to be studied from afar. The Arctic is livelihood; it is 
support despite a lack of physical contact; it is passion and excitement; 
and it is the draw of the supposed unknown. Never does that become 
clearer than when standing on the ice and experiencing overwhelming 
silence interspersed with deafening creaks and groans. No science can 
describe the feeling of isolation and exhaustion, which is far outweighed 
by sheer euphoria and awe.
Radar observation methods
Radar – an acronym for Radio Detection and Ranging – functions by 
transmitting and receiving pulses of radio waves to investigate the loca-
tion and properties of a target. The distance from the radar instrument 
to a target can be determined by measuring the round- trip delay of a 
radar pulse – a simple concept that originated from the classical exper-
iments conducted by James Clerk Maxwell (1865) and Heinrich Hertz 
(1886), reflecting a 455MHz wave off metallic objects from a distance. 
However, it is inappropriate to ascribe the invention of radar technol-
ogy to a specific incident or date, but instead through over a century 
of developments and refinements of radio technology, and aided by key 
geopolitical events during the mid- twentieth century.2 Although the 
concept of radar is overwhelmingly associated with World War II, the 
prominence of ionospheric research before and after the war, as well as 
the Space Race behind the scenes of the Cold War cannot be ignored.3 
Initially using radar to measure the height of the ionosphere, this sci-
entific technique was then adapted by Sir Robert Watson- Watts in 1935 
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to detect aircraft at a distance, along with other radiolocation methods 
developed by other countries under the cloak of military secrecy. The 
conclusion of World War II saw the dawn of radar for non- military use, 
with notable developments in civil aviation, meteorology, astronomy 
and geology.4
One of the earliest radar instruments used in the Polar Regions was 
ground- based ice penetrating radar, to investigate Antarctic ice shelves 
in the 1960s.5 Since then, the interest in radar turned towards airborne 
and then satellite platforms to give a wider view of the ice. The charac-
teristics of the radar waveform used vary depending on its application. 
High power short pulsed waveforms are very commonly used while, more 
recently, low power swept- frequency waveforms (pervasive within the 
automotive radar community) are popular particularly within research 
in academia due to their low cost and ease of implementation. Often, 
the primary goal of many radar surveys on or above ice is to measure 
ice thickness, which is an important component in models of ice dynam-
ics, ocean circulation, global heat budgets and sea-level rise. However, 
ground- based radars can also investigate certain qualities within ice, 
such as changes in crystal structure, internal layering and water con-
tent.6 The following section describes how different radar instruments 
can be used, with examples relevant in the Arctic. Principally, radar 
is used in two different ways to study the properties and characteris-
tics of snow and ice. The first is to obtain data on the changes of one 
area through time. The second is to obtain an ‘image’ of an area to be 
considered.
satellite radar
Radar instruments on board satellites can be used to observe the chang-
ing Arctic ice cover, using satellite radar altimetry. Altimetry is a tech-
nique in which the height of an instrument is measured above a target 
surface. In satellite radar altimetry the distance is measured from the 
satellite to the Earth’s surface. The Earth’s surface elevation can then 
be calculated by combining the distance measurement with precise 
knowledge of the satellite’s orbit. In the Arctic, satellite radar altimetry 
has been used to measure the elevation of land ice,7 the oceans8 and sea 
ice.9 Applications of the data include estimating the mass of ice  sheets,10 
ocean circulation11 and sea ice thickness and volume.12
Sea ice covers about 12 per cent of the world’s oceans. Because of its 
salt content, ocean water begins to freeze when it reaches a temperature 
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around – 1.8°C. Sea ice is a major element of the Earth’s climate system. 
It regulates atmospheric temperature by reflecting the sun’s energy 
and by forming an insulating layer between the ocean and the atmos-
phere. This insulating layer slows heat exchange from the relatively 
warm ocean to the cool atmosphere. The growth and melt of sea ice also 
affects freshwater input into the world’s oceans. As sea ice grows, salt is 
expelled in a process known as brine rejection and as sea ice melts, rel-
atively fresh water is released to the ocean. In the northern hemisphere, 
Arctic sea ice regulates the freshwater input into the Arctic Ocean and 
the subpolar North Atlantic. The Arctic temperature and freshwater bal-
ance affect patterns of atmospheric and oceanic circulation across the 
region and at lower latitudes. These in turn could impact on the climate 
in Europe, America and across the northern hemisphere through, for 
example, changes in rainfall13 or an increase in extreme weather events 
such as drought and flooding.14 To fully understand the global impacts 
of changes in the Arctic sea ice cover, long- term and accurate observa-
tions of the entire ice pack are required. It is now possible to measure 
the thickness and volume of sea ice across the Arctic by using satellite 
radar altimetry.
In 2010 the European Space Agency (ESA) launched the 
Cryo Sat- 2 satellite.15 CryoSat- 2 was, and still is, the only radar 
Fig. 4.1 Measuring sea ice thickness from the CryoSat- 2 satellite 
(Source: author).
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altimeter satellite to cover close to the entire northern hemisphere. It 
provides unparalleled coverage of the Arctic Ocean with an orbit that 
extends to 88°N. The resolution of the CryoSat- 2 radar allows it to 
measure the elevation of Arctic sea ice, and the elevation of the open 
water in the cracks between sea ice (Figure 4.1). The ice blocks are 
called f loes and the cracks are called leads. The difference in height 
between these two surfaces is known as the sea ice freeboard – the 
elevation of the sea ice above the ocean surface. A buoyancy calcula-
tion can then be applied to estimate the thickness of the ice below the 
waterline, which is called the sea ice draft. Combining the freeboard 
and draft gives the total ice thickness. Sea ice volume is simply the ice 
thickness multiplied by area.
Airborne radar
Compared to satellite radar observations, measurements of Arctic 
snow and ice conducted through airborne radar missions produce 
images at a much higher spatial resolution but at the cost of a smaller 
footprint.16 This can be beneficial in studies within single glacial 
catchments, for instance, to investigate local topography and how the 
shape of the terrain influences the flow and deformation of the ice 
above. This is a key parameter in models predicting loss of land ice 
and sea-level rise.
The majority of airborne radar is ‘side- looking’, whereby antennas 
are carried underneath the aircraft body or wings and are fixed to look 
at right angles to the aircraft’s trajectory.17 Continuous scanning while 
the aircraft is moving produces images that overlap in space, which can 
then be stitched together to create a composite swathe of the study area 
in question.
Much side- looking radar takes advantage of the moving platform 
by using one antenna in time- multiplex, which creates a synthetic 
antenna aperture consisting of the same antenna receiving echoes in 
a lengthwise array. This technique allows Synthetic Aperture Radar 
(SAR) to produce images with extremely high (millimetre) resolu-
tion, which differentiates it from other traditional airborne radar.18 
Normally, the output image resolution is scaled with the size of the 
antenna aperture – this is analogous to using larger telescopes to 
explore regions of outer space. Therefore, SAR is a convenient way to 
obtain measurements with a spatial resolution at millimetre accuracy, 
which would otherwise require an impractically large (greater than 
10 m) antenna array.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ArC t ICness eMerG InG32
A noteworthy dataset obtained from airborne radar are the obser-
vations from NASA’s Operation IceBridge19 – an eight- year- long mission 
of the largest airborne survey of the Earth’s Polar Regions. The objective 
of the mission is to bridge the gap in polar observations between the 
unexpected degradation of ICESat’s Geoscience Laser Altimeter System 
(GLAS) in October 2009 and the planned launch of the replacement 
ICESat- 2 in late- 2018.20 IceBridge is a vital component that ensures a 
20- year continuous record with the advent of ICESat in 2003 and the 
estimated design life of ICESat- 2 ending in 2022.21 IceBridge operates 
using a number of research aircraft that are equipped with radars, laser 
altimeters, photographic mapping systems and tools to measure surface 
gravity and magnetic properties.
Ground- based radar
Radio echo sounding (RES), another form of radar, functions by trans-
mitting and receiving electromagnetic waves at specific frequencies or 
frequency bands in order to investigate the properties of ice.22 The prop-
agation of radio waves through ice is principally controlled by the per-
mittivity and conductivity of the ice material. The contrast between these 
properties and other materials, such as water and sediments, causes a 
proportion of the radio waves to be transmitted through the ice to reflect 
back to the radar receiver on the surface. This delay and a (multiple) 
reflection mechanism allow the ice base and layers within the ice mass 
to be observed non- invasively by appropriate processing of the received 
radar signal. In the late 1990s, interests in ground- based sounders, in par-
ticular phase- sensitive radars (also known as pRES), began to re- emerge 
at the British Antarctic Survey23 after their initial popularity in the 1960s 
(see earlier). Such systems have many advantages over mobile platforms. 
For instance, a stationary system can acquire many radar datasets that 
can be coherently averaged to improve the signal- to- noise ratio. This will 
then help to reveal the weak internal reflectors within the ice column. It 
also makes it possible to use a low transmit power, often three orders of 
magnitude lower than airborne systems. Another popular application of 
ground- based radar is to profile ice sheets along transects.24
Recent advances have been made in a new phase- sensitive radar 
based on frequency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) techniques 
for glaciological applications.25 A version of this radar has also been con-
figured with an array of antennas to form an experimental system that 
allows imaging through the ice.26 A block diagram of a typical ice moni-
toring radar system is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Scientific examples of Arctic ice observations
satellite observations of Arctic sea ice thickness
Satellite radar altimetry can be used to measure Arctic sea ice thick-
ness, as discussed in the previous section. When combined with esti-
mates of the sea ice edge from a satellite technique known as passive 
microwave,27 Arctic- wide maps of sea ice thickness can be produced 
(e.g. Figure  4.3). This has only been possible since the launch of the 
CryoSat- 2 radar altimeter satellite, which provides unparalleled cover-
age of the Polar Regions.
Airborne radar
Since its launch in 2010, Operation IceBridge has been valuable to the 
scientific community because it has secured long- term measurements 
of important study areas and has provided key data to serve research 
goals. By producing yearly measurements over land and sea ice, it has 
aided research in snow and firn studies,28 ice sheet topography,29 sea 
ice thickness,30 glaciology31 and more. The four Operation IceBridge 
(OIB) radars  – accumulation radar, Ku- band radar altimeter, radar 
depth sounder and snow radar – were developed by the Center for 
Remote Sensing of Ice Sheets (CReSIS) at the University of Kansas. The 
radar depth sounder, for example, has been used to produce the latest 
Fig. 4.2 Block diagram showing operation of a typical ice monitoring 
radar (Source: author).
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ice thickness maps for the ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica.32 
IceBridge data are publicly available through the National Snow and Ice 
Data Center (NSIDC): https:// nsidc.org/ data/ icebridge/ 
Ground- based radar at Store Glacier, West Greenland
The phase- sensitive FMCW radar was recently configured as an experi-
mental imaging system and deployed at Store Glacier in West Greenland 
as part of the SAFIRE project led by the Scott Polar Research Institute, 
University of Cambridge.33 A  photograph of the system deployed on 
the surface of the glacier is shown in Figure  4.4. The blue boxes con-
tain an array of 8 transmit and 8 receive antennas which are arranged 
orthogonally to form a square 64- element virtual array looking down 
into the ice as illustrated in Figure 4.5. To achieve this, the radar signal 
is sequentially switched between 64 different combinations of transmit 
and receive antenna pairs.
Instead of emitting a single pulse at one designated frequency, 
as is the fundamental principle in traditional radars, this FMCW radar 
works by transmitting a chirp signal whose frequency is linearly swept 
from 200 MHz to 400 MHz. A  wide signal bandwidth increases the 
vertical range resolution of the radar, in this case 42.5 cm with which 
 individual layers within the ice can be distinguished. Conventional 
radars use high transmitting power to overcome the attenuation of the 
radar  signal through the ice. Recent developments have allowed the 
peak  output transmitting power level of the phase- sensitive FMCW 
radar to be as low as 100 mW, while consuming only 6 W of battery 
power during  operation – less than a household light bulb.
Fig. 4.3 Arctic sea ice thickness measured from the CryoSat- 2  satellite, 
for spring (March/ April average) (a) 2011, (b) 2012, (c) 2013 and 
(d) 2014 (Source: author).
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Chirp signals are coupled into the ice using suitable antennas. 
Over the octave bandwidth of operation, certain types of antennas 
have proven to be useful and reliable. These include skeleton- slot 
panel  antennas34 and low- cost custom designed cavity- backed bowtie 
antennas35 for long- term unattended operation. The very low power 
Fig. 4.4 Photograph of the experimental imaging radar deployed on 
Store Glacier in 2014 (Photo: T. J. Young).
Fig. 4.5 Illustration of the experimental imaging radar operating on 
the ice sheet surface (Source: author).
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requirement of phase- sensitive FMCW radars provides a distinct advan-
tage from a user’s perspective. A static ground- based system that moves 
with the ice flow also enables many radar waveforms to be collected and 
coherently averaged to reduce the background noise level and therefore 
increase the detection capability of the radar. This advantage has been 
used to detect the base of grounded ice sheets over 3 km thick. 36
A cross- sectional image through the ice formed by post- processing37 
the radar dataset is shown in Figure 4.6. The colour scale represents the 
intensity of the reflected radar signal. The processed radar image is 
analogous to an ultrasound of the ice. Here, three distinct layers of ice 
can be observed: an initial layer from the surface to around 100 m, fol-
lowed by an ice layer 100– 500 m, and finally another ice layer 500– 600 
m to the bed at approximately 618 m depth. These layers compare well 
with seismic data gathered in the same area and highlight the transition 
of the ice layers. At this particular site, a column of strong radar reflec-
tion was also observed from the surface down to around 100 m depth. It 
is believed this could be a water- / air- filled crevasse feature.
One problem with this experimental imaging radar, however, 
is the apparent curvature of the ice layers particularly from the bed – 
which should be horizontal in practice. The curvature is believed to be 
Fig. 4.6 Cross- sectional image through the ice after radar signal 
 processing (Source: author).
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a processing artefact resulting from the strong reflections that come 
from directly below the centre of the radar array, which swamp the true 
(weaker) returns that arrive from the wide angles. Improved methods of 
radar signal processing will be required to minimise this problem and 
this is the subject of further research.
These preliminary results from one field site in Greenland serve to 
illustrate the capabilities of modern radar techniques that are now being 
investigated further to help understand the processes occurring within 
ice sheets. The very low power requirement of the system means that it 
can operate all year, at hourly intervals, with a single 100 Ah battery. It 
can be complemented with invasive techniques such as borehole drilling 
to deploy sensors in situ within the ice.
Arctic science communication and outreach
The examples given in this chapter illustrate how radar can play an 
important role in documenting and encapsulating present- day climate 
change. For this reason, it is crucial to accurately translate the results 
generated by radar into accessible and engaging information to facilitate 
effective knowledge transfer to other academics, journalists, politicians 
and the general public. While it may be assumed that climate change 
policy relies on the latest results generated by science, there is a general 
reluctance from scientists in other disciplines, driven by various coun-
tervailing forces, to engage in political and public dialogue.38 However, 
such a dialogue is a vital step towards efforts to understand and combat 
change in the Arctic. This section will address how to effectively com-
municate Arctic science to a non- scientific audience.
the ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ of science communication
Based on the experience of communicating our work to the public, press 
and politicians, we have compiled a list of the key ‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’ when 
answering questions or preparing a press release relating to scientific 
research.
Dos:
• Do communicate the scientific facts, but without any ‘spin’. People 
tend to react negatively if it seems that you are telling them how 
they should feel about a certain result.
• Do speak or write in concise sentences that can be used as ‘sound 
bites’ for radio, or quotes in print.
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• Do remember that context is key. For example, a statement such 
as ‘CryoSat- 2 measurements showed that the volume of summer-
time Arctic sea ice increased by 40% in 2013’ relating to a paper39 
is highly ambiguous. Without any timeframe, it is not clear if 
this increase is relative to the last few months, years, decades 
or perhaps even longer. A much better way to communicate the 
same result would be to say ‘CryoSat- 2 measurements showed 
that in summer 2013, the volume of Arctic sea ice increased by 
40% compared to the previous year’. This statement is far more 
difficult to misinterpret, and shows that although the increase in 
volume was large, it did not offset the loss observed over the past 
few decades.
Don’ts:
• Don’t use any ‘jargon’. Although everyone is an expert in what they 
choose to do, we are not all experts in the same thing. For exam-
ple, at a conference one might say ‘I use a 13.5 GHz satellite radar 
altimeter to measure the freeboard of Arctic sea ice’ while for a 
non- expert audience this could be changed to ‘I use a satellite to 
measure the difference in height between the Arctic sea ice surface 
and the water in the cracks’.
• Don’t try and answer a question if you’re not sure of the answer to 
it. It is acceptable to admit that you don’t know, or that someone 
else may be better placed to answer.
• Don’t be afraid of silence. Take time to consider the best way to 
frame your answer.
outreach
The UK Polar Network regularly advertises opportunities for Polar 
Researchers to present their work and share their experiences with 
local school children.40 Another common practice nowadays is to use 
social media to publicise one’s research. The latest scientific results are 
often announced on Twitter within hours or days after a publication is 
released into the public domain. At universities, seminars and lecture 
series are another popular way for work to be disseminated publicly. An 
excellent example of this method was delivered by the late Dr Katharine 
Giles in 2012. It can be viewed on the YouTube archive41 and contrasted 
with her original scientific publication. 42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
r ADAr observAt Ions of ArC t IC  I Ce 39
Conclusions and outlook
Radar technology has already allowed us to investigate vast areas that 
would otherwise be unreachable for humans, whether it be within an 
ice sheet or on the most remote Arctic ice floe. The amount of informa-
tion that can be extracted from radar data is still in a nascent stage, and 
further advances in radar signal processing and data interpretation will 
help to unlock more insights from within and beneath the ice.
The different radar observation methods described in this chap-
ter complement one another, as well as other geophysical measurement 
techniques described in the literature. Data storage and processing 
requirements will undoubtedly increase, along with improvements in 
computational power. It is now common practice for large volumes of 
raw datasets to be curated in digital format for independent validation 
and future (open) access. There is significant potential for improvement 
in battery and fuel technologies, in terms of their efficiency and weight, 
and future radar instruments can stand to benefit from advances in 
these areas.
As scientists who hail from outside of the Arctic, it is the remote-
ness of the regions studied and the nature with which they form, 
change and adapt under a changing climate that embodies scientific 
‘Arcticness’. But emotionally the Arctic is so much more – and is not 
necessarily remote. The beauty of the Arctic cannot and should not be 
described by science alone. And so the mystery of its scientifically unex-
plored and most remote regions continues to entice scientists, not just 
to study it from a distance, but also to visit the Arctic and to dispel all 
logic to embrace its magic and its peoples.
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Arcticness: In the making 
of the beholder
Patrizia Isabelle Duda
Over the past 20 years, the Arctic has re- emerged as a space that is of geo-
political interest to regional and global actors alike. This development is 
particularly attributed to the Arctic being at the forefront of environ-
mental concerns and therefore featuring prominently in international 
scientific, political and popular discourse. But the iconised melting of 
the Arctic is also portrayed in the light of alleged new opportunities. 
Extractive industries look to the potential profits to be realised by tap-
ping into Arctic mineral resources; shorter Arctic shipping routes, which 
promise to cut time and costs, are tempting international shipping con-
glomerates; and the tourist industry promotes the Arctic as Earth’s last 
frontier, making it accessible to ‘ordinary adventure’ travellers, who 
wish to experience it ‘before it’s too late’.
Alongside these developments, a vague notion of ‘Arcticness’ is 
appearing throughout academic and political discourse. While Arctic 
national strategies make direct or indirect references to their (sense 
of) Arcticness, others wonder whether Arctic nations and states have 
 successfully shown their Arcticness.1 Yet not only Arctic, but also 
some  near- , sub- , and non- Arctic countries position their interests in 
the region by arguing for their Arcticness on the basis of geographi-
cal proximity or security and economic interests2 while asserting their 
‘perceptions and strategies of Arcticness’.3 These perceptions and strat-
egies then suggest the complexities of the term Arcticness: namely, its 
contextual meaning and usage in accordance with the different percep-
tions and strategies of a range of societal, political, economic, environ-
mental and scientific actors.
Perhaps a good place to start in order to shed some initial light on 
this notion is by looking at the most obvious:  the popular perceptions 
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and fantasies of ‘outsiders’; that is, populations living outside of the 
Arctic. Of course, this in itself constitutes a problem of definition. When 
is somebody considered to be living ‘outside of the Arctic’? Does that 
refer to any point below the Arctic Circle, or are people in close sub- 
Arctic regions with similar conditions still ‘too Arctic’ to be considered 
non- Arctic? Furthermore, are southerners’ perceptions of so- called 
Arctic nations different based on an assumed, more intimate under-
standing of their countries’ northern dimensions?
Here, a simplistic yet pragmatic line is drawn by referring to ‘out-
side perspectives’ as being those of people who do not belong to Arctic 
countries defined geographically. While it may seem trivial to explore 
these outside perspectives in this context, they are far from irrelevant as 
they have the potential to influence Arctic politics and, hence, ‘insider’ 
narratives of Arcticness. One glance at current environmental debates 
suffices to reveal the power of outsiders’ perceptions and attention. 
Hence, exploring these outsiders’ perspectives is well worth the effort.
It appears that even among societal elites and non- elites who have 
perhaps never experienced the Arctic first- hand, there seems to be an 
almost intuitive feeling of what Arcticness might be. The examination 
of popular culture, literature and visual arts (see for instance, Corey 
Arnold’s Arctic photography: http:// coreyfishes.com) shows that partic-
ular Arctic attributes dominate the popular imagination:4 snow, ice and 
cold weather; untouched, pristine and desert- like landscapes; long, dark 
periods versus long periods of eternal sun; indigenous communities; 
fishermen (this gendered term is used here intentionally) and masculin-
ity; the intimate relationship between people and their environment, as 
well as an abundance of natural resources – or in other cases, the scar-
city of resources.5 In sum, the Arctic, the north, and the apparent Arctic- 
north construct in the outsider’s collective image resemble a near- binary 
dichotomy of simplistic generalisations and stereotypes of nature and 
culture(s).
While popular media on climate change concerns may contradict 
notions of the Arctic as a pristine region,6 the efforts to raise aware-
ness of its global relevance beyond Arctic latitudinal borders7 rarely 
go beyond reminding viewers of the fragility of this space through the 
threat of near apocalyptic determinism. As such, they reinforce some 
of the listed fantasies about the Arctic and the perception of a global 
imperative to protect it. That is, Arcticness emerges as a collection of the 
same aforementioned environmental and physical attributes that are 
now simply of a more global concern, driving outsiders’ calls to keep the 
Arctic as the untouched, pristine place they perceive it to be.
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Seen this way, Arcticness represents the character of the Arctic 
as featured in outsiders’ collective constructs – a more or less coherent 
space disrupted by climate change and made up of the aforementioned 
elements or a perceived absence thereof, rather than a more realistic, 
‘dynamic, transnational, connected and contested region where natures, 
identities, histories and politics all intersect’.8 In fact, the distance 
between outsiders’ perceptions and ‘northern peoples’ perceptions of 
themselves and their homeland is as vast as the Arctic landscape’.9 The 
analysis of such ‘at best simple and incomplete and at worst incorrect 
and prejudiced perceptions’,10 have led some scholars11 to draw connec-
tions to Said’s ‘Orientalism’.12
The resulting references to ‘Eskimo Orientalism’13 or ‘Arctic 
Orientalism’14 are not without merit as collective images of the Arctic 
have been fundamentally driven by either past or modern scientific 
imagery.15 More so, these served as a mirror of one’s (western/ south-
ern) self, ‘a strategy of imagining the self as an explorer- hero, a scien-
tific worker, or a white, imperial male’16  – ultimately emphasising the 
(political) power to objectify the ‘other’ versus the civilised ‘self’. Thus, 
it is perhaps unsurprising that colonially charged male Arctic explora-
tion and scientific inquiry, and the resulting descriptions/ travelogues, 
have contributed to gendered portrayals of Arctic nature and indig-
enous communities and cultures and, thus, perceptions of Arcticness. 
This gendered image is further perpetuated through influential popular 
magazines such as National Geographic,17 high literature and visual arts, 
taking inspiration from such ‘scientific’ imagery. Arctic nature is then 
‘romanticised through literary stereotypes based on masculinist val-
ues’.18 Consequently, manhood- related themes such as wilderness and 
breaking away from home, courage and heroism, domination over infer-
tile land, of man over nature, and with it the conquest over ‘uncivilised’ 
communities and exotic indigenous females became defining features of 
outsiders’ perceptions of the Arctic.19 Remarkably, until today, ‘alterna-
tive ways of perceiving northernness are extremely rare’.20
Yet, while our collective Arctic image may have remained con-
stant, others argue that it has slowly begun to change since the mid- 
2000s as a result of embracing new, often climate change- related 
concepts that generated more nuanced perceptions.21 Of course, ‘new’ 
does not necessarily mean more gender- neutral. The obvious por-
trayal of heroic masculinity alluded to here seems less salient and less 
socially appropriate today, but our political and to an extent, scientific 
institutions still have concrete foundations based on such images of 
masculinity. They may dictate the type of personnel expected to reach 
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and thrive inside the Arctic Circle as well as their likely behaviour. 
We can refer to the better- studied topic of military systems and quote 
Dixon: ‘The argument is simply that a proportion of those [individu-
als] who opt for a career in the armed services ... will be attracted to 
organisations which set them upon the seal of masculinity ... being 
admitted to a society of men bent upon the most primitive manifesta-
tions of maleness’.22 Can we then expect that Arcticness is still affected 
by the potential of an assumed male prevalence in these realms?
Interestingly, some Arctic players are further reinforcing these 
outsiders’ images in the effort to capitalise on increased global inter-
est in the Arctic  – for instance, through national branding initiatives. 
Iceland serves as a prominent example. Its tourist and state industries 
have successfully reproduced these images into a unique national brand 
that fits the globalised neoliberal world’s commercialisation of distinct 
cultures, ethnicities, and exotic and isolated places.23 Thus, outside 
notions of Arcticness are reinforced by advertisements of the Arctic 
region as, for example, a moon- like, empty last frontier, by the selling 
of €9 boxes of ‘fresh Icelandic Mountain Air’ in Icelandic tourist shops, 
Rovanemi’s (Finland) branding as the official home town of Santa Claus, 
and by cruise brochures’ shiny images promising vast landscapes of 
ice, polar bears and the aurora while recalling the authenticity of past 
explorers’ experiences. And what historically was often seen as a prob-
lematic, ‘uncivilised’ hinterland is now embraced by all sides – after all, 
indigenous people performing ‘unusual’ rituals and traditions are well- 
suited to staging the sought- after authenticity.24
Consequently, perceived Arcticness is also manifested through 
the branding of the Arctic as a pristine, exotic, gendered, wild and unci-
vilised place25 to attract adventurous, ‘independent’ tourists, enthusias-
tic to explore the allegedly ‘undiscovered’ and rough character of the 
Arctic, turning ‘their holiday tours into a mode of exploration and their 
narrative personas from tourists to adventurers’.26 But, as Loftsdóttir’s 
analysis of Icelandic national branding efforts demonstrates, to succeed, 
such campaigns require ‘already existing stereotypes and conceptions’,27 
filtered through the colonial past ‘into the present, shaping contempo-
rary global imaginings of difference’28 that ‘emphasise the association 
with the exotic, from which Icelanders had tried for so long to distance 
themselves’.29 Hence, perceived Arcticness serves as a branded commod-
ity in a global marketplace. Arcticness represents, among other aspects, 
characteristics considered lost by so- called ‘advanced’ regions30 which 
are valued particularly by younger generations who are influenced by 
neoliberal ideals.31
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However, it is not merely ‘economic actors’ who are ‘selling out’ 
by defining and using what might be considered ‘ignorant’ outsider 
notions of Arcticness in order to make economic gains. Similar ‘market-
ing’ processes take place in the political realm, although with different 
goals and purposes: those of international strategic positioning. While 
an ostensibly descriptive and overarching term such as Arcticness may 
indicate certain regional belonging based on a more or less uniform set 
of national characteristics, this is not the case.
In line with increased popular, economic and political interests 
in the region, all eight Arctic sovereign states have published com-
prehensive national Arctic strategies, manifesting their belonging, 
legitimacy and interests in the Arctic.32 Most ‘found their “Arcticness” 
only after the publication of the ACIA report in 2004’.33 Examining 
these strategies shows that all involved parties justify their Arcticness 
and, hence, their self- appointed legitimacy for tapping into the region 
based on partially differentiated sets of reasons that fall primarily into 
five categories: security, sovereignty, environmental protection, social 
and economic development as well as the governance and administra-
tion of the region. How these categories are then integrated into each 
nation’s Arctic strategy, and their claims of Arcticness, depends on 
their unique geographical, economical, technological and historical 
starting points.34
Consequently, with uncertainty still prevailing over the region’s 
tangled interests, institutions and future political constellations, care-
fully disguised power games may be the name of the game. That is, Arctic 
narratives emphasise Arctic international politics as essentially being 
characterised by peaceful cooperation among all the stakeholders.35 The 
motivation for this stance is to subtly establish de facto power in antici-
pation of future economic and (to follow the (neo)realist line of thought) 
territorial gains and any potential disputes over them. The Arctic can 
thus be portrayed as a set of actors, interacting in ways that demonstrate 
different, more integrated ways of undertaking international dialogue 
and politics.36 One illustration of integration is the establishing of (some 
‘unlikely’) state partnerships and non- state actors being brought to the 
institutional ‘Arctic Council table’ as equals. The Arctic Council table is 
supposed to take a lead position in enabling its members to cooperate 
and shape policy- making.37 Does this point to Arcticness as a new, more 
cooperative, inclusive and peaceful approach to international politics, 
be it based on tactics or even on previous international political lessons?
To some degree, this seems to be the case, considering the ‘unpar-
alleled level of indigenous political engagement’ in high- level politics.38 
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Moreover, there are collective historical memories of a challenged and 
divided Arctic region,39 most recently by the Cold War – an issue which 
to some extent still exists due to ongoing NATO divisions. Such mem-
ories of division provide a powerful impetus for public narratives to 
emphasise the necessity of peaceful cooperation for the secure gover-
nance of this environmentally harsh region. This is especially true when 
much international relations history and literature point to the region’s 
potential for conflict.40 However, this narration of space, be it by outsid-
ers, economic actors or states, may have exerted significant influence on 
states’ foreign policies as a visibly more cooperative approach has been 
developed since the 1990s aided by the institutionalisation of coopera-
tion on non- military matters through the creation of the Arctic Council 
in 1996.41
While Arctic states portray peaceful cooperation as part of their 
Arcticness, the atmosphere seems to change when non- regional Asian 
and European middle powers, China, or the European Union (EU) as a 
soft or smart power, express a wish to join the Arctic club.42 Ironically, 
these non- regional nations construct and ‘sell’ their own Arcticness and, 
thus, their legitimacy to the ‘Arctic pie’ as a global common.43 Those who 
have successfully wooed the Arctic Council are now acting as observ-
ers in cross- cutting middle power diplomacy. They are ‘bridging pub-
lic diplomacy’ and creating niche alliances on many specific subjects, 
environmental issues and so- called ‘green growth’. But they are also 
entering some traditional domains of big power politics in order to exert 
their influence on Arctic agenda setting.44 A focus is thereby put on soft 
areas of technical win– win situations (i.e. ship- building technologies, 
investments in Panamax ports, cooperation on expensive scientific proj-
ects and environmental technologies), demonstrating ‘southern solidar-
ity’, reiterating shared experiences45 or any issue which is regarded as 
essential to the Arctic. In this forum, the EU is something of a special 
player. Its desire to be involved is not only motivated by Brussels’ energy 
and environmental concerns but also by the geographical position of its 
northern member states within the Arctic.46
As alluded to above, these outsider efforts are often met by the 
Arctic club with some nervousness and the use of stalling tactics. This 
has been demonstrated most recently by the 2015 deferment of allow-
ing the EU observer status on the Arctic Council. The continued mis-
trust and reluctance of Arctic countries to fully include non- Arctic states 
points to some elemental characteristics of what Arcticness means to the 
Arctic nations. Namely, it is not just a static identity- politics but it also 
involves region- building47 via the social exercise of ‘zoning’ the Arctic 
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as a distinct space with respect to other states and regions.48 At the 
same time, the Arctic nations are asserting their own belonging to this 
socially constructed ‘imagined community’49 in relation to the exter-
nal ‘other’. The external other in this case can mean both positioning 
oneself ‘with the other’ as is currently the case vis- à- vis those nations’ 
Arctic ‘hinterland’ or other regional states, and positioning oneself ‘ver-
sus the other’ as is happening vis- à- vis non- Arctic players. Interestingly 
though, efforts among Arctic states to establish their Arcticness based 
on some common features of regional belonging are almost immediately 
followed by an emphasis on the differences between them. This lends a 
unique colour to their individual Arctic claims for legitimacy to be part 
of their own club.
Establishing one’s Arcticness, therefore, is built partially, but pow-
erfully, by utilising the notion of a margin as a tool or considering the 
dichotomy between centre and margin, with which to side or which to 
block to naturalise these social constructions until they become accepted 
as reality. Hence, Arcticness means an exclusive club of states decid-
ing who to include and cooperate with and who is not worthy or trust-
worthy enough to be granted this status. By the same logic, non- Arctic 
players construct an Arcticness in their national identity narratives that 
rationalises their envisioned involvement in the Arctic arena through 
non- traditional justifications that deviate from ethnic nationalism and 
traditional power politics. In short, sub- Arctic actors assert their status 
as ‘Arctic stakeholders with real rather than imagined stakes’.50
In conclusion, and at the risk of stating the obvious, Arcticness 
is not a static value but essentially the rich and dynamic processes of 
outward- and inward- looking imagination, identity- building and estab-
lishing belonging motivated by a plethora of reasons. In the narrower 
scope of states’ Arcticness, it is just as Rostoks51 writes (drawing on 
Wendt)52 ‘The Arctic is what States make of it’. So is Arcticness what 
states make of it: a social construction of identities, interests and power 
politics in an arguably anarchic system? With political debates once 
again turning to competing narratives of human nature as projections of 
the Arctic’s future fate – split between (neo)liberal assumptions of coop-
eration and (neo)realist warnings of looming conflict and hostile com-
petition – a more balanced view is sometimes lacking. Yet it takes only 
an innately ‘empty’ concept such as ‘Arcticness’ to demonstrate how a 
social construct and related discourse becomes an instrument of power 
politics in a state’s toolbox.53
In the wider context, it is the shared ideas and interactions of 
different actors that over time have given meaning to the notions of 
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Arcticness, in fact creating them to begin with. Arcticness then emerges 
from the perceptions and resulting collective images of outsiders, 
built upon backward- looking sets of historical legacies and forward- 
looking alleged threats and opportunities driven by economic, politi-
cal, technological and environmental factors. Environmental factors 
in particular have had an enormous effect on Arcticness being char-
acterised as an integrated, distinct region, seen as ‘either an ecologi-
cally protected space or as a space of natural resource exploitation’.54 
This puts the Arctic on the map again and contributes to northern 
countries’ empowerment due to their potential to be a local resource 
rather than just a global environmental problem. Finally, Arcticness 
is powerfully affected and effected by efforts to utilise or manipulate 
the common perception based on globalised (neo)liberal values and 
fantasies, especially among younger generations. Hence, Arcticness 
is becoming what states and actors make of it. At heart, it is an issue of 
identity, power and interest- formation.
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Arcticness insights
Anne Merrild Hansen
What is special about people living in the Arctic? Do we have more in 
common with other Northerners than we do with people living south 
of the Arctic Circle? What makes us what we are? These are the types 
of questions I  started wondering about when I  was confronted with 
the term ‘Arcticness’ in relation to the creation of this book. Being a 
Northerner myself, and based on my experiences as an Arctic researcher 
conducting fieldwork across the region, my view is that there is a special 
bond among Northerners and also particular values and interests that 
we commonly share.
I believe that the Arctic environments shape the lives of its peoples, 
the traditions, views and livelihoods. Dark winters and light summers, 
remote settlements and sparse resources are features that bring the 
communities together. But there are also great differences. While people 
in Barrow, Alaska, are living on the open frozen tundra, Greenlanders 
are living in coastal areas surrounded by mountains and Saami nomads 
are crossing large distances inland every year. Even though there are 
common challenges related to living in the Arctic, the environments in 
the different countries vary and influence peoples’ ways of living.
Other things besides the environment influence and frame the life 
of Northerners. Human decisions on local, national and international 
scales and actions throughout history influence the way we live and per-
ceive ourselves. The perception of what an Arctic identity is and entails 
is therefore as unique to communities as it is to individuals. In this chap-
ter, I focus not on the differences but rather on the common characteris-
tics of Arctic peoples, the Northerners.
Based on my biased expectation of an Arctic identity being a real-
ity and to reflect on the potential characteristics and to gather inspira-
tion for this chapter I reached out to my cross- Arctic network through 
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my personal profile on social media (LinkedIn and Facebook) and asked 
my connections what they find is special about being Northerners. I par-
ticularly encouraged my contacts from the Arctic region to finalise the 
sentence: ‘You know you are from the Arctic when …?’
More than forty responses were posted within a few days, from 
people living in Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland/ Denmark and 
Alaska. A few asked me to contact them privately and this led to interest-
ing and good conversations on the topic of Arcticness. As expected, most 
responses came from Greenland where my Arctic network is widest.
Not claiming the results from this small social media exercise to 
be representative in any manner for the opinions of Northerners in gen-
eral, I  still find that they point to general characteristics, which I will 
share here as they offer insights into how we as Northerners see our own 
reflections in other Northerners. The responses were, probably, partly 
due to the publicity on social media and partly due to the populist way 
I formulated the question, written with a focus on positive features and 
not on negative perspectives of living in the Arctic. There was a roman-
tic tone in many of the replies and not a single sarcastic reaction. These 
inputs from my Arctic connections supplemented and nuanced my own 
reflections. I  found them both funny and thoughtful and I  have to a 
large extent used them in the following. I do not claim to point at cul-
tural markers and I would never dare to try to define what identifies a 
Northerner.
The chapter is meant merely to present a snapshot in time of per-
sonal perceptions by fellow Northerners and myself on our common 
characteristics in 2016. The topics in the replies were inherently inter-
connected, but for the sake of simplicity I  have grouped them under 
three headings, which I present and elaborate on.
The sounds of quiet
The environment in the Arctic is often described in international litera-
ture as fragile, vulnerable and sensitive, but as a Northerner you tend, 
rather, to perceive the surrounding environment as great, strong and 
potentially dangerous, fostering respect and continuous adaptation. The 
weather conditions are extreme and harsh, but nature is also the pro-
vider of the resources needed to survive and the greatness and beauty 
of Arctic nature is stunning to its residents. I expect that this is a part of 
the explanation as to why we as Northerners feel need, love and fear of 
Arctic nature all at the same time.
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Emphasised by my Arctic contacts, in relation to Northerners’ 
connection with nature, is the love of the sounds of quiet. ‘We love the 
greatness of our nature, which allows the remote feeling that gives you 
room to breathe and space to unfold’ as one of my Greenlandic friends 
stated. The silence is particularly remarkable in the Arctic as it contrasts 
the noises whenever a storm or blizzard sets in and the moments of 
silence are the times where you stop and think, and make you present 
in the presence. One of the respondents noted ‘You know you are from 
the Arctic when you live in nature and the nature lives in you’. And this 
underlines the special bond Northerners feel to nature.
Related to the silence and the bond to nature, a particular Arctic 
phenomenon is the aurora borealis, also called the polar lights, but by 
Northerners mostly known as the northern lights. The magnificence 
of the bulging light waves across the skies at night is subject to various 
myths and legends across the Arctic region. As a child growing up in 
South Greenland, I was scared to whistle during northern lights, as it 
was said that the light was created when the dead played ball across the 
sky, and if you whistled, they would come and take your head to use it as 
a ball. In general, ghost stories and creepy myths are also something we 
share in the Arctic. I think the huge wilderness and uncontrolled nature, 
and the long dark winter nights, create an atmosphere that invites these 
stories to be told. Every place I have visited in the Arctic, people have 
their own stories and love to give each other the creeps. As noted by a 
woman from Alaska, you know you are from the Arctic ‘when you grew 
up with stories about the little men of the tundra and their poison tipped 
spears’.
In relation to the natural environment and climate in the Arctic, 
an inevitable part is the cold and the fresh air and low humidity. Related 
to the sound of silence and the cold and dry climate, therefore, is the 
sound of squeaking snow. Snow, when it is really cold and dry, makes a 
particular noise. Some years ago, I conducted an interview with a lady 
who was, at the time, the oldest woman in Qeqertarsuaq, Greenland. 
I  was asking her about issues related to climate change and when 
I asked if the weather in recent years was good or bad, she answered 
that she could not define on behalf of others what was good or bad. 
What may be good weather for fishers may be bad weather for hunters, 
but one thing that she could tell me was that she missed the sound of 
squeaking snow under her kamiks (seal skin boots) in the winter as the 
temperature rose and the winters became milder. The interview was 
one of those that left an impression, and I clearly remember her face 
and voice.
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Isolation and togetherness
Arctic communities in general are small in size and the number of inhab-
itants is low. The communities are typically geographically dispersed 
and remote. The infrastructure is sparse and travel happens by plane, 
boat, helicopter or snowmobile or even by sledge, on horseback or on ice 
roads in the winter. This means that many communities are as isolated 
as if they were each located on their own islands, creating a situation 
where social relations among residents within a community can be very 
strong and intimate.
Relations between different communities are also important. 
In Greenland, one of the first things you ask when you meet other 
Greenlanders is who they are related to. While I was conducting inter-
views in North Greenland in 2013, all the conversations I had were ini-
tiated by the interviewees asking about which town I  come from and 
about my background, parents and relatives. When they had an idea of 
where I belonged and common acquaintances were identified, the inter-
views could begin. Family bonds tie people together and a comfortable 
atmosphere can be reached when relations are shared, and they always 
are. We are so few, that family and friends are always to some degree 
shared within the same countries, even when we each live in our end of 
the country.
Another aspect related to living in the small communities in 
the Arctic is that we live close to each other. As one stated: ‘You know 
that you are from the Arctic when grocery shopping involves talking 
to friends, neighbours, and colleagues’. It is difficult to hide abuse, an 
affair or crime. And even though taboos exist here and there are things 
that are ‘not being talked about’, secrets are not easily kept. Issues con-
nected to the social relations and networks in the communities were 
highlighted by Northerners addressing the question of what being 
Arctic entails, with an emphasis on how we, to a large extent, accept 
peculiarities of other community members, not least in recognition of 
every person being a resource in a local community, and in recognition 
of most people or families having their own secrets to live with and for 
others to accept.
Social relations and togetherness are widely practised and 
Northerners are generally open and welcoming. Get- togethers involve 
a lot of eating, often including sweets and cakes along with local deli-
cacies such as fermented shark, sheep, raw whale skin or special cuts of 
moose or bear meat (Figure 6.1). Storytelling and sharing at gatherings 
contribute to upholding what we perceive as a good quality of life.
 
  
ArC t ICness Ins IGHts 55
Meat we eat
The selection of goods in Arctic communities is often limited. Natural 
fresh food resources such as muskox, caribou, seal, fish, berries, sea-
weed, sea birds, mussels, mushrooms, whale and moose are free and 
available, so subsistence hunting and fishing are activities of great 
Fig. 6.1 Mattak, panertuut, iginneq and other delicacies from 
Greenland (Source: author).
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importance to Northerners. As the vegetation is insignificant due to the 
cold, the storms, permafrost and rocky ground, greens are hard to grow. 
Meat is therefore an indispensable part of the Arctic diet.
Limited infrastructure and long transport distances mean that 
supplies are often expensive and sparse. Self- sufficiency is an import-
ant contribution to Arctic diets. Even in the larger Arctic towns where 
the stores can provide most goods, hunting, fishing and gathering are 
still considered essential for well- being and are practised both for recre-
ational purposes and to supply food.
As hunting and fishing are such an integrated part of living, access 
to relevant tools is essential. Several responses I received from my Arctic 
network about Arcticness were about how easy it is to access weapons 
and how common it is to carry and use a rifle. One emphasised that ‘You 
know you are in the Arctic when you can walk into a bank with a rifle on 
your shoulder and not be arrested’ and another said that you know you 
are from the Arctic ‘When you can walk into a store and buy a rifle on 
special offer; but milk won’t be in till at least Wednesday (true story)’.
People in the Arctic have a strong bond with nature and time is 
spent in the wild; hiking, skiing, climbing and sailing. And the cold does 
not bother Northerners. As one stated, ‘When the temperature at the lake 
rises to +5°C, children start to swim’. We also know how to dress in the 
cold. Clothing made of leather, fur and wool is commonly used and as 
one stated: ‘You know you are from the Arctic when your date wears long 
wool underwear even in the summer’. Dressing warmly is something we 
naturally prioritise, and we learn to dress in layers. During time spent on 
the land, meat is gathered, which is why you often see animals and fish 
being cut outdoors; chunks of meat hanging outside buildings to tende-
rise, or lying spread on rocks for drying, or hanging on racks. Skins are 
similarly being treated by hand and hung to dry. Butchering is a skill that 
is passed on to the younger generations and blood is an inherent part of 
this. Northerners therefore have a relaxed attitude to killing and butch-
ering and one of the responses underlined this with the statement: You 
know that you are from the Arctic ‘when you think people are strange 
who get sick by the sight or smell of blood’.
The interconnectedness of characteristics and  
perspectives on quality of life in the Arctic
As described in the previous sections, the Arcticness characteristics 
highlighted all relate to each other (Figure 6.2). The love of silence is 
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related to the love of the land that provides the meat we eat and the 
way we live in remote communities where there is room to be different 
and still be a part of the community. The Arctic environment offers the 
frames and the resources in which identities, traditions, norms and val-
ues of Northerners are developed; frames which are to some extent sim-
ilar and resources which are similarly rich in some ways and similarly 
sparse in others.
My personal experience is that the common frames and resources 
mean that it is easy to be in the company of other Northerners. We laugh 
and cry over the same things and share similar experiences and in this 
way recognise our own reflections in each other. That is why we feel 
comfortable and understood by our Arctic neighbours to a larger extent 
more than we do with others.
In everyday life, we seldom stop and consider what it is that makes 
our life what it is. We are not consciously reflecting characteristics or 
Fig. 6.2 Interconnected characteristics: Northerners according to 
Northerners (Source: author).
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values, but the values present in our life make sense and fill it with what 
for us is the prerequisite for quality of life. Returning to the question of 
what Arcticness entails, I think that the overall main characteristic of a 
Northerner is a person who loves and thrives in the Arctic. Northerners 
live in the Arctic not because they have to, but because they want to.
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Reindeer herding in a changing 
world – a comparative analysis
Marius Warg næss
Introduction
Imagine for a moment that you wake up one morning: Getting out of 
bed, you look out of your window and discover that a lot of snow has 
accrued during the night. You start to panic: how will your livestock 
do in this weather? The snow is too deep for them to dig through to 
find fodder and they are therefore at risk of starving to death. Luckily, 
you can move your herd to another pasture that you have saved just 
for such an emergency: To get there, you need to move through pas-
tures that have been used by your neighbours and collaborators for 
many years. On the way you discover a newly erected fence that stops 
you dead in your tracks. At the same time one of your former collabo-
rators, quite angry, tells you to turn around. He says that you cannot 
move on because this is now his ‘private’ pasture area not open for 
anyone else.
While a somewhat caricatured story, strangely enough it is a description 
that fits the situation currently facing herders on the Qinghai- Tibetan 
Plateau1 and might as well be the future for reindeer herders in the 
Arctic parts of Norway. On the Qinghai- Tibetan Plateau, re- allocation 
of grazing areas and fencing has been going on since the early 1980s2 
and has already resulted in war- like conditions. A  dispute relating to 
grazing rights resulted in the deaths of at least 29 Tibetans between 
1997 and 1999:  starting small, the dispute soon escalated into peri-
odic armed fighting, involving some 2,000 fighters using automatic and 
semi- automatic weapons.3 In the Arctic, the Norwegian government is 
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currently in the process of privatising previously semi- common winter 
pastures as this is assumed to be an important prerequisite for develop-
ing a sustainable reindeer husbandry.
As privatisation is currently happening in Norway, we do not really 
know how, if at all, it will affect reindeer herders. Nevertheless, a sub-
stantial amount of comparative evidence exists that can be used to crit-
ically investigate the current policy and its possible effect on reindeer 
herding, that is, developing scenarios for reindeer herding. Pertinently, 
the Qinghai- Tibetan Plateau has a cold climate and is covered by cold 
grasslands that are similar to the cold grasslands of dry- tundra regions 
of the Arctic,4 making it a useful comparison. Scenarios are a way to 
envision possible futures and while they are sometimes understood as 
being a prognosis for the future, here scenarios are better conceptual-
ised as storylines about how the future might unfold.5
Comparative aspects of land tenure privatisation
In general terms, nomadic pastoralists have traditionally owned animals 
privately: rangelands have been owned – or at least regulated – infor-
mally by groups of herders. The underlying rationale for the privati-
sation of pastures is usually twofold: on the one hand it is driven by a 
desire to develop pastoral societies. In this light privatisation makes per-
fect sense because it renders pastoralists less mobile and thus enhances 
governmental objectives of providing basic social services such as edu-
cation and health. Mobility has led governments to look at pastoralists 
as ‘backward’, lacking the technological level and skill to successfully 
exploit their existing adaptation. Thus, in many areas of the world large 
governmental sedentarisation programmes have been established to 
raise the technological level, and to enhance the profit of pastoral pro-
duction.6 But it also provides a form of governmental control lacking 
when pastoralists were constantly on the move – not only within sover-
eign national states, but also across state borders.
On the other hand, there has been an interconnected concern of 
sustainability: it is assumed that pastoralists are trapped in social dilem-
mas where individuals act independently and seek to maximise short- 
term gain to the detriment of collective benefits.7 Hardin  – with the 
introduction of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (ToC) – provided a frame-
work predicting that pastoralists would increase stocking rates to such 
a degree that overgrazing was inevitable; in other words pastoralists 
are ‘overstockers’.8 This implies that pastoralists are unable to establish 
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rules and norms that minimise, for example, overgrazing:9 it is a widely 
held belief that common ownership of land coupled with private own-
ership of livestock and the lack of a strong state provides incentives to 
degrade the environment.10 Consequently, nomadic pastoralists have 
been viewed as non- rational, and professionals and governments have 
seen problems, such as pasture degradation, as inherent in the nomadic 
pastoral adaptation.11
Privatisation is thus occurring within an official debate pertaining 
to overgrazing and rangeland degradation. The debate in China is illu-
minating. There it is argued that increasing land degradation is caused 
by (1)  increased livestock numbers (from approximately 29 million in 
1949 to 90 million in the early 1990s) and (2) a decline in the area of 
available rangeland (around 6.5 million hectares were lost from 1949 
to 199212). Notwithstanding an apparent increase in livestock num-
bers, the evidence for degradation is somewhat tenuous:  according to 
Harris,13 in 1999 the State Environmental Protection Agency estimated 
that one- third of China’s grasslands were degraded, but in a very short 
time the figure that is often cited increased to 90 per cent without any 
obvious scientific reason (generally, estimates of degradation in China 
have been based on varying subjective measures and have been poorly 
documented  – no systematic investigation has been undertaken14). 
Similarly, in Norway the official policy is based on the assumption that 
fixed grazing boundaries are a prerequisite for establishing an ecologi-
cally sustainable upper limit on the number of reindeer and will serve 
as a facilitator for rational resource use.15 In short, despite apparent 
 differences in overall political systems, the decision to privatise pastures 
seems to be driven by a common ideology presupposing a ToC and over-
stocking in both Norway and China.
Land tenure
Land tenure can be defined as the relationship between people and the 
land, and the rules that regulate how the land can be used, possessed 
and redistributed;16 or as the mode by which land is held or owned; or by 
the set of relationships among people concerning use of the land and its 
product. Land tenure refers to the societal institutions (organisations, 
rules, rights and restrictions) that control the allocation and use of land 
and its associated resources.17 Generally, land tenure is often concep-
tualised as: (1) commons (common property) – land is treated as com-
mons with no enforceable control over access to resources; (2) reciprocal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ArC t ICness L Iv InG62
access (communal property) – there is reciprocal access between mem-
bers of land owning groups; transfer of group membership (the founda-
tion of property right) is easily negotiated; (3) territoriality (local group 
ownership) – strong control on local group membership and a reduction 
in reciprocal access; and (4) private ownership – ownership devolved to 
well- defined subsets of local groups (e.g. kin groups or individuals).18
A chronology of land tenure changes 
in Tibet and Norway
For both Tibetan herders in China (drokba) and Saami reindeer herd-
ers in Norway, the basic unit of social organisation is the household, 
a nucleus or stem family. Traditionally, households often combined 
together and formed small cooperative groups that shared nearby pas-
tures, called ru skor in Tibet19 and siida in Norway.20 In some parts of 
Tibet, ru skors were aggregated into higher order groups called tsowa.21 
The tsowa has been predominantly described for the east and was 
organised around a lineage of a particular founding patrilineal clan that 
controlled bounded tracts of land.22 While the land rights of tsowa were 
fixed – unless and until other tribes took them by force – the rights of 
individual ru skor were fluid.23
In contrast, nomads in the central and western parts were all under 
direct state control.24 In principle, all of the land in Tibet was owned by 
the central government in Lhasa, which distributed the land among the 
aristocratic families, great incarnate lamas and monasteries for their 
upkeep and support. The nomads had to pay taxes and provide labour 
services to the institutions; in return the lord had to maintain law and 
order.25 Pastures were re- allocated at three- year intervals based on the 
herd size of individual households. Additional pastures were allocated 
to households whose herds had increased, and pastures were taken 
away from those whose herds had decreased.26
In Norway, the siida seems to have been the highest social aggre-
gate, but following the Reindeer Law for Finnmark, from 1854 reindeer 
herding was formally (and physically) separated into different summer 
districts.27 Winter pastures on the interior constituted an overlapping 
quilt due to an absence of physical obstacles and because they were less 
formally governed.28 While pastures were technically Crown land, the 
siida formed the basis for user rights both within districts during the 
summer and on the winter pastures. In other words, the customary ten-
ure system was based on siida user rights (albeit informal). While winter 
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pastures were informally regulated according to siida membership – that 
is, Saami reindeer herders had a clear understanding of the fact that dif-
ferent winter pasture areas belonged to different siidas – when in need 
everybody had a right to access alternative pastures.29
In Tibet, the traditional system was effectively dismantled during 
a period of collectivisation. The Cultural Revolution  – a campaign to 
destroy the ‘four olds’, that is, the old ideas, old culture, old customs 
and old habits – arrived in Tibet in the 1970s and almost destroyed the 
nomads’ way of life.30 While the pastoral technology stayed the same, 
ownership of livestock and decisions regarding production were trans-
ferred from the household to communes, the collective production 
units.31 Under the traditional system, only the distribution of pastures 
was controlled by the state; after the Cultural Revolution all aspects of 
economic and social life were fixed by state policies. Pastoralists were 
the subjects of commune leaders, and received work points, or ‘stars’, for 
their labour. The work points became the basis on which they got food, 
goods and cash.32
The Saami herders in Norway never experienced anything as dis-
ruptive as the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, while both the siida and 
household retained their positions (the household in some sense became 
strengthened at the expense of the siida33), the traditional tenure system 
was dismantled with the 1978 Act. This Act introduced a system whereby 
the Saami own their herds while the rangelands – owned by the Crown – 
are administered by the Ministry of Agriculture through the Reindeer 
Herding Administration which plans and regulates the distribution of 
herds and the grazing time schedule.34 The most disruptive aspect of the 
Act redesignated the autumn/ spring and winter pastures as ‘commons’. 
It has been argued that as the 1978 Act did not incorporate any system for 
managing the pastures, it effectively ‘led to the exclusion of the custom-
ary tenure system and, in the absence of a functional alternative regime, 
created de facto a situation of open access to resources’ (p. 215).35
In the 1980s the communes were dissolved in China and the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) was introduced.36 In short, the 
HRS re- established the household as the basic unit of production and 
management decisions were largely devolved to households. For pasto-
ralists, the HRS was implemented in two stages: first the privatisation of 
livestock and second the privatisation of rangelands.37 Since the dissolu-
tion of the commune system, Chinese government policies have empha-
sised that individual household tenure is a necessary condition for 
sustainable rangeland management38 as well as increased production.39 
By the end of 2003 around 70 per cent of China’s usable rangeland was 
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leased through long- term contracts, where 68 per cent was contracted 
to individual households and the rest to groups of households or to vil-
lages,40 although estimates vary.41 Consequently, the ru skor seems to 
have been destroyed in the east,42 while cooperative herding still occurs 
and provides a necessary component of effective livestock management 
in the west.43
In contrast, in Norway the traditional cooperative siida system 
is being formalised and used as a basis for re- distributing winter pas-
tures. Reindeer herding is usually organised into summer and winter 
siidas. The summer siida was formally recognised by the Reindeer 
Management Act from 200744 and is a more formal institution than the 
winter siida; the summer siida is required to have a board that facilitates 
the practical implementation of collaborative activities. Currently, there 
are plans to formalise the winter siida, primarily through establishing 
fixed siida grazing boundaries and user rules.45 The redistribution can 
thus be viewed as a step towards increased co- management, as well as 
an attempt to reinstate power to the traditional siida system by giving 
siidas exclusive user rights to geographically delineated winter areas.46 
The legal consolidation of siida user rights, however, can be seen as a 
step towards the privatisation of grazing areas.
In summary, while in China the overall aim seems to be to  re- 
distribute pastures to individual households (although both group 
tenure and individual tenure seem to coexist), in Norway there is a 
collective re- distribution of previously common/ semi- common winter 
pastures.
Fragmentation, privatisation and density dependence
Privatisation as a source of fragmentation
Four global trends in rangeland land tenure change have been 
described:  (1)  the maintenance or expansion of state ownership and 
pastoralist use of rangeland; (2)  the quasi- privatisation of state land 
or devolution to local control; (3)  the privatisation of commonly used 
(often state- owned) land; and (4) the maintenance of private ownership 
and use with some consolidation or collaborative management of pri-
vate lands.47 As described in the previous section, rangelands in both 
China and Norway were owned by the state (or the lineage or clan in 
eastern parts of Tibet) but where groups/ individuals had some form 
of user rights to designated tracts of land (albeit informal) and where 
reciprocal access was prevalent, pasture use was flexible. In contrast, 
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the rangelands in both countries are now being quasi- privatised so that 
individual households or groups have exclusive user rights, thereby lim-
iting flexible pasture use.
Changing land tenure from commons to private can be viewed as 
beneficial: it might provide nomadic pastoralists with more control over 
their own lives as well as provide them with a legal basis for claiming 
and enforcing rights vis- à- vis competing interests.48 Privatisation, how-
ever, is often followed by fragmentation:  the dissection of landscapes 
into spatially isolated parts,49 often through fencing.
To understand the effect of fragmentation we have to consider 
how resources are distributed in time and space. In general, fragmenta-
tion is only a problem if key resources are distributed unevenly in space 
(or time). If not, all important resources are present in the fragmented 
patches (Figure 7.1A).
In contrast, if key resources are distributed unevenly – for exam-
ple some areas have better quality grass than others, water holes utilised 
by livestock are only present at some places as in Africa, winter pastures 
differ from summer pastures as in Tibet and Norway  – fragmentation 
represents a problem because it might destroy the connectivity between 
important resources. Fencing has the potential to break the connectivity 
between differentially distributed pasture areas. Due to the high altitude 
on the Tibetan Plateau, the growing season is short. It starts in late April 
or early May, and ends in mid- September. The winter pastures are thus 
especially sensitive: the amount of vegetation left by the end of summer 
must sustain the livestock until next year’s growth begins. This results in 
a pattern where winter areas are ‘saved’ for grazing during seasons with 
no vegetation growth.50 Fencing is a viable option for protecting these 
important grazing areas – and has in fact been supported by the Chinese 
Government through subsidies for the costs of buying and erecting 
them.51 The problems arise when everyone fences their ‘private’ summer 
and winter pastures:  since they are located in different areas, moving 
between them becomes difficult (Figures 7.1B and 7.1C).
The fact that pastoralists have traditionally been mobile seems to 
indicate that resources are, in general, distributed unevenly in both time 
and space.52 It appears that this simple fact has not been considered in 
any process of privatising rangelands. Instead, the number of livestock 
per household has provided a guideline for calculating how much area 
that household would need as its own private grazing area. In other 
words, there has been no consideration of the quality or quantity of the 
different grazing land – and when it has, it has favoured the powerful 
herders, where they have secured access to the best and largest grazing 
areas through political influence, as seen in Inner Mongolia.53
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Fig. 7.1 (A) Even distribution of grazing resources – fragmentation  
by fencing would not be a severe problem as long as the quantity within 
each patch is sufficient (right panel). (B) Uneven distribution of  grazing 
resources where darker patches represent poor grazing resources. 
Fragmentation by fencing would  represent a problem depending on 
which patch you occupy (right panel). (C) Uneven distribution of grazing 
resources and water points (triangles) in time and space. Left  corner with 
darker colour represents summer grazing while right corner with lighter 
colour represents winter. Fragmentation by fencing would  represent a 
severe problem as herders would have to cross neighbouring patches – 
owned by other herders – to travel from winter to summer pastures as 
well as when accessing water points (right panel) (Source: author).
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Density  dependence and density  independence
From an ecological point of view, it is often argued that populations are 
regulated by density- dependent factors (competition, predators, stress, 
parasites, etc.) and limited by density- independent factors (climate, 
temperature, light, latitude, etc.). The overstocking paradigm takes as 
its starting point the primacy of density dependence: livestock and pas-
tures are regulated by grazing pressure alone. In contrast, in the early 
1990s range ecologists and anthropologists started to argue that live-
stock and pastures are limited by external factors such as climate (den-
sity independency), especially in arid and semi- arid areas.54
In systems characterised by density dependence, sustainable 
levels of grazing are relatively easy to calculate: it can be defined as a 
relationship between vegetation and livestock. Negative livestock or 
vegetation growth is seen as a symptom of overgrazing. This is usually 
conceptualised as carrying capacity:  the basic idea being that as live-
stock numbers increase, available food decreases, which over time neg-
atively affects livestock numbers. The trick is to keep livestock numbers 
at a stable level – through harvest – creating a balance between numbers 
and available food.
The problem, however, is that no system is as simple as this: cli-
matic factors like snow or drought negatively affect vegetation irre-
spective of livestock numbers. In other words, carrying capacity might 
vary depending on climate. Pertinently, there are also indications that 
density-dependent and independent effects interact negatively:  it has 
been shown that population growth rates or survival vary more at high 
density, for example density- independent effects can be stronger at high 
densities.55
The form of density dependence of interest here relates to food 
availability: as the number of animals increases, competition for food 
also increases. In general, with more animals, less food is available per 
individual animal. With less food available, body mass decreases; this 
is important because there is a positive association between body mass, 
survival and reproduction.56 Livestock with poor nutritional status are 
also more susceptible to disease.57 Livestock usually gain body mass 
during the good season (e.g. summer) in order to survive the lean season 
(e.g. winter): in reindeer husbandry in Finnmark, Norway, for example, 
there has been a decreasing trend in reindeer body mass58 and, in 2010, 
there was a news report that reindeer were starving to death on their 
way to winter pastures.59 According to the report, large herds of reindeer 
moving to winter pastures trampled the vegetation, leaving little food 
available to subsequent migrating herds.60 The obvious paradox is that 
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at this time the reindeer should be in good condition having gained body 
mass during summer. Previously, starvation was mainly seen during a 
harsh spring or early summer61 when the reindeer were in poor condi-
tion having lost body mass during the winter season.
This form of density  dependence does not necessarily indicate 
increasing numbers of animals – it might also be caused by animals stay-
ing too long in a given grazing area, as this does not allow the pastures 
time to recuperate. Traditionally, both forms of ‘overuse’ have been off-
set by moving and changing grazing areas at regular intervals.
Discussion
Land privatisation creates a paradox for pastoralists:  They need 
both flexible and secure access to land to ensure future grazing, 
but if they settle on that land to secure it, their lack of movement 
means poorer livestock production. Often settlement by one fam-
ily denies other community members access to common resources 
and interferes with traditionally coordinated grazing systems, 
especially in times of scarcity (p. 226).62
reduced mobility, intensification and degradation
Mobility has been described as a rational response to seasonal environ-
mental variation.63 This is fairly obvious when considering large- scale 
phenomena such as the location of grazing areas. Consider, for example, 
the migratory pattern of reindeer herders in Norway where some herds 
move up to ~170 km from winter pastures on the interior to summer 
pastures along the coast.
Mobility can be classified according to the spatial extent of move-
ment. The seasonal migratory patterns of reindeer and herders are influ-
enced by both climate and geography: for reindeer, the most important 
diet during the winter is ground lichens which are commonly distributed 
in relatively dry continental areas.64 Similarly, as indicated earlier in the 
chapter, Tibetan herders set aside grazing areas that are only utilised 
during winter. In other words, the migratory pattern between summer 
and winter pastures meets the different seasonal needs of livestock;65 a 
form of mobility often termed resource exploitation mobility.66
On a smaller scale, there is escape- or micro- mobility: movement 
in order to escape environmental hazards.67 Tibetan nomads move their 
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herds quite frequently within different seasonal grazing areas, and some-
times even cross into another seasonal grazing area if necessary. Heavy 
snow during the summer, for example, causes problems: since sheep and 
goats are poor diggers, the nomads have to wait to bring the sheep and 
goats out to graze until after the snow has melted. Nevertheless, since it 
can snow continuously for days on end, it may be impossible to take the 
animals to the summer pasture. As a consequence, nomads often have to 
utilise areas reserved for winter grazing during the summer. These win-
ter areas are further from the mountains and thus relatively free from 
snow during the summer. The ability to move is thus not only restricted 
to seasonal utilisation of different grazing areas, but also incorporates 
the ability to respond flexibly to day-to-day variation in climatic factors 
such as snow.68
Mobility in the face of environmental risks has been argued to 
undergird the survival of most nomadic pastoralists69 and for centuries 
pastoral mobility has provided herders with the flexibility needed to 
survive in patchy, unpredictable and low- productivity environments.70 
Little et  al.71 argue that mobility is the key pastoral risk management 
strategy; pastoralists who migrate with their herds have considerably 
fewer livestock losses during climatic disasters than their sedentary 
counterparts. More to the point, mobility allows pastoralists to take 
advantage of resources found in different habitat types and thus sup-
ports more animals than would be possible if they were stationary.72
Pastoral movement therefore seems to be a rational strategy aimed 
at dealing with the vagaries of the herding lifestyle. Nevertheless, the 
same strategy has been considered unsustainable and non- rational by 
national governments all over the world.73 In fact, privatisation has 
been implemented as a countermeasure to what has been considered an 
unsustainable resource use:  the assumption being that open access of 
privately owned livestock to common rangeland has led to severe range-
land degradation. In short, privatisation is assumed to be an efficient 
tool to combat rangeland degradation.
In contrast, it has been noted in Africa that areas with concentrated 
use are marked by severe and spreading degradation of vegetation and 
soils, leading to lower herd productivity and increased herd size require-
ments to meet household needs. In turn, this accelerates environmental 
degradation and the probability of poverty.74 Crucially, privatisation and 
fragmentation have resulted in an increased concentration of both peo-
ple and livestock in small areas leading to increased grazing intensifica-
tion and consequent rangeland degradation.75
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In Maqu County (eastern part of the Qinghai- Tibetan Plateau) two 
grassland management patterns currently exist: (1) a traditional multi- 
household system where grassland is jointly managed by two or more 
households with no fences between individual households and (2)  a 
single- household system where grassland is separately managed by one 
individual household and is fenced. A study comparing the respective 
benefits of the two management patterns found that multi- households 
were more mobile and that the single- household pattern was more likely 
to cause rangeland degradation.76 A study looking at rangeland condi-
tions over time found that while there was no significant difference 
in 2009, by 2011 multi- household grasslands had significantly higher 
biomass, vegetation cover and species richness than single- household 
grasslands.77
One study in Inner Mongolia – an area experiencing high level of 
degradation since the 1980s – reported that ‘it is reasonable to assume 
that the property rights regime change [i.e. privatisation] might be one 
of the reasons for grassland degradation’ (p. 465)78 and may in fact 
have accelerated degradation.79 The same has also been argued for 
Kyrgyzstan where the ‘[p] rivatisation of livestock and decreased mobil-
ity of herders has in turn led to increased use of pastures immediately 
around villages, resulting in extensive pasture damage, proliferation of 
unpalatable woody plant species and large slope failures in these areas’ 
(p. 193).80 A study comparing changes experienced by pastoral societies 
and their environments in Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Buryatia, 
Chita and Tuva, found that the highest levels of rangeland ‘degradation 
was reported in districts with the lowest livestock mobility; in general, 
mobility indices were a better guide to reported degradation levels than 
were densities of livestock’ (p. 1148).81 In short, due to fragmentation 
and subsequent reduced mobility, privatisation has been found to exac-
erbate the same effects it was introduced to counter; the underlying rea-
son being that fragmentation increases density dependence.
the erosion of cooperative networks
The siida and ru skor systems were small cooperative networks, based 
on kinship, that flexibly formed and reformed according to both external 
(e.g. pasture) and internal (e.g. population growth) factors.82 The siida 
and ru skor were cooperative groups based on close kinship ties allow-
ing members to: (1) maintain face to face communication; (2) monitor 
each other; and (3) punish individuals who broke the rules. These are 
all characteristics that to a large degree favour cooperation and deter 
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free riding tactics.83 The siida and ru skor were fluid and dynamic, their 
composition could change as a result of expulsion, or alternatively some 
households left the group and changed partners because of a transgres-
sion of rules connected to, for example, the sharing and exchange of 
labour.84 Moreover, they have been described as changing according to 
season: the siidas, for example, were smallest during spring calving and 
largest during the summer.85
The inherent seasonality of cooperative group formation was also 
present among Tibetan herders:  since environmental, demographic, 
political and social conditions vary during different seasons and at 
different locations, the ru skor also changed in size over the course of 
a year.86 The importance of cooperative production has been demon-
strated theoretically87 as well as empirically among reindeer herders 
in Norway, indicating that pastoralists with extensive cooperative net-
works do better than pastoralists with less extensive networks.88
Privatisation and fragmentation may not only break resource 
connectivity, but also social connectivity by dismantling the traditional 
cooperative networks. As indicated earlier, the ru skor seem to have been 
destroyed – or at least have diminished in importance – on the eastern 
parts of the Qinghai- Tibetan Plateau. In general it has been argued that 
privatisation may break up already existing group organisation and pre-
vent ‘effective cooperation in herd and rangeland management within 
and among pastoral communities’ (pp. 141–2).89
From a general point of view, mobility – specifically the move-
ment of people – has been found to be an important prerequisite for 
cooperation. The logic is as follows: imagine that you work together 
in a group with other herders. Suddenly you discover that some of 
your fellow herders never contribute to common tasks, for example 
they stay in the tent rather than helping with herding or during shear-
ing they gladly accept help with their own animals but never help 
out when other herders shear wool from their animals. Traditionally, 
you would have been able to change group – it is most likely that you 
would have had family in another group that you could move to. Not 
surprisingly, the ability to move or change groups is a deterrent for 
free- riders:  the ability to move away allows would- be cooperators 
to assort positively as well as limit the rate at which cooperators are 
exposed to defectors. Known as the ‘walk- away’ hypothesis,90 there 
are strong indications that simply providing the option to move allows 
cooperation to persist for a long period of time.91 It is difficult to see 
how such a flexible system of group formation can be upheld in a 
system with privatised and/ or fenced grazing areas that cut across 
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former cooperative groups. Similarly, if group membership becomes 
consolidated through the legal system  – as is the plan in Norway  – 
transferring to another siida might become difficult for individual 
herders. In short, positive assortment, facilitating cooperation, might 
be limited with land tenure privatisation.
In addition, it has been claimed that privatisation has resulted in 
increasing levels of conflict and created the potential for new disputes, 
because fuzzy boundaries are open for negotiation while fencing in 
rangelands precludes negotiation.92 Moreover, privatisation seems to 
have changed the nature of conflicts: previously conflicts occurred pri-
marily between groups, now conflicts occur between individual (former) 
group members93 and also between family members (usually brothers) 
and neighbouring households.94 In short, formerly cooperative rela-
tionships may have been transformed into competitive relationships.95 
Privatisation has also resulted in increasing differences between poor 
and rich herders:  For example, in Inner Mongolia in the 1980s those 
with the means to enclose land did so – effectively a first- use principle 
for those with most power. This intensified economic exploitation and 
encouraged more irregular grazing practices.96 Powerful and rich herd-
ers therefore enjoyed a tremendous advantage in the local competition 
for present and future grassland resources; some have enclosed far more 
than their allotted share.97
Concluding remarks and future prospects
While discussing the significance of place in the construction of anthro-
pological theory, Appadurai98 makes a number of observations relevant 
for this volume’s focus on Arcticness. Appadurai99 notes that there is a 
tendency for places to become showcases for specific issues over time 
and thus might restrict theoretical discussions locally as well as exclude 
other relevant issues. Appadurai cautions us to ask:
whether these gatekeeping concepts, these theoretical metonyms, 
really reflect something significant about the place in question, or 
whether they reveal a relatively arbitrary imposition of the whims 
of [anthropological] fashion on particular places (p. 358).100
Arcticness as a ‘quality of being Arctic’ – as Medby writes in the preface 
of this book – has the potential to become a theoretical construct linked 
to a specific place, that is, the Arctic, that excludes other lines of inquiry. 
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It also has an explicit ontological connotation: while anthropology has 
had a long tradition of documenting different ideas of what ‘is’ and how 
to ‘be’, it has always been firmly rooted in the idea of a common human-
ity shared by all people in all cultures.101 Currently, however, the onto-
logical turn posits a move from different worldviews to different worlds 
altogether; from reality to realities; from variations of how to be human 
to emphasising incommensurable differences.102
It is therefore important to critically investigate what exactly 
Arcticness denotes. Do we take it to mean ideas about being in the Arctic, 
for example Arctic worldviews? Or are we positing the Arctic as an onto-
logical distinct lifeworld where the quality of being Arctic unfolds? If 
the former, then Arcticness becomes an unnecessary theoretical con-
struct that we do not really need. If the latter, then we might reinstate 
the Arctic and the people who live there as the significant ‘Other’, fun-
damentally different. In other words, Arcticness might become a con-
cept of exotification where we reify what it means to live and be in the 
Arctic. Because by adding – ‘ness’ to the word Arctic, we seem to point 
to something qualitatively essential, immutable and unchanging with 
being (and living) in the Arctic, while in fact – as Medby points out in 
the preface – the Arctic is undergoing rapid changes on several fronts.
As shown here, a comparative approach is fruitful for understand-
ing challenges facing reindeer herders in the Arctic parts of Norway. It 
might not tell us much about the ‘quality of being Arctic’ (or, in fact, it 
might not tell us anything about ‘the quality of being a reindeer herder 
in the Arctic’, which to me makes more sense, since it does not have the 
connotation of ‘being a place’), but comparative evidence indicates that 
privatisation might result in a corollary of unintended consequences 
for reindeer herders: (1) reduced mobility and increased degradation; 
(2)  increased conflicts and/ or the development of social hierarchies; 
(3) a negative impact on efficient cooperation.
Concurrent with land tenure changes that reduce pastoralists’ 
ability to respond to environmental variability by moving away from 
affected areas, environmental variability has increased during the last 
few decades and is predicted to increase further in the future due to cli-
mate change.103 As for the Arctic and sub- Arctic, scenarios generated by 
most climate models predict that the climate is likely to become increas-
ingly unstable during the next half century with concomitant increases 
in the frequency of extreme weather conditions.104
A case has been made that pastoralists are in a unique position to 
tackle climate change due to extensive experience managing environ-
mental variability in marginal areas105 and it has been argued that the 
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ability to withstand environmental shocks is a defining feature of pas-
toralism.106 Nevertheless, a case can be made that traditional pastoral 
risk management may be insufficient for dealing with climate change.107
In theory  – depending on the spatial scale of extreme weather 
events – mobility has the potential to provide pastoralists with recourse 
from the most detrimental effects of climate change because they may 
be able to move away from the affected areas (and thus increase the 
herds’ recuperative potential). I have already discussed the relationship 
between survival and body mass: animals in good condition are better 
equipped to deal with harsh environmental conditions. They might sur-
vive for a longer period of time during a drought, for example, than those 
in poor conditions – basically they have a longer window of time to lose 
body mass before starving to death. In terms of climate change, where 
we expect – as well as have observed – that the frequency and duration 
of extreme events like drought, icing, snowstorms, etc., will increase, 
keeping animals in good condition seems to be an important strategy.
The apparent paradox is that privatisation and subsequent frag-
mentation has the exact opposite effect: it increases density- dependent 
food limitation for animals by either intensifying grazing in a limited 
area or circumscribing too many animals in a limited area, or both. With 
fencing restricting movement, pastoralists have inadequate opportunity 
to offset these effects: it is therefore expected that – on average – body 
mass and condition decrease, making livestock more susceptible to 
environmental hazards. It should come as no surprise, then, that it has 
been argued that it is not climate change by itself that is problematic for 
pastoralists but rather ‘the limitations imposed on pastoral coping and 
development strategies, especially their ability to move and to access 
critical resources in different territories’ (p. 3).108 Consequently, it may 
not be mobility per se that fails, but rather mobility in increasingly frag-
mented landscapes.
Another traditional and efficient strategy utilised by pastoral-
ists to buffer environmental variation is herd accumulation.109 Among 
Saami reindeer herders in Norway it has been shown that herders with 
large herds have comparably larger herds from one year to the next110 
as well as before and after crisis periods.111 While herd accumulation 
seems to be an efficient strategy, it is predicated on periods of recupera-
tion when herd growth is possible. In fact, a delay in recuperation after 
environmental- induced losses has been argued to be one of the main 
problems of pastoral production.112 Herd accumulation can thus be 
expected to work less efficiently, if at all, when the frequency of extreme 
events increases. Pertinently, cooperation is an integral part of pastoral 
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production and has been found to be prerequisite for efficiently accumu-
lating herd size: pastoralists with extensive cooperative networks seem 
to do better – measured in terms of herd size – than pastoralists with less 
extensive networks.113
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aurora
with terrifying beauty
the sky alight with flame
shimmering and quivering
the soul shan’t be the same
the wispy, haunting tendrils
sear down from up above
remote from their oppression
of life and lore and love
the spirit’s chilled by wonder
its ceaseless awe is pain
this ecstasy of torture
a universe insane
(Source: author)
Ilan Kelman
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Energy justice: A new framework 
for examining Arcticness in the 
context of energy infrastructure 
development
Darren McCauley, raphael Heffron, ryan Holmes and Maria Pavlenko
We propose the application of an emerging research agenda in ‘energy 
justice’ to consider Arcticness in the context of energy exploration in the 
Arctic region. We define Arcticness as a process (rather than a state of 
being) of bringing voice to those affected by change in the Arctic. It is 
important not to objectify Arcticness as this will lead inevitably to exclu-
sion. We should instead subjectify in the context of past, present and 
future changing trajectories  – a changing process. We therefore need 
frameworks for exploring and indeed promoting this changing process 
of ‘Arctic voice’. Energy justice is a framework that is able to contribute 
to this process.
The context of change in this chapter is not the climate, but rather 
energy exploration. Almost a third of the world’s undiscovered gas and 
13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil may be found there, mostly 
offshore under less than 500 meters of water.1 In an age of resource 
depletion, researchers need to pay greater attention to justice concerns 
in energy policy. In particular, energy exploration – and the resulting 
energy infrastructure that is built in the Arctic and across the world as a 
result of the energy resources being extracted – is a major concern for the 
world. This is even more important when considering the knowledge the 
global research community published in 2016 and highlighted: (1) tem-
peratures in the Arctic are running at 20°C higher than normal at this 
time of year;2 and (2)  because of the high temperatures there will be 
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19  ‘tipping points’ in the Arctic region that will suffer severe conse-
quences and there will be direct effects felt by many countries around 
the globe.3 Energy justice provides a framework for assessing the justice 
implications  – or simply the injustices  – of current policy decisions as 
well as making practical recommendations. In this chapter we identify 
some key injustices and recommendations with regards to uncovering 
Arcticness. We finish with a call for research into ‘frames of injustice’ 
beyond those currently promoted by existing energy justice scholarship.
The energy justice framework
A wide range of the modern- day justice conceptualisations that exist, 
including environmental, (anti- )global, climate and now energy jus-
tice are, to different extents, rooted in finding voice for the excluded. 
‘Environmental justice’ aims to act ‘(where) people of colour and lower 
socio- economic status are disproportionately affected by pollution, 
the siting of toxic waste dumps, and other Locally Unwanted Land 
Uses (LULUs)’.4 This has been more successfully utilised as a mobilisa-
tion tool for activists in the USA,5 with some notable exceptions with 
regards to the protection of indigenous peoples across the Americas6 
or in Taiwan7 or tribal groups facing environmental hazards in Africa.8 
Through initial explorations of distributive and subequently proce-
dural justice concerns, environmental justice scholars have ‘examined 
multiple reasons for the construction of injustice’,9 including race,10 
gender11 or culture.12
‘Global Justice’,13 and its more recent incarnation, ‘climate jus-
tice’,14 emerged from ‘anti- globalisation protests’, aimed in the first 
instance at global trade imbalances and then at international climate 
negotiations. Global justice retains a distinctly economic focus in argu-
ing for the redistribution of existing wealth and indeed new distribu-
tions of wealth. Its procedural dimension concentrates specifically on 
reforming international governance structures. Global and climate jus-
tice share, moreover, a common preoccupation with increased recogni-
tion of under- represented cultures.15 Climate justice has, nonetheless, 
developed a more sophisticated research agenda through assessments of 
city and locally- based incarnations,16 in addition to international- level 
action.
Energy justice (the focus here) carries the same Rawlsian liberal-
ism approach, while incorporating Fraser’s recognition of justice and 
cosmopolitan justice. Two critical distinctions are evident within this 
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research agenda. The concept is, first, rooted to energy systems. In this 
way, therefore, it aims to provide all individuals, across all areas, with 
safe, affordable and sustainable energy. We increasingly need a more 
nuanced understanding of social justice concerns within energy sys-
tems, from production to consumption. Energy justice offers, second, a 
unique opportunity to engage with established thought in science, pol-
icy and activism. We will now cover in more detail two core themes or 
tenets of energy justice that have emerged in the justice literature for 
energy policy: recognition and procedural justice.
the framework
Our energy justice framework is underpinned by the principles of cos-
mopolitan justice. Cosmopolitan philosophy is the belief in that we 
are all ‘world citizens’.17 With the advent of clear and visible effects 
of climate change, the approach to environmental protection is being 
seen more in the light of cosmopolitan philosophy. Cosmopolitanism 
has, of course, a distinct and long history in global justice thinking. 
From this perspective, we build on environmental and climate jus-
tice demands for a collective approach to resources. The focus here, 
however, is targeted on energy resources in the Arctic regions in an 
attempt to achieve a meaningful global change, specifically in terms 
of energy behaviours and attitudes.
From this perspective we identify two frames of analysis for this 
chapter: procedure and recognition. An adoption of recognition justice 
could shed light on under- recognised sections of society. There is often 
not only a failure to recognise but also to misrecognise and therefore 
distort people’s views, whcih can be demeaning or contemptible.18 Thus 
recognition justice includes calls to recognise the divergent perspec-
tives rooted in social, cultural, ethnic, racial and gender differences.19 
Second, energy justice requires the use of equitable procedures that 
engage all stakeholders in a non- discriminatory way.20 It states that all 
stakeholders in the Arctic should be able to participate in decision mak-
ing, and that their contributions should be taken seriously throughout. It 
also requires participation, impartiality and full information disclosure 
by government and industry,21 and the use of appropriate and sympa-
thetic engagement mechanisms.22 In addition, due process is relevant to 
every level of energy decision making at local, provincial, national and 
global levels. We expand this principle below to consider also the role of 
the ‘non- human’.
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Energy infrastructure development in the Arctic
The energy context in the Arctic is dominated by oil and gas reserves 
and the increasing role of international companies. Extraction and 
production takes place on the basis of resource ownership. The Arctic 
states are Canada, Denmark (with Greenland, an autonomous Danish 
dependent territory, and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden and the United States. However, according to the 1982 
United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the right 
to explore natural resources in the ocean belongs to the coastal states 
within the distance of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), that is, 
200 nautical miles. Therefore, only six of the Arctic states can legally 
exploit oil and gas within the Arctic circle, namely Canada, Denmark, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia and the USA.
Non- Arctic states such as China, Japan, India and Singapore as 
well as the European Union have expressed their interest in engag-
ing in Arctic- related activities ranging from research programmes to 
direct extractive operations. Some non- Arctic- based companies take 
part in joint projects with companies from the Arctic states, for exam-
ple the Italian company ENI currently has a joint exploration agree-
ment with the Russian organisation Rosneft. This creates a unique 
operational environment where a few actors representing countries 
with diverse economic, political and cultural backgrounds are respon-
sible for a  vulnerable and complex environment and the intimately 
linked futures of 400,000 indigenous peoples. The activities of energy 
companies that are exploring oil and gas in the Arctic are likely to 
determine the Arctic’s economic, social and environmental well- being 
in the years to come.
Yet, Arctic development is a risky and costly venture. The major 
drawbacks include the remoteness and harsh climate conditions, 
which require more advanced technologies, equipment and infrastruc-
ture, as well as competition from unconventional gas sources such as 
shale gas and liquefied natural gas. In addition, there is a long invest-
ment cycle and potential overlap of sovereignty claims. The develop-
ment of Arctic reserves, however, may have serious implications not 
only for an oil and gas company’s budget, but for the global climate in 
general. Interventions in the fragile Arctic environment may put the 
future of the region and the planet under a great threat. While the ris-
ing demand for resources pushes companies to play for high stakes, 
environmentalists warn that the consequences of their actions may be 
irreversible.
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Justice and Arcticness in energy infrastructure 
development
The first tenet of the framework manifests as a call for equitable proce-
dures that engage all Arctic stakeholders in a non- discriminatory way. 
Arcticness is therefore dependent on voices being heard. Indigenous 
and non- indigenous peoples are central, for example, to monitoring the 
increase in tourism in the high north, but equally the intentions of busi-
ness to develop there. Cultural pluralism is a place for creative industry. 
Fishing- or reindeer- based livelihoods should be respected. But more 
attention should be paid to the knowledge creation this involves with its 
implications for siting and procedural- based decisions. Land use change 
is a key challenge for indigenous peoples – who moderates if and where 
land is used for other uses? Holistic management plans are needed 
which focus equally on the land and not just the sea.
Early intervention is paramount to an effective consultation pro-
cess. More positive examples were raised also, where companies took 
a more proactive and constructive approach. As Kadenic concluded 
in an examination of large- scale Arctic mining projects, the degree of 
local involvement during the planning phase will directly affect future 
socioeconomic outcomes.23 From siting decisions to projected habitat 
destruction, the Saami people, for example, can therefore help develop-
ers achieve common outcomes. Procedural justice is more than simply 
inclusion. It also involves the mobilisation of local knowledge.
A central theme in Arctic energy development is the identification 
of local communities. Projects in Canada involve multiple indigenous 
peoples in project development in an explicit attempt to profit from 
‘multiple views’ on local knowledge and creativity. Almost all economic 
activity in Canada’s Arctic is reviewed not just for its economic and envi-
ronmental aspects but also social factors. However, the involvement of 
indigenous peoples has been limited. These differing views clearly indi-
cate that a desirable level of economic activity, as well as the extent of 
being or feeling included in decision making is highly subjective and 
contextual.
On Russian oil development in the Arctic, there is trilateral policy 
making:  businesses, local governments and indigenous peoples, all of 
whom need to get their ‘fair share’ from the activities agreed. Yet the 
latter group especially are often disadvantaged; for example, they fre-
quently have to endure the low- level jobs which result from develop-
ment projects. Large corporations come into local communities – where 
education levels tend to be low – with 500- page technical reports and 
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ask for comments, which is not a fair way to involve the indigenous pop-
ulation. The large size of the corporations involved means that decisions 
are taken at far away headquarters, while local representatives have to 
manage their implications for affected communities.
The second tenet of our framework, recognition justice, sheds 
light on instances of under- or mis- recognition of vulnerability. Local 
communities such as the indigenous Saami peoples are scattered across 
most of the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, 
living off fishing and reindeer herding. In addition, there is an under- 
recognised importance of the non- indigenous people in this area. In 
both cases, these populations are heavily dependent on local ecosys-
tems. Hence, such communities are extremely vulnerable to energy 
development.
The richness of fossil fuel energy resources in the Arctic area can 
be considered in contrast to the provision of energy and electricity in 
many of those areas. A number of Arctic regions in Alaska are off the 
electricity grid and electricity has to be generated by diesel genera-
tors. This is highly problematic in many ways and contributes (next 
to health issues) to comparatively low living standards. Such lower 
standards of living in areas of fuel richness point to local communities 
having an insufficient level of participation and an inadequate stake 
in the wealth generated by exploitation activities. As Parlee notes, 
indigenous communities often have limited access to certain forms of 
capital and are therefore particularly susceptible to the resource curse 
phenomenon.24
Increasing living standards in the Arctic region is a central mech-
anism for reducing vulnerability, while simultaneously threatening the 
environment. The low population density within the Arctic hints at the 
vast natural space, precisely what makes the Arctic so unique. Tourism in 
the Arctic region will increase with a growing global upper middle class 
which is looking for more authentic and exotic holiday experiences. This 
comes with its own challenges: for example, little effort is put into pre-
serving reindeer herding as one of the large traditional economic activi-
ties. Tourism, if exercised in certain ways and at certain scales, will itself 
contribute to environmental degradation and create issues of a differ-
ent nature, depriving the Arctic of its unique vastness. Stewart and col-
leagues report that while the opportunity to educate visitors appears as 
a positive benefit reflected in the perspectives of residents about cruise 
tourism in Nunavut, there are emerging risks at the community level 
which highlight the need for appropriate policies to mitigate the vulner-
ability of those communities.25 Therefore, greater involvement of local 
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populations and attention to their knowledge of the region is needed to 
direct touristic flows. This allows the generation of additional income by 
offering authentic experiences, while preserving local ecosystems and 
habitat.
In this context, it is important to consider how extractive indus-
tries and other activities potentially impact upon the means of action 
of local peoples. One dimension is improving general levels of human 
security. Revenue streams from commercial activities could potentially 
benefit the security aspect of freedom from want – the provision of an 
adequate standard of living. In fulfilling this approach, we need to fully 
appreciate that indigenous groups significantly differ in their histories, 
and thus in their present needs as well as their visions for the future. 
Therefore, it is important that different local groups are considered indi-
vidually within their contexts rather than being seen as all coming from 
the Arctic region. Thus, the mere engagement of the Arctic community 
into planning and decision making as an attempt for procedural justice 
is insufficient. Regional differences across Arctic communities must be 
respected and taken into consideration.
Beyond indigenous peoples, academic scholars can equally be iden-
tified as under- or mis- recognised. A call for the recognition of north-
ern scholars in the identification of research priorities in Arctic areas is 
also needed. The focus has to be redirected towards the co- production 
and co- communication of research results between science and stake-
holders. Next to a better integration of natural and social science in 
the Arctic, advancing recognition- based justice would be achieved if 
research results were presented in a way which is easy for non- scientific 
audiences to understand. Part of recognition justice is the informed 
self- determination of future development pathways that communities 
choose for themselves, despite adherence to traditional social and eco-
nomic activities.
Expanding justice in Arcticness – a new role for 
the non- human
One particular debate on Arcticness deserves particular attention in this 
study, namely whether the natural environment can be considered a 
separate voice. The energy justice framework continues to suffer from a 
uniquely anthropological outlook. Arctic- based ecosystems and habitats 
are at the forefront of energy developments in the region. If their full 
implications are to be considered, energy justice must be more than a 
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means to ‘provid[ing] all individuals, across all areas, with safe, afford-
able and sustainable energy’.26 Protection of the environment should 
have equal status. One avenue suggests that changing reporting proce-
dures for companies, as the primary agent in a largely unregulated area, 
may provide some modest hope.
Procedural justice refers largely to human populations, with an 
overconcentration on impacts upon local communities. We of course 
agree with Marshall and Brown that ‘the question of whether to report 
on the environment is no longer an issue’.27 But rather than reporting to 
stakeholders on environmental impacts, we question here whether the 
environment itself should be considered to be a stakeholder. It is essen-
tial that we find new ways to bring the environment into this debate on 
justice and security in Arctic energy development.
The main controversy in relation to the environment is connected 
with its non- human nature. Indeed, the environment cannot physically 
engage in dialogue with developers or articulate its interests and con-
cerns. However, there is no denying that the environment is affected by 
organisational activities, and the organisation likewise can be affected 
by the environment. This is particularly relevant to Arctic oil and gas 
companies as resource extraction can cause extreme environmental 
damage, for example oil spills from an operational accident, and can 
easily be disrupted by the extreme weather conditions which are typical 
of this region.
The definition of a stakeholder, namely ‘any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives’,28 does not explicitly specify whether stakeholding is only 
applicable to people. Technically, there is no reason not to consider 
the natural environment as a stakeholder just because it cannot speak. 
Starik compares the non- human environment to the groups that were 
historically discriminated against and hence deprived of a political 
voice:  slaves, indigenous minorities, the homeless and political pris-
oners.29 He argues that, despite not having such a voice, these groups 
would still be considered as stakeholders, so why should the environ-
ment not also receive stakeholder status? The question remains as to 
what the practical implications of such recognition could be.
The environment can also be viewed as a stakeholder due to its 
importance to the interests of future generations with regards to both 
human and non- humans. This argument is of particular relevance to 
the Arcticness debate as oil and gas extraction in this region is likely 
to increase the speed of the already melting Arctic ice, which will 
affect the ecological balance by accelerating the process of global 
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warming. Social scientists need to engage with natural scientists in 
order to theorise how energy developments can be just to both human 
and non- human.
Implications: energy justice and ‘frames’ of Arcticness
Injustice – rather than justice – should be the focal point for energy jus-
tice research through a more explicit assessment of master frames of 
‘injustice’ in the pursuit of understanding Arcticness. Master frames are 
collective action frames of Arctic stakeholders that have expanded in 
scope and influence. Put simply, a master frame encompasses the con-
textual boundaries, interaction and normative claims of more than one 
organisation, one movement or one voice. Such frames can indeed vary 
dramatically in terms of restrictiveness or exclusion. Gerhard and Rucht 
found that two distinct master frames (with different protagonists, 
antagonists, organisations, etc.) worked together to encourage social 
mobilisation in Germany.30 They can, therefore, often serve as a ‘kind 
of master algorithm that colours and constrains the orientations and 
activities of other movements’.31 Scholarship in energy justice research 
remains theoretically, conceptually and contextually bound. This sec-
tion concludes with a reflection not only on unbinding energy justice 
research from pre- set notions of justice, but also its conceptualisation of 
‘environment’.
Theoretical accounts of energy justice threaten, first, to bind 
researchers into pre- determined logics of justice.32 For Caney, justice 
research has hitherto focused on exposing and proposing archetypal 
normative frameworks.33 In support of Agyeman and colleagues,34 Reed 
and George comment, ‘researchers are cautioned that the long- observed 
disconnect between theory and practice in the field of environmental 
justice may be exacerbated should academics become more concerned 
with theoretical refinement over progressive, practical, and possible 
change’.35 The theorisation of justice seeks to expose ideal end points 
(and more recently processes) from various philosophical traditions. For 
example, Okereke finds that any notions or principles of justice origi-
nate from five distinct incarnations: utilitarianism, communitarianism, 
liberal equality, justice as meeting needs and libertarianism36  – later 
refined to include ‘market justice’.37 In a similar vein, Schlosberg argues 
that justice theorists need to be pluralist in accepting a range of under-
standings of ‘good’.38 It is argued here that we need instead to explore 
the plurality of injustice.
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The first step in this direction is indeed the acknowledgement 
that the study of justice is pluralist. Martin et  al. acknowledge, ‘that 
justice poses considerable conceptual challenges, not least because of 
the practical (if not intellectual) impossibility of reaching consensus’.39 
This is borne out by a valiant theoretical sortie through the myriad of 
approaches to conclude that justice is both plural and multi- dimensional. 
Their conclusion bears a self- reflective unease; ‘we clearly have much 
to learn about the limitations of our own framing and methods, includ-
ing our inevitable starting point in logics of justice’.40 The second move 
involves an acknowledgement that justice is contextualist, whereby 
some principles may apply in certain situations. Walker comments, ‘as 
we move from concern to concern and from context to context, we can 
expect shifts in both the spatial relations that are seen to be significant 
and in the nature of justice claims being made’.41
Ideal justice theorists seek to effectively eliminate the potential for 
conflict. Schlosberg comments, however, ‘such theorists are mistaken … 
(c)onflicts of justice arise … problem solving entails the negotiation of 
different conceptions of (in)justice in and across participants, from com-
munity or stakeholder groups to corporations or states’.42 Schlosberg 
claims that the idea of environmental justice has ‘examined multiple 
reasons for the construction of injustice’.43 This chapter calls, however, 
for an exploration of the construction of multiple injustices. An expan-
sion in the theorisation of environmental justice as a concept must be 
answered with a similar response in our understanding of environmen-
tal activism. As Barnett comments in support of Sen:44
Rather than thinking of philosophy as a place to visit in order to 
find idealised models of justice or radically new ontologies, we 
would do well to notice that there is an identifiable shift among 
moral and political philosophers towards starting from more 
worldly, intuitive understandings of injustice, indignation, and 
harm, and building up from there.45
Second, the recent development of normative concepts of justice 
looms in a similar manner. There is a sense (to some extent correct) 
that such concepts are worldly, emerging from situated conflict. They 
are, however, more often emerging from philosophical debate. A  set 
of normative testable assumptions materialise based upon achieving 
equity and fairness in the distributional, post- distributional – referred 
to as ‘recognition’ largely attributed to Nancy Fraser46 and developed 
by Schlosberg47 – and procedural burdens of environmental risk. We of 
course explore procedural and recognition forms in this chapter.
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However, the analytical objective identification of injustice can 
be blind to the experiential perception of spatial constructs. The more 
recent attempt to uncover a third form of energy justice tenets as the 
‘post- distributive justice of recognition’ threatens, for example, to 
unintentionally disrobe those who are unrecognised of any meaning-
ful agency.48 Even though Fraser firmly identifies social movements 
as key agents of change,49 the emphasis is on the call for ‘authorities’ 
and ‘policy- makers’ to recognise under- represented groups – such as in 
Walker and Day.50 Framing research emphasises, in contrast, the need to 
explore such processes among those who are ‘under- recognised’ in order 
to gain insight into the success or not in mobilising against injustices. 
They are often referred to not as ‘victims’, but rather as ‘non- activists’, 
and as posing a new challenge for justice research.
Third, our approach to energy justice remains contextually bound. 
In this vein, the energy justice ‘master’ frame is derived from specific 
empirical contexts – in this case the Arctic. The origins of energy justice 
research are accepted to be race- and poverty- based campaigns involv-
ing multiple organisations and individuals across the USA merging into 
a veritable energy justice movement – often cited as beginning in Warren 
County, North Carolina.51 And thus, the energy justice master frame 
in the USA is formed around race, class, gender and the environment. 
Taylor talks explicitly about the ‘environmental justice paradigm’ as a 
master frame which links together ‘environment, race, class, gender and 
social justice’ issues.52 In the UK (especially among non- governmental 
organisations or NGOs), the master frame has been termed as ‘just sus-
tainability’53 despite the earlier observation that there exist ‘at least 
three different constructions of environmental justice’.54 This refers to 
a frame that links together issues of sustainability, social inclusion and 
procedural equity.
Dawson demonstrates, however, the potential fluidity of the 
energy justice master frame in linking it explicitly to eco- nationalism.55 
She identifies sub- group identity, social justice and environmentalism 
as the core tenets of the US energy justice frame. The US environ-
mental movement is, in her view, built on the foundation of sub- group 
identity and the desire for social justice. As a result, groups defined 
by religion, gender, national identity or class could offer a basis for 
energy justice movements and their master frame. In this way, the 
energy justice frame covers, for example, the protection of indigenous 
peoples across the Americas56 or Taiwan57 or tribal groups facing envi-
ronmental hazards in Africa.58
In such a conception, the energy justice frame can actually be 
ultimately divisive and exacerbate violent conflict. Dawson traces the 
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environmentalist roots of nationalist movements in the former USSR 
which lead directly to social tensions and fragmentation. She observes, 
‘the intertwining of environmental causes and sub- group identities can 
be seen to both enhance environmental mobilisation among previously 
unmobilised groups and deepen a pre- existing sentiment of “us” versus 
“them” within the population’.59
Empirical conceptions of justice are, therefore, as problematic 
as theoretical and conceptual incarnations. Pellow and Brulle argue, 
indeed, that ‘(s)cholars cannot understand … environmental injustices 
through a singularly focused framework that emphasises one form of 
inequality to the exclusion of others’.60 Our attention should be drawn 
to where and when injustice is felt and experienced. Hobson argues 
that energy justice research must diversify its understanding of where 
injustice can be found. In her assessment of an environmental organi-
sation in Singapore, she demonstrates how environmental injustice is 
felt in everyday practices of individuals and organisations, even where 
expressions of public concern on the environment are infrequent or at 
least highly managed.61 More recently, substantial research has focused 
our attention on injustices within climate activism.62 The fluidity of mas-
ter frames on energy justice offers one potential solution to unbinding 
how we approach justice and injustice. We should turn our attention 
to unlocking further how we can explore master frames of injustice 
through a better understanding of Arcticness framing.
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Understanding Arcticness: 
Comparing resource frontier 
 narratives in the Arctic and East Africa
James van Alstine and William Davies
Introduction
When exploring what is meant by ‘Arcticness’ it becomes pertinent to ask 
what is unique about the Arctic as a ‘resource frontier’. The Arctic has 
found itself receiving greater international attention in recent years,1 
this attention commonly attributed to pronounced sea  ice loss from 
rapid climate change2 and the subsequent increased accessibility to the 
region’s abundant natural resources.3 While excitable claims of a region 
opening up and a resource rush are arguably hyperbolic,4 nevertheless it 
is clear the presence of extractive industries will continue to grow in the 
coming decades, be it offshore petroleum in the Pechora Sea,5 diamonds 
in Nunavut,6 or rare- earth minerals mining in Southern Greenland.7
Resource frontier narratives represent a specific set of ideas and 
interests and can be conceptualised as relational spaces where economy, 
nature and society co- construct.8 Typically host governments, interna-
tional financial institutions and the private sector use this rhetoric to 
legitimise foreign direct investment, natural resource extraction and 
commodity production.9 To investors, the term ‘frontier’ denotes higher 
levels of risk but also the possibility of significant rewards. These so- 
called frontiers are typically located in remote regions lacking strong 
forms of state governance. The potential exists for higher levels of politi-
cal, social, technical and environmental risk from resource extraction.10
When exploration begins and the first commercially viable energy 
or non- energy minerals are discovered, the idea of resource wealth leads 
to multiple imaginaries. On the one hand, the resource curse narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ArC t ICness L Iv InG90
demonstrates the links between natural resource wealth and weak devel-
opment outcomes.11 On the other hand, the resource- led development 
narrative highlights how new- found petroleum resources may catalyse 
national development towards middle- or high- income country status.12 
It is assumed that if social and environmental issues are well managed 
then the extractive industries can contribute to sustainable develop-
ment and poverty reduction. Indeed, the resource curse narrative has 
been reframed as a ‘governance issue’ and a political- institutional chal-
lenge, as opposed to a quasi- automatic phenomenon that resource- rich 
countries are destined to follow.13
Predicted environmental transformation and transition towards a 
resource frontier presents significant challenges for the Arctic14 as it does 
for other regions around the world. Here, a comparison with another 
region experiencing the rhetoric of extractives- led growth proves use-
ful. Significant reserves of oil and gas have been discovered in East 
Africa in the last decade, prompting governments in the region to model 
pathways towards middle- income status with significant emphasis on 
resource- led development. Where the overriding political economic 
context in the Arctic and East Africa is that of extractives- led growth, it 
becomes pertinent to explore the similarities and differences between 
these emerging resource frontiers.
This chapter compares and contrasts developments in the Arctic 
and East Africa by examining key material, global interest, governance 
and community themes associated with increased oil exploration in 
Greenland and Uganda. Both contexts are considered to be at the ‘fron-
tier’ of extraction given their ‘unconventional’ locations.15 In doing so, 
it aims to better understand the characteristics associated with regions 
undergoing extractive- led growth imaginaries as well as unpacking 
location- specific idiosyncrasies such as ‘Arcticness’.
Background
Greenland is the world’s largest island (2,150,000 km2) with the vast 
majority of this territory comprised of 80 per cent ice cover.16 With a pop-
ulation of 58,000, it is also one of the least- densely populated territo-
ries in the world with 15,000 of its population found in the capital Nuuk 
to the south- west of the country. A  Danish colony for over 200  years 
(1721– 1953) with a demographic that is 90 per cent Inuit and 10 per 
cent ‘European’, in 1979 was granted ‘autonomous rule’ within the 
Kingdom of Denmark, and has since been progressing towards complete 
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independence;17 what has been described as a process of decolonisa-
tion.18 If this happens, Greenland would become the first Inuit nation 
state.19 Further autonomy was granted to Greenland in 2008 under the 
status of ‘Self- Rule’ which significantly gave the country control over its 
vast natural resource reserves20 which include gold, diamonds, iron ore, 
cryolite, lead, zinc, molybdenum, oil, natural gas, uranium and other 
rare- earth minerals.21 Uranium reserves are considerable near the site 
of Kvanefjeld with some predicting Greenland could potentially over-
take China as the world’s largest exporter of the mineral.22 While some 
extractive activity has previously occurred in Greenland, no such activ-
ity has taken place in recent decades.23
Uganda is a relatively small landlocked country (238,000 km2) in 
East Africa. It has a diverse landscape with mountains and lakes ring-
ing a plateau. The country is generally tropical (although semi- arid in 
the north- east) with two dry seasons punctuating rainy weather. It is 
a densely populated country with a population of over 37  million. As 
a presidential republic, Uganda is a sovereign state that became inde-
pendent from the UK in 1962. However, the country was besieged with 
conflict under dictatorial regimes until President Museveni’s regime, 
which began in 1986, brought relative peace, stability and economic 
growth to the country. Although a leader in implementing neoliberal 
reforms in the 1990s, which paved the way for an era of economic 
growth and positive donor relations, government– donor relations have 
deteriorated over the last decade with the government hampered by 
allegations of widespread corruption.24 While poverty has declined in 
Uganda from 56.4 per cent to 19.5 per cent between 1992 and 2012,25 it 
still remains very low on the Human Development Index (163rd out of 
188 in 2016). Agriculture is Uganda’s most important sector and employs 
over a third of the workforce, with coffee, tea, cotton and fish accounting 
for the bulk of export revenues.26 Uganda’s key resources include copper, 
cobalt, hydropower, limestone, salt, phosphate and now oil.27 However, 
given relatively small deposits, the extraction of minerals has been a 
very small proportion of export revenues in the past.
Materiality
Within this chapter, materiality is concerned with oil’s physical and 
economic properties, as well as the social- technical and environmen-
tal implications of oil extraction in resource frontiers. In Greenland, 
hydrocarbons have largely been explored offshore in the Disko Bay 
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area, whereas in Uganda this process is being undertaken onshore in the 
remote Albertine Graben region of Western Uganda. Both regions are 
remote, difficult to access and pose socio- technical and environmental 
challenges. However geography matters, there are a number of ‘devel-
opment traps’ that hinder income growth in poor countries.28 One of 
those ‘traps’ is being landlocked with poor infrastructure connections 
to the sea through neighbouring countries, as is the case with Uganda. 
Greenland, on the other hand, is well- positioned to develop and exploit 
its resources through seaborne trade. Nevertheless, the risks are sig-
nificant. In Disko Bay the environmental risks of oil extraction include 
sea ice, extreme cold and harsh weather. In both areas oil extraction 
may disrupt local livelihoods, wildlife and tourism given the extensive 
infrastructure that needs to be built in and around villages, towns and 
national parks.
Both contexts lack oil infrastructure. Oil reserves in Uganda are 
extremely remote and isolated from markets, as they are in Greenland. 
However, the type of infrastructure needed to extract the onshore 
oil in Uganda is significantly different from Greenland’s offshore oil. 
A 1400 km oil export pipeline is currently being scoped from Uganda 
to the Indian Ocean via Tanzania, as is a small oil refinery in Uganda 
for domestic and regional consumption. In Greenland, considerable 
infrastructure developments to areas such as port and onshore support 
facilities are required to make oil production and exportation a reality.29 
Furthermore, there are questions surrounding the efficacy and reliabil-
ity of current oil drilling technology and its ability to withstand extreme 
polar conditions.30
Commercial viability is also an important material attribute of 
these frontiers. In Greenlandic waters the quantities are estimated as 
vast (although no commercially viable wells have been drilled yet), 
with nearly a fifth of undiscovered oil resources in the Arctic region 
located in two Greenlandic provinces: East Greenland Rift Basins and 
West Greenland– East Canada.31 In Uganda, commercially viable oil 
was discovered in 2006 with recoverable reserves estimated to be at 
least 1.4 billion barrels of crude with proven reserves of 6 billion bar-
rels. However, given these technical challenges and associated politi-
cal and economic concerns, progress towards commercial production 
has been slow in Uganda with the first oil projected for 2020. Indeed, 
US$50/ barrel is needed to make oil production economically feasible 
in Uganda. For Greenland, the per barrel cost required for economic 
viability is significantly higher given the expensive production costs 
involved with working in remote, polar waters and a limited drilling 
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window confined to the summer months.32 With the crude oil prices 
dropping as low as US$30/ barrel in January 2016, the prospects for 
offshore oil development in Greenland look increasingly unlikely in 
the short- term.33
Broadly- speaking, there are certainly similarities between the 
material challenges facing each resource frontier; for example, limited 
oil infrastructure, economic viability, technological challenges and 
the potential for socio- environmental impacts. These similarities are, 
however, unsurprising as such characteristics are usually common to 
resource frontiers.34 The very fact that they are frontiers signals limited 
infrastructure in relation to the resource being developed. Questions 
over economic viability are always present in such contexts:  if it were 
not so, it is likely the resource would have been developed earlier. 
Technological challenges are often an obstacle that has previously pre-
vented resource development; likewise are the potential risks associated 
with negative socio- environmental impacts.
One aspect of Arcticness then is the extremity of these material 
challenges for Greenland. The sparse population of Greenland, the 
remoteness of its seas, the harsh, polar environment and the vulnera-
bility of ecosystems that are crucial for Arctic peoples’ livelihoods are 
all factors contributing to this extremity. These are, also, character-
istics commonly associated with traditionally romanticised imaginar-
ies of Arcticness: a remote wilderness to be explored that challenges 
human endeavour (and its technological ingenuity) to the utmost.35 
Much in common with the Arctic explorers of the past, there is an 
aspect of discussing oil company exploration in Greenland that sounds 
like explorers entering a remote, challenging corner of the globe. On 
the other hand, geologists have known about the presence of oil in 
Uganda’s Albertine Graben since the 1920s, with the first exploration 
well drilled in 1938.36 It was not until the commodity super cycle of 
the 2000s and the rise in oil prices that exploration into the region 
was reinvigorated and commercial quantities of oil discovered. Thus 
a key distinction between Uganda and Greenland is the extremity of 
oil development in Arctic waters.
Global interest
The Arctic is a region of significant global interest. It is often framed as a 
region opening up to stakeholders worldwide and home to a new geog-
raphy of voices.37 As such, what takes place in the Arctic is of increasing 
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global concern and can often lead to the Arctic resembling a ‘global com-
mons’, especially given the context of its ocean and climate change. The 
East African context has interesting parallels.
Two prominent reasons contribute to the perception of the Arctic 
Ocean as a global commons. First, there is a conflation with the situa-
tion found in the Arctic’s polar relation in the south, Antarctica. While 
sharing many cryospheric characteristics due to their polar latitudes, 
there are certain factors that ultimately define them as fundamentally 
different international spaces.38 Crucially, Antarctica is an uninhabited 
landmass surrounded by ocean. This lends itself more readily to the 
perception of an international space or global commons. While it is too 
simplistic to label Antarctica purely as an ‘international space’, inter-
national agreements such as the Antarctica Treaty embody this per-
ception.39 In contrast, the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by inhabited 
landmasses. However, in terms of remoteness and lack of inhabitants, 
the (varying) ice cover at its ocean’s centre resembles a polar wilder-
ness akin to Antarctica. It is often these imaginaries of the upper Arctic 
Ocean that are evoked when the Arctic Ocean is described as a ‘global 
commons’.40 The ambiguity of the Arctic Ocean41 facilitates this global 
perception of the region.
In a Greenlandic context, where oil and gas development is off-
shore but takes place in sovereign waters, there is a blurring with the 
high seas of the Arctic Ocean that accentuates a greater legitimisation 
of ‘outsider concern’; for example globally- focused environmental 
campaigns such as Greenpeace’s ‘Save the Arctic’ around Arctic off-
shore oil and gas.42 While the African context is obviously very differ-
ent, there is still significant global interest in the region. On the one 
hand, there is often heavy involvement by donors and international 
NGOs among others keen to assist least developed country govern-
ments, such as Uganda, to utilise natural resource rents for pro- poor 
development (as will be discussed below in the governance section). 
On the other hand, the general public and media in Western countries 
make the mistake of homogenising the African continent as one coun-
try in dire need of charity and overseas development assistance based 
upon negative post- colonial narratives of war, disease, poverty, cor-
ruption and starvation.43
The Arctic’s tightly woven relationship with climate change 
ensures global interest in Greenland’s oil adventure. Much is written 
about the impact of climate change on the Arctic, where the impacts 
are felt more keenly than anywhere else.44 Projections from the IPCC 
and ACIA suggest a surface air temperature rise of 2.5– 7°C by the  
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end of the century; significant changes to the Arctic biome’s biodiver-
sity and ecosystems;45 and a substantial retreat of the summer sea ice 
extent. Furthermore, these changes have significant global ramifica-
tions, with a sea- level rise and alterations to global oceanic circula-
tions from the effect of lower surface albedo and increased freshwater 
run- off from glaciers and/ or ice sheet retreat.46 The rate at which the 
Greenland Ice Sheet recedes is particularly important with regards to 
global sea- level rise.47 It is in this context that Greenlandic oil develop-
ment finds itself positioned. That there is a commonly held belief that 
the potential for oil development in Greenland is a direct consequence 
of increased accessibility from a warming environment reinforces the 
association with climate change. As such, Greenland’s location in the 
Arctic, at the frontline of climate change, ensures that the discourse 
around Greenland oil becomes entwined with the wider global cli-
mate change discourse.48
The African context is significantly different. The exploration 
and production of oil is not dependent upon a changing climate, but 
sub- Saharan Africa is acknowledged to be among the regions which 
are most vulnerable to climate change.49 The East African region, in 
particular, has a high dependence on rain fed agriculture, biomass 
and rivers for energy, and increasing vulnerability given the higher 
frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods.50 
One of the hardest hit sectors has been energy given the region’s 
reliance on hydroelectric power.51 While 80 per cent of Uganda’s 
energy supply comes from large hydro, increasing industrial demand 
and potential delays to large hydro projects may necessitate the re- 
commissioning of heavy fuel oil power plants to fill predicted energy 
shortfalls.52 There is significant inequity in energy access as 85– 90 
per cent of the country’s population has no access to electricity. A sig-
nificant 90 per cent of the people in Uganda live in rural areas and 
use biomass (wood and charcoal) as primary energy sources.53 While 
a changing climate is significant for both Greenland and Uganda, the 
narratives of oil exploration, climate change and global commons are 
tightly interwoven within the context of Arcticness.
Governance
As highlighted above, there is significant global interest in how to gov-
ern resource extraction in frontier contexts. Governance in this case 
can be defined as the hard and soft rules that shape and constrain oil 
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exploration and development.54 The governance of a resource frontier 
is characterised by a myriad of actors and ideas. International NGOs, 
donors, multi-national oil companies, and international finance institu-
tions among others vie for policy space to have their ideas and interests 
taken up and implemented by host governments and exploration com-
panies. Often international norms on transparency, stakeholder engage-
ment, environmental protection and social welfare are advocated given 
a lack of state capacity in these remote regions.
At a Greenlandic national level, the Minerals Resources Act of 2009 
is the guiding legalisation surrounding oil development.55 The growth 
in interest in Greenland’s oil reserves and the willingness of successive 
Greenlandic governments to develop this sector has led to governance 
changes at a national level. Most notably, after pressure from domestic 
and international civil society, the Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 
which once had responsibility for every aspect of oil development 
including environmental matters, has seen many of its responsibilities 
move to new organisations, such as the Environmental Agency for the 
Mineral Resources Area.56 Positioned within the Kingdom of Denmark, 
Greenland governance structures around offshore oil are complex.57
Furthermore, Greenland is positioned within a modern narrative 
of Arcticness: ‘as an apolitical space of regional governance, functional 
co- operation, and peaceful co- existence’.58 The Arctic as a global com-
mons provides the basis for a spirit of collaboration and cooperation 
that is somewhat unique and distinct from other regions of the world. 
This spirit is embodied by the Arctic Council, a non- regulatory, soft- law 
intergovernmental forum comprised of the eight Arctic states, indige-
nous groups in the form of ‘permanent participants’ and ‘observers’ that 
include non- Arctic states and other interested stakeholder groups. The 
council is continually evolving from its original narrow environmen-
tal focus and while changes have not been particularly revolutionary, 
they are nevertheless significant enough to suggest an attempt at adap-
tion to regional change. It is in recent years that governance initiatives 
around offshore oil development have shown hints of a future Arctic 
Council transforming into a decision- making body, such as the binding 
‘Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic’.59 If such evolution continues, Arctic regional 
governance could potentially have a greater impact on Greenland’s deci-
sions around oil; the contemporary geopolitics of Arcticness influencing 
its governance arrangements.60 However, at present, many argue that 
agreements like the council’s oil spill response are weak and require lit-
tle from the Arctic states who have signed it.61
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There are also norms for greater continental integration and coop-
eration for development in Africa. The African Union was established in 
2001 and consists of 54 member countries. It is headquartered in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia and made up of both administrative and political bod-
ies. Utilising the extractive industries for sustainable growth is a strong 
norm in Africa, underpinned by the African Union’s ‘Agenda 2063’ as 
well as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the 
African Mining Vision, among other African Union entities and docu-
ments.62 While the African Union does have the ability to make binding 
decisions, for example, through its Peace and Security Council to impose 
sanctions and deploy peace- keeping forces, it is likely to use soft rules 
and norms to facilitate extractives- led growth across the continent.
In East Africa the rhetoric of resource- led development has largely 
been adopted by countries with significant hydrocarbon deposits. In 
Uganda expectations of the benefits are extremely high: the Government 
of Uganda’s Vision 2040 to transform Ugandan society ‘from a peasant 
to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years’ are largely pred-
icated on revenues from oil and gas.63 While the integration of oil and 
gas infrastructure has been discussed at the level of the East African 
Community, cooperation remains elusive as countries compete aggres-
sively for foreign direct investment and oil infrastructure projects.
For example, Kenya and Tanzania sought to win over Uganda as 
the preferred pipeline route to ports on the Indian Ocean. The Kenyan 
route seemed most likely for years, until Uganda was swayed in 2016 
to partner with Tanzania due to security, economic and land acquisi-
tion concerns along the northern route.64 Thus governance of oil and gas 
development at the regional level remains mired in zero sum politics 
between nation states.65
Domestically, Uganda’s oil and gas legal framework has been influ-
enced by international norms and standards but there are concerns 
about loopholes and implementation deficits. For example, Uganda’s 
2008 National Oil and Gas Policy was influenced by international 
norms on transparency, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Although Uganda has not adopted the EITI, the policy 
conforms to international best practice on stressing the importance of 
transparency and accountability in all aspects of natural resource man-
agement.66 In order to put the 2008 National Oil and Gas Policy into prac-
tice, the Government of Uganda has established its legal framework for 
petroleum: the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) 
Act 2013; the Petroleum (Refining, Gas Processing and Conversion 
Transportation and Storage) Act 2013; and the Public Finance Act 2015.
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While Uganda’s legal framework is seen as a positive step towards 
transparency and accountability throughout the value chain of the 
sector, there are a variety of concerns, including: the centralisation of 
power in the executive branch of government; loopholes in the Public 
Finance Act that may fall short of EITI requirements; and the National 
Environment Management Authority’s lack of capacity to monitor and 
regulate the environmental impacts of oil activities.67 The promise of 
future oil revenues will most likely reduce Uganda’s reliance upon donor 
budget support, but may have negative impacts on governance, as one 
political analyst observed in 2006:  ‘But of course, depending on how 
commercial the oil is, his [Museveni’s] foreign policy will change. He 
will no longer need donor money to buy political support’.68
Community
As Oran Young notes, romantic notions of the Arctic have traditionally 
represented ‘human life in the Arctic that casts the indigenous peoples 
of the Circumpolar North as happy hunter/ gatherers living a simple exis-
tence in harmony with the natural environment and uncorrupted by the 
forces of modernity’.69 Intuitively, this romanticised view would suggest 
a reluctance of many Greenlandic people to embrace oil development as 
it would clash with their traditional lifestyles, from fears over impacts 
on whaling migration and oil spillage to the social upheaval involved in 
large- scale industrialisation. In reality, indigenous lifestyles and iden-
tity in the contemporary Arctic are considerably more nuanced. This is 
especially so for Greenland, which serves as an example of indigenous 
self- government,70 a situation rare for many of the world’s indigenous 
populations.
Research exploring local community opinion around oil devel-
opment in Greenland shows a spectrum of perspectives, ranging from 
those who strongly support the development, those undecided or uncer-
tain, to those vehemently opposed.71 Those who side more favourably 
with development tend to cite the important economic benefits that 
would arise from such large- scale industrial activity and the positive 
impacts this would have on employment, educational opportunities and 
healthcare. Those opposed often point to the environmental damage 
such activity would inflict, both locally and globally, as well as social 
concerns such as the democratic implications of a small  nation becom-
ing dependent on large oil companies and the societal implications of 
the immigration of foreign workers.72
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While issues on how oil development impacts indigenous commu-
nities and lifestyles are evident and are of importance,73 they are not 
necessarily as pronounced as images of Arcticness might suggest. To 
take one example, research with inhabitants of the town of Aasiaat, a 
community that served as the base of oil exploration in 2010, found a 
complex picture regarding the relationship between traditional liveli-
hoods and oil development.74 For some, traditional livelihoods no longer 
really existed or were already disappearing, the modern reality being 
that the majority of Greenlanders now live in towns. Others pointed 
towards the ability of traditional culture to adapt to changing societal 
pressures as a fundamental part of the Inuit identity, that is not a fixed 
position but is malleable to change.
While community concerns found around oil development in 
Greenland may resemble other areas of oil development, there are dif-
ferences. In Uganda, the general public, media and civil society appear 
to largely support the pro- oil resource- led development rhetoric of the 
national government, that oil should be used to propel the country into 
middle-income status over the next 30  years. The national debate is 
around good governance of the resource as opposed to whether or not 
it should be extracted. At the local level, communities in the Bunyoro 
region along Lake Albert are comprised of peasant small holders largely 
reliant upon subsistence agriculture and fishing. The villages where 
oil exploration has taken place have had significant interaction with 
oil companies and their contractors. This interaction has led to some 
casual labour and corporate social responsibility and social investment 
projects in the areas of health, water, sanitation, education, road infra-
structure and local economic development among others. Expectations 
of local benefits are high, particularly in the area of local employment, 
infrastructure development and social amenities. However, there are 
concerns in Uganda’s oil bearing communities about lack of informa-
tion, stakeholder engagement, local employment, livelihood and envi-
ronmental impacts among other things.75 These issues are significant, 
but are not unique to Uganda.76
While elements of these narratives are present in the Greenlandic 
context, the picture is more complicated. Greenlanders are conflicted 
over various aspects of oil development. This is highlighted in a poll 
of 721 Greenlanders undertaken in autumn 2013, where it was found 
half supported drilling and just under half opposed the activity.77 
Oceans North Canada, who conducted the poll on behalf of the Inuit 
Circumpolar Council, Greenland, cited Greenlanders’ strong cultural 
connections to the sea combined with the perceived risks this would 
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have on important sectors such as seafood and tourism as reasons for 
those unsupportive of oil development.78 However, much like Uganda, 
questions of good governance are ubiquitous within the debate, with the 
same poll highlighting how the majority felt the government were not 
doing enough to inform the public, remain transparent or put adequate 
safeguards in place.79
It is relevant to note that community perceptions of oil develop-
ment will depend on the stage of the project cycle, proximity to the oil 
wells and associated infrastructure and cultural and economic ties to 
the areas of extraction. Much Arctic oil development, as in the case of 
Greenland, finds itself at an early stage of the project cycle. As such, 
they are surrounded by considerable uncertainty and many unknowns 
exacerbated by rapid regional change. In Greenland, where oil develop-
ment is proposed to take place in seas that represent sites of cultural and 
economic significance, community opposition, or at least greater scepti-
cism, is likely.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to better understand the concept of ‘Arcticness’ 
through the lens of resource frontier narratives in Greenland and 
Uganda. Somewhat surprising is the amount of similarity in the discus-
sion of material, public good, governance and community themes. On 
the material characteristics of oil development, both contexts exhibit 
limited oil infrastructure, challenging economic conditions, techno-
logical hurdles and the potential for significant socio- environmental 
impacts, while Arcticness is characterised by the extremity of oil devel-
opment in Greenland. Both the Arctic region and sub- Saharan Africa 
spark global interest; for example creating a marine sanctuary in the 
Arctic Ocean’s international waters and the global fight against poverty 
in less developed countries such as Uganda. While climate change, a 
challenge with significant global interest, is present in both resource 
frontier narratives, it is dominant in Greenland and thus tightly inter-
woven with the concept of Arcticness.
There are also similarities related to the challenge of governing 
the sectors in Greenland and Uganda, including the politics of getting 
the legislative frameworks in place, potential governance loopholes, 
and the influence of international actors in the ‘good governance’ of 
the sector. Modes of cooperative governance are characteristic of the 
Arctic and at the pan- African level, while cooperation remains elusive 
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in the context of East African oil development as countries compete 
aggressively for foreign direct investment and oil infrastructure proj-
ects. Thus governance of oil and gas development at the regional 
level in East Africa remains mired in zero sum politics between 
nation states. Finally, communities in both contexts felt that a lack 
of information and transparency about the sector were significant 
issues. However, in Uganda the public is generally pro- oil whereas in 
Greenland sentiment is rather more mixed.
This chapter has demonstrated that Arctic resource development 
actually shares much in common with resource frontiers elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, Arcticness is still a prominent feature of Greenland’s oil 
story. The extremity of oil development, the impact of climate change, 
the opportunities for cooperative governance, and the mixed commu-
nity sentiment on whether oil development should proceed highlight 
aspects of ‘Arcticness’ in Greenland’s resource frontier.
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Scopes and limits of ‘Arcticness’: 
Arctic livelihoods, marine mammals 
and the law
nikolas sellheim
Introduction
The Arctic has become a prominent feature in the current media land-
scape. It seems fair to say that not a day goes by on which climate 
change, perceived geopolitical tensions and resource exploitation do not 
surface in popular media outlets. As a consequence of the environmen-
tal changes altering the narrative of the ‘frozen north’, the Arctic has 
moved from being perceived as a frontier to a centrepiece of everyday 
discourse. But only recently, and most notably with the establishment 
of the Arctic Council in 1996, the notion of the Arctic as a home has 
entered the popular understanding on the north.
This chapter explores how the Arctic and its peoples are perceived 
and constructed in international legal regimes. By focusing on controver-
sial marine mammal hunts, in particular the hunt for seals and whales, 
it examines how legal regimes construe ‘Arcticness’,1 how the parame-
ters are set to determine a legitimate or illegitimate hunt and in how far 
Arctic economies are consequently framed. A focus on marine mammal 
hunts, which constitute a highly emotional activity, was chosen as they 
best exemplify the difficulties of reconciling the imagination of Arctic 
cultures and the empirical realities in Arctic communities. While drawing 
on a hermeneutical analysis of available documentation, the chapter is 
complemented by the author’s observations at the 66th meeting of the 
International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 2016.
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Arctic peoples in international legal regimes – the case 
of marine mammal hunting
From very early on, the Arctic has played a crucial role in international 
legal regimes. This was not related to the perception of the Arctic as a 
distinct region, but rather to the abundance of marine resources – par-
ticularly whales and seals. Their overexploitation prompted states to 
conclude bi- and multi-lateral agreements in order to ensure the sustain-
ability of the stocks and, later on, to sustain a viable industry for their 
exploitation.2
The first international environmental treaty that was concluded 
was indeed based on the overexploitation of seals in the Bering 
Sea. Throughout the late nineteenth century, American, British/ 
Canadian, Japanese and Russian vessels significantly overharvested 
northern fur seals (Callorhinus ursinus). With the purchase of Alaska 
from Russia in 1867, the seal- rich Pribliof Islands became part of the 
United States, which required licences for the hunting of seals in 
American waters. In the early 1890s, it seized two British/ Canadian 
vessels which were conducting the extremely wasteful pelagic seal 
hunt without a licence. The case was brought before the Tribunal of 
Arbitration in Paris. In 1893, the first bilateral treaty relevant for 
the Arctic was concluded with the Arbitration Treaty,3 which estab-
lished a ban on pelagic whaling and set clear rules for the conduct of 
seal hunting. Most notably, for the purposes of this chapter, the first 
reflection of the Arctic as a cultural space occurred in this treaty, 
the narratives of which, by and large, remain until today: Article 8 
establishes an exemption for the native people of the region who are 
not bound to the provisions of the Arbitration Treaty. This, however, 
is only the case if they conduct the seal hunt in a traditional manner, 
using traditional equipment and without any commercial intent.4 
The Arbitration Treaty therefore establishes the first legal definition 
of ‘subsistence hunting’ and the conditions for exempting indigenous 
peoples from any bans on or restrictions to commercial hunting of 
marine mammals. The provisions of the Arbitration Treaty concern-
ing Arctic peoples and cultures were also mirrored in the Convention 
between the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan for the 
Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals of 7 July 1911 (Fur Seals 
Convention). The Fur Seals Convention was concluded due to the 
continuous decline of the northern fur seal populations, primarily 
 
 
 
 
  
ArC t ICness L Iv InG104
because of ongoing hunts by Japanese and Russian vessels. Article IV 
of the convention reads:
It is further agreed that the provisions of this Convention shall not 
apply to Indians, Ainos, Aleuts, or other aborigines dwelling on the 
coast of the waters mentioned in Article I, who carry on pelagic 
sealing in canoes not transported by or used in connection with 
other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles, or sails, 
and manned by not more than five persons each, in the way hith-
erto practiced and without the use of firearms; provided that such 
aborigines are not in the employment of other persons or under 
contract to deliver the skins to any person.
The regime collapsed during World War II, being succeeded by the 1957 
Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals. Article 
VII of the interim convention once again almost verbatim reiterates 
the provisions of its predecessor and exempts ‘Indians, Ainos, Aleuts, 
or Eskimos’ from the convention’s provisions, provided they are not in 
the employment of commercial enterprises and conduct the seal hunts 
with non- modern equipment. Up until 1985, when the fur seal regime 
collapsed,5 Arctic indigenous peoples were not entitled to technological 
development when conducting seal hunting in the Bering Sea, but were 
forced to apply techniques and utilise technology even though safer and 
more humane practices and technologies were available.
In a similar manner, although not exclusively limited to indige-
nous peoples in the Arctic, the international regime regulating whale 
hunting has incorporated exemptions for indigenous peoples. In partic-
ular, the whale hunts in Alaska and Greenland played crucial roles in 
inserting the category of ‘Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling’ into the work 
of the International Whaling Commission in 1981.6 From the first emer-
gence of a whaling regime in 1931, aboriginal people were excluded 
from any regulatory means. As with the Fur Seal Regime, this exemp-
tion only applies when the hunters do not employ modern technology 
and are not part of a commercial enterprise. Both the 1931 Regulation of 
Whaling and the 1937 International Agreement on Whaling underline 
this approach. The 1946 International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling (ICRW) has, however, stepped away from blocking aborigi-
nal peoples from utilising modern technology. Instead, the narrative of 
‘subsistence need’ has been inserted. While this concept in its inchoate 
form in the whaling context merely referred to local consumption of 
gray and right whales by indigenous peoples, over time the concept has 
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evolved. ‘Subsistence needs’ are not to endanger the population status 
of a species while they are required to correspond to the nutritional and 
cultural requirements of the respective indigenous people. In order to 
determine whether quotas for indigenous peoples are set,7 national gov-
ernments are to provide the IWC with a ‘Needs statement’, which ‘details 
the cultural, subsistence and nutritional aspects of the hunt, products 
and distribution’.8
The reflection of narratives that were applied more than 100 years 
ago in legal regimes affecting Arctic residents are still relevant. The most 
prominent example is the EU regime banning the trade in seal products 
that was adopted in September 2009.9 Here, Arctic livelihoods relating 
to the hunting of seals are clearly narrated and, throughout the prepa-
ratory process of the regime, the ‘traditionality’ of seal hunts – meaning 
the long- standing history of seal hunting and processing by indigenous 
peoples – stands at the fore. The Seal Regime’s overall purpose is shady, 
but it functionally bans all trade in seal products in the European Union 
with the exemption of those stemming from indigenous peoples. This 
so- called ‘indigenous exemption’ is, as can be seen above, a common fea-
ture in regimes managing – or banning – the utilisation of marine living 
resources. In the wake of the challenge of the regime before the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) by Canada and Norway, the EU was forced to 
amend the regime in order to make it fully compliant with international 
trade law and its moral exception under GATT Article XX (a).10 These 
amendments saw an insertion of animal welfare requirements into 
the indigenous exemption, but did not alter the way legitimate Arctic 
seal hunting is legally constructed in a European context. The text of 
the amended Basic Regulation in Article 3 (‘Conditions for placing on 
the market’) thus stipulates that seal products can be placed on the EU 
market when: (1) Seal products result from hunts conducted by Inuit or 
other indigenous communities; (2) There is a tradition of seal hunting 
in the community; (3) The hunt contributes to subsistence and income 
support yet without primarily commercial intent; and (4) The hunters 
pay due regard to animal welfare.11
In other words, the European Union is legally constructing lim-
its for what Arctic seal hunts should be like in order to fall under the 
indigenous exemption of the EU Seal Regime. Special attention must be 
given to the notion of ‘commercial seal hunts’ in this context. The indig-
enous exemption does not allow seal hunts by indigenous peoples to be 
driven by commercial intent to yield products eligible for the European 
market. Although the exemption does refer to ‘income to support life 
and sustainable livelihoods’,12 thus indicating the generation of money 
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from the sale of seal products, the distinction between seal hunts for 
subsistence and commercial purposes is not easy to uphold.13 Moreover, 
not perceiving the Inuit as being embedded in modern economic sys-
tems neglects substantial in situ realities in the Inuit regions of the USA, 
Canada, Greenland and Russia.
As a result, Inuit and other groups have launched several court 
cases before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in order to overturn 
the ban. Although legally exempt from any trade barrier, the inter-
linked trade pathways of Inuit and non- Inuit seal products, the overall 
abstention of buyers from purchasing any seal products, and the market 
economic realities in Inuit communities led to drastic impacts on Inuit 
communities. Although being ultimately unsuccessful, the court cases 
demonstrate the empirical limitations, and arguably imagination- shaped 
character, of legal rules regarding Arctic economies and livelihoods.14
Arctic livelihoods as a legal construct
While the Arctic finds many reflections in international legal regimes, 
the focus of this chapter is ‘Arcticness’, a concept which this author 
understands to contribute to a better comprehension of what Arctic 
realities encompass. Many attempts have been made to decipher the 
scopes and limits of ‘the North’, the ‘Circumpolar North’ or the ‘Arctic’ 
and up to this point no fully satisfactory definition, at least for this 
author, has been found.15 Contrary to what the Arctic as a geographi-
cal region entails, despite the ambiguities surrounding the definition of 
‘Arctic’ and, in particular, ‘culture’,16 Arctic cultures appear to be more 
clearly defined legally by law- makers. Conditions are inserted into legal 
regimes that lay down conditions for what constitutes a ‘real’ Arctic cul-
ture and what does not. Along with these criteria go the conditions for 
the delimitations of Arctic economies which, as shown by Glømsrod and 
Aslaksen, are diverse and complex in nature.17 First and foremost, these 
legal reflections of Arctic narratives unveil significant shortcomings in 
knowledge regarding livelihoods and economies of contemporary Arctic 
societies. At the same time, legal regimes now attempt to include Arctic 
and other indigenous cultures, their traditional ecological knowledge 
(TEK) and livelihoods as a valuable element in sustainable development 
and environmental protection.
For example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)18 in its 
Article 8(j) lays out that the contracting parties are to ‘respect, preserve 
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and 
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local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the con-
servation and sustainable use of biological diversity’. While this is held 
very broadly and is not limited to Arctic indigenous peoples, it becomes 
more concrete in a Canadian context where, for example, the Oceans 
Act19 in Article 42(j) stipulates that traditional ecological knowledge 
is to be used ‘for the purpose of understanding oceans and their living 
resources and ecosystems’. Procter questions how far this approach 
towards TEK reflects the interests of the knowledge holders and argues 
that the discourse surrounding TEK and its embodiment in law ulti-
mately reflect neo- colonial approaches given the inherently exploitative 
nature with which TEK is utilised.20 Thus, conceptualising the cultural 
practices and knowledge systems under the banner ‘traditional ecolog-
ical knowledge’,21 while well- meaning, neglects the cultural diversity 
of indigenous peoples, simplifies the socio- cultural attachments to the 
knowledge as well as negating the achievement and generation of this 
knowledge.
A deeper analysis of ‘knowledge’ in the Arctic and elsewhere, par-
ticularly in environmental governance, furthermore reveals a systemic 
bias in approach:  although the CBD explicitly refers to ‘indigenous 
and local knowledge’, by and large the terms ‘traditional’ and ‘local’ 
are equated with indigenous knowledge holders. The same, I argue, is 
prevalent in the notion of ‘tradition’ or ‘traditionality’. Indeed, Berkes 
exemplifies this with reference to the West Indies and notes:  ‘Strictly 
speaking, the West Indies is one part of the world in which traditional 
systems do not exist’ since ‘the indigenous populations … have almost 
completely disappeared’.22 This approach, as Berkes himself acknowl-
edges, neglects that vast ranges of long- standing systems that have 
developed (or are developing) based on which management systems 
have evolved or are evolving. Inevitably, whether or not those engaged 
in the development of these systems are considered indigenous or not 
is epistemically irrelevant.23 Approaching Arctic socio- cultural systems 
by making a distinction between ‘indigenous (knowledge) systems’ 
and ‘non- indigenous (knowledge) systems’ creates a bias which points 
towards a ‘museified’ perception of Arctic living conditions.24 In other 
words, this approach neglects, first, the presence and knowledge of non- 
indigenous Arctic residents; second, the close intermingling of indige-
nous and non- indigenous people and peoples in the Arctic;25 and third, 
the ‘modernisation’ of Arctic indigenous economies, which concerns the 
shifting towards a market economy.
‘Traditionality’ of Arctic livelihoods therefore refers to livelihoods 
that are perceived as pre- colonial. The ‘indigenous exemptions’ utilised 
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in regulating the marine mammal hunt or the trade therein reflects this 
stance. Two points must be made in this context. From a legal perspec-
tive, this ‘museified’ view came to play a role in the Länsman v Finland 
case that was brought before the Human Rights Committee (HRC). The 
HRC oversees the implementation of the two core human rights cove-
nants.26 The HRC argued that:
The right to enjoy one’s culture cannot be determined in abstracto 
but has to be placed in context. In this connection, the Committee 
observes that article 27 does not only protect traditional means of 
livelihood of national minorities …. Therefore, that the authors 
may have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the 
years and practice it with the help of modern technology does not 
prevent them from invoking article 27 of the Covenant.27
This author would argue that preventing indigenous peoples’ access to a 
resource and access to the market for that resource due to the moderni-
sation of practices and technology, stands in violation of the finding of 
the HRC. The HRC comment is, indeed, a landmark comment on accept-
ance of the technological development of indigenous peoples within the 
context of ‘tradition’. The legal response, however, for example in the 
European Union, has been slow. In all fairness, the EU does not consider 
subsistence hunting as being merely limited to the community sphere of 
exchange28 but as holding an external dimension. Otherwise, the notion 
of ‘income support’ would not appear comprehensible, nor would an 
‘indigenous exemption’ be necessary in the first place. Notwithstanding, 
the law banning the trade in seal products in the EU narrates Inuit cul-
ture and economy in an outdated fashion. Although the Inuit were con-
sulted as part of the preparatory process of the EU Seal Regime from 
2006, by and large the perception of Inuit seal hunts still reflects the 
narratives of ‘traditionality’ as in the regimes of more than 100  years 
ago:  the hunting of seals with ‘traditional’ hunting gear such as har-
poons; the hunting of seals from canoes and/ or on the ice; the hunting 
of only very small numbers of seals; and the processing and utilisation of 
seals on site without a larger external dimension.29
In Greenland, albeit a part of the kingdom of Denmark but having 
left the European Community formally in 1985 while Denmark remained 
a member, the Arctic and its livelihoods play an integral part in the legal 
environment. This is particularly the case with regard to the hunting 
of marine mammals. Since its colonisation, Greenland’s legal system 
has been subject to a dual system of Greenlandic and Danish rules – for 
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example, the Greenland Administration of Justice Act in 1951  – but 
the legal and court system on the island has become significantly 
more ‘Danisized’.30 Hunting for any species in Greenland has therefore 
been subject to stringent national and international legislation. Since 
Greenland’s population is considered indigenous by the international 
community, any hunting for marine mammals falls under ‘indigenous 
exemptions’, both by the EU Seal Regime as well as under the ICRW. The 
hunts conducted, therefore, are considered legitimate and justifiable as 
fulfilling subsistence – and not commercial – needs. While this is norma-
tively the case, the legal regimes in Greenland strictly regulate marine 
mammal hunts. By taking a microscopic look at the provisions of the leg-
islative framework, little consideration for the realities on the ground, or 
for Arctic livelihoods, appears to be embedded therein. Licensing, animal 
welfare, reporting, technological requirements and quota provisions, 
to name but a few aspects, are an inherent part of the legal environ-
ment in Greenland. In terms of content, not structure, the Greenlandic 
system thus resembles other states in which marine mammal hunts are 
conducted, for instance Norway.31 Only by taking a step back can the 
consideration of Arctic livelihoods become apparent. This is particu-
larly the case in international terms, for instance in the view of the IWC. 
Greenland’s representatives vehemently defend its marine mammal 
hunts and frequently refer to the necessity of whale and seal hunting for 
the benefit of Greenland’s people.32 Moreover, Greenland’s membership 
in the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), a ‘sus-
tainable use’ organisation, indicates its position as defending its right to 
hunt marine mammals.
From a legal perspective, this puts Greenland in a difficult posi-
tion. How is it possible for the island to defend its ‘Arcticness’ as part of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, which, in turn, is part of the EU that holds a 
stringent anti- sealing and anti- whaling stance? Crucial in this regard is 
Declaration 25 to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which enables Denmark 
to diverge from the EU’s common position in the interest of Greenland 
and the Faroe Islands.33 Denmark first invoked the Declaration at the 
IWC meeting in 2008 and intervened on behalf of Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands and contrary to the EU’s common position.34 In addition, 
at the 2016 meeting of the IWC, which the author attended, Denmark 
defended the interests of Greenland in particular. For example, although 
no quota was allocated to Greenland’s Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling 
hunts for 2013/ 14, several whales were taken by Greenlanders. Several 
anti- whaling nations considered this an infraction and stated that the 
act should therefore be treated as such. Denmark, however, disagreed 
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with this assessment and explicitly referred to the subsistence needs 
of Greenlanders that were met by taking a small number of whales.35 
Whether or not the EU took the same view cannot be ascertained, but 
given the EU states’ normative alignment with the anti- whaling nations 
in the IWC, it can be presumed that the EU would consider the hunts an 
infraction. Indeed, Denmark surfaced prominently at the IWC meeting 
and openly represented Greenlandic interests. Although the author did 
not attend the coordination meetings of the EU, Greenland’s arguments 
appeared to imply they considered Declaration 25 to still be valid. Or 
to put it differently, Denmark openly voiced its support of Greenlandic 
whaling given its inherent part of Greenlandic culture and livelihood.
‘Arcticness’ in other legal contexts
It goes without saying that the Arctic and ‘Arcticness’ play a significant 
role in other contexts, particularly as regards climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. These issues will only be touched upon here very briefly. 
In general, the significance of the impact of climate change on the Arctic 
region shifted onto the world’s agenda after publication of the seminal 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)36 in 2004/ 05. After release of 
the report, the Arctic Eight all released their respective Arctic strategies 
in which they committed to different goals while at the same time tack-
ling climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and fostering 
‘green’ economies. Moreover, the ACIA report helped to bring the Arctic 
more closely into the scope of the international climate change regime. 
Since the third and fourth assessment reports of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2001 and 2007 respectively, the 
Arctic has become an integral part of the regime.37
Although, from an environmental perspective, this appears to 
correspond with the interests of Arctic peoples, the situation is slightly 
more complex. The role of Greenland in the climate change regime is 
twofold: on the one hand, Greenland’s population depends on the Arctic 
environment and suffers greatly from melting ice.38 On the American 
side, a legal expression of ‘Arcticness’ was uttered when in 2005 the 
Inuit Circumpolar Conference (now Council) filed a petition to the 
Inter- American Commission on Human Rights over the emissions of 
the United States, constituting human rights violations due to climate 
change implications. Similarly, the Arctic Athabascan Council filed a 
similar petition over Canada’s black carbon emissions in 2013. Although 
Arctic indigenous groups, in particular, frequently highlight the adverse 
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effects of climate change on the natural environment, Sejersen presents 
a stunning insight into the ‘other’ side of the climate change debate, 
namely the new opportunities, for example as regards hydrocarbon 
exploitation, for Arctic communities. This is especially the case in the 
context of Greenland’s aspirations for independence. Sejersen shows 
how industrial mega projects have now become a political and economic 
reality in Greenland, which is often still portrayed as a remote and 
somewhat backward orientated island in the Arctic.39
While the above discussion appears to imply that the legal reflec-
tion of ‘Arcticness’ is limited to environmental factors such as resource 
abundance or climatic changes, a brief look should be taken at soft- law 
means of cooperation in the north.40 The Barents Euro- Arctic Council 
stands out in this regard as this north- eastern European organisation 
goes much further than environmental cooperation. ‘Arcticness’ or a 
common identity as part of the Barents Region has spawned cooperative 
structures for education, health and social issues, transportation, youth 
or investment.41 While this cooperation is not based on legally- binding 
documents, but on declarations and Memoranda of Understanding, the 
Council reflects the regional understanding of the legal ‘Arcticness’, 
inevitably dealing with more tangible issues that have direct and imme-
diate effect on the people in the region.
Conclusion
In the context of marine mammal hunting, in particular, the concept of 
‘Arcticness’ is primarily linked with specific understandings of Arctic 
peoples and economies. These understandings largely correspond 
to those narratives that were applied in the early regimes more than 
100  years ago that regulate and manage marine mammal hunting 
activities. This view on the Arctic therefore romanticises and ‘musei-
fies’ the Arctic with little regard for the socio- economic conditions that 
have arisen over the last 50 years or so. The legal frameworks reflect 
these narratives and create a legal space for Arctic cultures with signif-
icant impact on living conditions in the high north. As a result, Arctic 
peoples appear to be put in boxes from which it is difficult for them to 
escape. Only through targeted ‘securitising moves’42 that use the legal 
and political environment in which Arctic peoples are located can these 
narratives be challenged. These moves occur through action taken 
by Arctic people themselves, as in the examples of court cases before 
the ECJ or Inuit and Athabascan petitions, or through their official 
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representation in international fora, such as the IWC via, for example, 
the Danish representation.
From a legal perspective, it can be concluded, ‘Arcticness’ lies 
in the eye of the beholder. This chapter has taken a somewhat critical 
approach towards the outside view – imagination – of the Arctic and its 
reflection in Arctic- relevant laws, such as for marine mammal hunting. 
And it was argued that this imaginary perception of ‘Arcticness’ that 
has found its way into legal regimes actually causes hardships for Arctic 
communities by not taking real- life circumstances adequately into con-
sideration. More research is needed on the anthropology of Arctic legal 
regimes to investigate the origin of Arctic legal understanding and the 
impact on contemporary Arctic societies.
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Continental divide: Shifting Canadian 
and Russian Arcticness
nadia french, Mieke Coppes, Greg sharp and Dwayne Menezes
Introduction
People are often defined by the locations in which they are born, in which 
they live or to which they are culturally and historically tied. Geography 
is one of the many factors that plays a role in shaping culture, politics 
and society. Yet, societies are tied to more than one defined geography 
which can have implications on their development. The Arctic is but one 
example. Generally perceived as one region – and in many cases, with 
having one identity – the Arctic holds eight countries and several indig-
enous nations with distinct cultures. Sometimes, Arctic provinces seem 
to have more in common with each other than with other areas of their 
countries; however, it is misleading to assume that these commonalities 
mean that the Arctic is changing uniformly. It should be clarified that 
the authors believe that there are no absolute differences or similarities 
between geographical regions considered in their socio- political repre-
sentation and this chapter only seeks to outline and propose the instru-
mental benefits of such a theorisation.
The future of the Arctic is fundamentally important to the future of 
the world, not only due to the fact that a changing climate means a chang-
ing world, but also because the north teaches the world about resilience 
and the importance of working together. The peoples who have been 
 living in the Arctic know that it is not only beneficial to work together 
and protect the environment, but it is part of the very core of life. Without 
this, there would be no ability to live successfully in the Arctic.
Speaking of the future of the Arctic can conjure many different 
aspects, including the changing climate, the impacts of tourism, poten-
tial new shipping routes, extractive natural resource development 
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and developing infrastructure needs. Each of these aspects plays out 
on the international stage in a plethora of ways, but the string that 
ties these pieces together is the people who live there, those who are 
being directly impacted by the issues. Although the region is changing 
dramatically, in some ways universally, the reaction to and the impli-
cations of these changes are different. Across the entire region, the 
climate is changing and ice is melting, which means the opening of 
shipping routes and a potential increase in both long- term and short- 
term populations. Nevertheless, how countries react to this, how their 
politics and society are shaped by these changes, is different and dra-
matically so in some cases.
This chapter will analyse the two countries with the largest 
geographical space in the region and assess the shifting political and 
societal changes in both Canada and Russia, providing a window into 
how two countries are reinterpreting their relations with the north. 
Canada and Russia have historically- rooted differences that have 
led to the creation of two Arctics: culturally, socially and politically. 
Furthermore, the core political and social values of these countries 
will be assessed through the lens of their Arcticness, generally defined 
as a perceived right of a state to the Arctic territory, while also evalu-
ating north– south relations within the countries. It is clear that ‘dis-
cussion on the changing Arctic environment, as well as on the impacts 
of such change on the cultures and livelihoods of indigenous and local 
communities, plays out against the backdrop of the shifting views on 
the concept of sovereignty in international relations and international 
law’.1 The role that sovereignty and the view of self plays in how coun-
tries and Arctic territories develop should not be negated. This is why, 
throughout each section of this chapter, three areas will be expanded 
on to highlight the present and future trajectories of Arctic develop-
ment in the context of a narrowing international gaze on this part of 
the world. The political and social dimension of north– south relations 
will be analysed from the perspective of historically defined relations 
between the colonisers and the colonised. Particular attention will be 
paid to the different meanings these relations have produced, which 
appear idiosyncratic to each continent.
Canadian Arctic
Canada’s north has played an important role in the creation of Canadian 
national identity. The region is still vaguely defined in three main 
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ways: as north of the Arctic Circle, north of the 60th parallel, or north 
of the 60th parallel and the Inuit homeland, Inuit Nunangat. For the 
purpose of this analysis, the definition of Canada’s Arctic will be the 
political definition of the term and, therefore, it will include not only 
the geographical region above the Arctic Circle, but also the entirety 
of the three northern territories and the Inuit territories in Québec and 
Newfoundland/ Labrador (Nunavik and Nunatsiavut respectively). This 
distinction is important to note, due to the fact that although parts of 
Canada’s north are not geographically in the Arctic, the culture and soci-
ety found in these regions are intrinsically tied to the Arctic and, there-
fore, are integral in any analysis seeking the implications of change in 
the region.
The political rhetoric and culture in Canada’s Arctic has under-
gone dramatic shifts over the last 50 years. This, in turn, has had impli-
cations for both those who have lived in the region for millennia as 
well as newer transplants. This changing society is still deeply rooted 
in the historical bearings of the region, which creates a dichotomy of 
old and new, of indigenous and settler, and of sovereignty and multi- 
nationalism. Some of the Canadian north’s most fundamental changes 
in the last few years have been political, demographic and a shift in the 
state of knowledge and its intergenerational transition.
Canada’s Arctic has always been felt as an important region in the 
psyche of the Canadian people. From the role of the polar bear to the 
northern lights, from the use of the Inukshuk to the international role 
that Canada plays as a ‘Northern’ nation, the Arctic is inherently import-
ant to the people who live there and important to how Canada sees itself 
on the international scale. This claim to ‘Northernness’ could be con-
strued as disingenuous, as the vast majority of Canadians do not live 
in the Arctic, and most have never visited. In fact, of the approximately 
33 million people who call Canada home, only approximately 104,000 
of them live above the 60th parallel.2 Even with so few people living in 
these northern regions, often in very challenging conditions that differ 
from much of the rest of Canada and with different issues than the rest 
of Canada, the dramatic changes that are happening there cannot sim-
ply be shrugged off as regionally ‘Arctic’ issues, but must be recognised 
in their intrinsic Canadian and Arctic nature. The three major shifts – 
political, demographic and knowledge- based – that will be analysed in 
this chapter tell a story of a region that is simultaneously Canadian and 
Arctic, yet neither at the same time. It is a region that can be defined 
neither by the country of which it is a part, nor the geographic space to 
which it belongs.
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Political change
Changes in the discourse of Canadian politics are one of the key issues 
surrounding the north. Previous Prime Minister Stephen Harper created 
a specific political rhetoric when it came to the region, which focused 
on sovereignty and militarisation. ‘From attempting to replace the bea-
ver with the polar bear to substituting human rights leaders with ice-
breakers on the fifty- dollar bill, Harper has used his time in office to 
determinedly shift Canada’s national identity from a “peacekeeping 
nation” to one focused on security and strength’, with the north playing 
a crucial role.3
With the election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, there was 
an expected change to a more Canadian view on collaborative multi- 
nationalism. The new politics ‘mark a return to Canada’s historic empha-
sis on multilateralism and careful diplomacy. Indicative of as much, the 
relationship with Russia has stabilised after Trudeau’s government took 
over in November of 2015’.4 However, the Prime Minister has yet to make 
known his specific politics in the Arctic, and there is much uncertainty 
as to the long- term implications of a Trudeau government. The difficult 
relationship between the indigenous peoples in the north and the fed-
eral government, located far to the south, has led many to question the 
policies implemented by Ottawa. This is unsurprising given the colonial 
history marred by discrimination, institutionalised abuse and forced 
assimilation. Experiences such as these were not uncommon: ‘Nomadic 
hunters were forced off the land into settlements. Children were sent to 
residential schools in the south. Tongue- twisting names in native lan-
guages were discarded in favour of numbers. Social problems, such as 
rampant alcoholism and drug use and a high suicide rate, were rife in 
the settlements. When Canada felt the need to assert its sovereignty in 
the 1950s, Inuit families from northern Québec were relocated to unfa-
miliar terrain in the high Arctic. Many of these “human flagpoles” grew 
sick and died’.5
This history informs the politics of today and the mistrust that is 
often still prevalent. It also ensures that many stay sceptical about the 
political promises that are being made, leading people to ask: will policy 
shift as well as rhetoric? Prime Minister Trudeau’s rhetoric is focusing 
on nation- to- nation relations with the indigenous peoples in Canada, 
which can in part be seen by the appointment of Mary Simon as the 
Minister of Indigenous Affairs’ Special Representative on the Arctic and 
the official adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).6 However, people are still waiting for the 
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real policy applications of this changing rhetoric: UNDRIP has yet to be 
incorporated into Canadian law and discussions are ongoing. Canada 
is currently at a crossroads in its political relationship with its north-
ern half. Only time will tell how the real day- to- day international and 
domestic policy will shift in the coming years.
Changing demography
Canada’s Arctic has always been vast, but remote from the south. 
Although the percentage of indigenous peoples is particularly high 
in the north, especially in the Inuit territories of Nunavut, Nunavik, 
Nunatsiavut and Inuvialuit, this is not true for the whole region. Yukon, 
for instance, is predominantly non- indigenous with only about 20 per 
cent of the population being First Nations.7 This highlights the problems 
of making generalisations even within Canada’s north, let alone across 
the entire Arctic region.
There is now a shift in the demography of the north, not only in 
the nationalities of people living there, but also in the average age of 
the people living there. The latter change will be fleshed out in the 
following section. According to the 2011 Canadian Census, there are 
approximately 2,900 Canadian immigrants living in the Northwest 
Territories, with a large swathe coming from the Philippines, the UK, 
Vietnam and the United States.8 The population of the territory, which 
is an area of approximately 1  million km2, is approximately 43,500 
 people. That means that approximately 6.7 per cent of people living in 
the territory are immigrants. According to the 2011 National Household 
Survey, 11.3 per cent of the population of Yukon were foreign- born or 
immigrants, with the largest percentages coming from similar coun-
tries as the Northwest Territories.9 Nunavut was the territory with the 
lowest proportion of immigrants at only approximately 2 per cent of the 
population.10
These numbers show a changing landscape in the north. With 
more international immigrants, and some refugees, heading to the 
north, some of the societies in these regions are also in flux. This is part 
of a larger trend in Canada which is attempting to successfully create a 
multi- national, multi- cultural society. Although the numbers of immi-
grants are not extremely large in the north at the moment, with the 
changing climate and the potential for milder weather, the Canadian 
north may have to prepare for a large shift in the demographic which 
will have lasting impacts on its societies. The Northwest Territories, for 
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example, recognises the benefit that immigrants can play in boosting 
the economy and building on the society in the region. The Nominee 
Program, which is one example of a government policy attempting to 
achieve this boost, is designed to ensure high- skilled individuals, includ-
ing immigrants, are living and working in the Northwest Territories.11 
As Jackson Lafferty, Deputy Premier and Minister of Education, Culture 
and Employment, said in a speech, ‘[The Nominee Program] initiative is 
a key component of our Growth Strategy, aimed at attracting 2,000 new 
residents to the NWT over the next 5 years’.12
A large population of indigenous peoples still live in the north. 
From the four Inuit territories, to the Dene people in the Northwest 
Territories, to the Gwich’in in the Yukon, there are many First Nations, 
Inuit and Métis peoples living above the 60th parallel. This does 
not mean that the region is not diverse:  according to the Northwest 
Territories Language Commission, for example, the Government of the 
Northwest Territories recognises 11 languages as official, including 
English, French, Cree, Inuktitut and Gwich’in.13 As shown by the dif-
ferences in language, the differences among indigenous peoples in the 
north should not be negated. Indigenous peoples in Canada include a 
vast array of First Nations, Métis and Inuit, each with their own history, 
culture and traditions. Although there will likely be an increase in the 
immigrants moving to the northern region of Canada, the society there 
is already varied in many ways.
The changing state of knowledge
The way knowledge is passed down from generation to generation was 
almost entirely disrupted in the twentieth century due to the horrors of 
residential school. The experiences in the north were somewhat differ-
ent to the rest of Canada partly because of the remoteness and the lack 
of economic development in the region at the time. In fact, there were 
only six residential schools in the three northern territories by 1950. 
This demonstrates that speaking of such an issue on a country- wide 
basis can be misleading, so much so that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Council (TRC) wrote a separate report on ‘The Inuit and Northern 
Experience’.14 This Commission was designed as a response to the res-
idential schooling and the healing that was needed. The report that 
came out of the TRC was not only an analysis of the legacy of residential 
schooling, but also an indication of how Canada could work toward a 
healthier and stronger future together.
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There were significant differences between the residential schools 
of the south and those of the north, notwithstanding the distances 
involved, but also the fact that the schools were administered (after the 
1970s) by the northern governments themselves, as opposed to Indian 
Affairs, which was the case for the southern schools.15 These schools, 
even though they were not segregated, ‘disrupted the intergenerational 
transmission of values and skills and imparted few if any of the skills 
needed for employment’.16 Not only was there a dramatic impact on the 
skills transmitted, but ‘when [the students] returned to their communi-
ties, they were estranged from their parents, their language, and their 
culture’.17 This left a gap in communities that passed information in a 
way that was different to the ‘Western’ system; for the northern com-
munities it was one based on the importance of the land and learning 
from previous generations. The loss of culture and language, and the 
estrangement from families, had an impact on education and subse-
quently the lifestyles of those living in the north.
The shape of education in the north is changing, although the 
underlying principles are not:  ‘schools are relatively new to many 
indigenous communities, but community responsibility for the educa-
tion of the young is not’.18 And the impacts of a Western- based educa-
tion system has left questions and problems surrounding the way that 
children are being taught. Zebedee Nungak, who was President of the 
Makivik Corporation in the 1990s as well as an important negotiator 
in the James Bay and North Québec Agreement (a land claims agree-
ment signed in 1975 spanning much of northern Québec), speaks to 
this, comparing the current Nunavik education system to the failure of 
the Franklin expedition. He also emphasises the societal turmoil that 
came from such a dramatic shift in education from one generation to 
the next, asking the reader to ‘consider that our grandparents, the first 
generation of Inuit to observe their grandchildren (us) being herded 
into uni- lingually English federal schools, were the last of countless 
previous generations to leave the nomadic lifestyle’.19 Education in the 
north was, in many cases, information passed down through genera-
tions, not something that was taught in a school: ‘Inuit education did 
not traditionally comprise a separate set of practices, supervised and 
documented by an administrative body, this topic necessitated input 
from Elders who were raised and educated by their parents on the 
land’.20
With a shifting age demographic, as well as the boom of tech-
nology, the way that knowledge is being transmitted has also been 
impacted – not only the passing of knowledge, but also the culture and 
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the society that depend on these relationships. Technology has a large 
role to play in how new generations are learning, and although the 
technology in the north may be slower than some southerners are used 
to, it still has an important role in the lives of newer generations. In 
today’s society, the young can turn to Google instead of their elders and 
parents to learn the answers to some of the questions they have, and 
this will likely have a lasting impact on historical relationships built on 
learning and sharing of knowledge. The exact nature and magnitude 
of the impact this will have on communities in the north has yet to be 
determined, but one can be sure that it will shape the society of the 
next generations of Northerners, much as it will those living in the rest 
of Canada.
Russian Arctic
The place of the Arctic, and the north in general, in Russian history 
and national identity is punctuated with periods of heightened political 
interest and exploratory ventures. The populating of the Russian north 
began in earnest in the nineteenth century, while industrial develop-
ment began in the 1930s– 1940s and continued with the discovery of 
oil and gas in the 1960s– 1980s. Seen from the south as a northern fron-
tier, a resource bed of hydrocarbons and marine resources, a curse for 
convicts and a source of pride in the popular imaginary, the Russian 
Arctic defies a single definition. The Russian Arctic is also referred to by 
southerners in more abstract terms as ‘a condition’ of Northernness,21 a 
geocultural non- place expressed linguistically through the concept of 
Russkiy Sever (the Russian North),22 or a socio- cultural entity defined 
as a vernacular mental cultural region.23 The ambiguous attitude of 
the Russians to their northern region is captured to an extent in the 
poll results of the Fond Obschestvennoye Mnenie (2015) which found 
that two- thirds of Russians support the state’s policy of exploration in 
the Arctic; yet, the majority of the respondents to the poll expressed no 
desire to go there themselves.24
The politically- defined Russian Arctic, known as the ‘Russian 
Arctic Zone’, is generally described as a macroregion (which is defined 
in Federal Law on State Strategic Planning of 28 June 2014)25 that is, a 
special area of state governance implying similarity of economic and 
political interests (and naturally that of geographical conditions). Little 
affinity and lateral economic or political interactions between Arctic 
territorial units have been identified,26 while most of the resources 
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required for regional development are being outsourced (from work-
force to technologies to energy to food).27
The ‘Russian Arctic’ is often used, especially in International 
Relations studies, interchangeably with ‘Russia’ or ‘Moscow’ to indicate 
the Russian government.28 This implies subjugation and inseparability 
of the region from its metropole. While the term Russian Arctic Zone, 
used extensively in domestic political documents, is itself indicative of 
such centre– periphery relations and the supremacy of the government 
in representing and managing the Russian Arctic as a border region, 
there are indisputably more layers to the Russian Arctic (or any political 
region) that are often ignored ‘to accommodate the story’.29
Political change
After the Arctic Strategy (Foundations in 2008 and Strategy in 
2013)30 was issued, the heuristic parallels with the Soviet Union’s 
industrialisation efforts were inevitable.31 Russian academics (e.g. 
A. Granberg, A. Tatarkin, A. Chilingarov) en masse supported Putin’s 
undertakings, and some even insisted that there cannot be continu-
ity between the Soviet Union and Russia, for the former’s aggres-
sive approach and reliance on convict labour is incompatible with 
the apparently liberal and democratic conditions of present- day 
Russia.32 Similarly, the institutional model of hypercentralisation 
adopted by the Soviet state and enacted through Glavsevmorput 
(semi- militarised ‘fiefdom’) and Dalstroi (industrial complex heav-
ily reliant on convict labour)33 have been ‘succeeded’ in 2015 by a 
mere coordinating committee with no budget of its own, located in 
Moscow and headed by Dmitry Rogozin.
Cartography has long been interpreted as an associate of power 
and domination.34 In this respect, the new Russian Arctic map pres-
ents an interesting case study. The geographic delimitation of the 
so- called Russian Arctic Zone (Presidential Decree of 2014) was not 
based on ethnic distribution borders, nor administrative borders of 
subregions, nor even on the Arctic Circle of latitude, leading to the 
reduction of the overall area compared to the previous delimitation 
document of 1989. Geographic determinism of economic and polit-
ical priorities of  the state hit the predominantly indigenous Sakha 
Republic especially hard as it saw eight of its districts (ulus) dropped 
from the list of the Arctic land territories and denied investment 
 privileges as a result.
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Development and demography
Whether continuous or divergent, Russian Arctic development brings 
to light similarities in the challenges faced by the Kremlin before and 
after the regime change and the north– south dynamics created to solve 
them. It seems likely that in Russia as it is today, neither development 
nor governance of the Russian Arctic region can be fully self- sourced, 
that is, based on its indigenous populations and local resources. In terms 
of administration, in Russia, most of the Arctic provinces are governed 
by either first generation locals of non- native descent or southern- born 
and educated migrants (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Yamal- Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug, Norilsk, Arkhangelsk); only one self- proclaimed 
ethnic native (evenk) is heading a Sakha Arctic district.35 Since most 
of the indigenous peoples have adopted traditional Russian names and 
speak the Russian language, it becomes nearly impossible to determine 
the ethnic association of a person living in the Arctic without overt self- 
identification or direct inquiry. It is further complicated by the fact that 
only about 25 per cent of the total Russian Arctic population is made up 
of ethnic natives, with Russians representing the unrivalled majority.
Yet it is often overlooked that ‘colonisation’ of the Arctic is not a 
one- way street: the non- indigenous settlers and their descendants have 
in the past undergone so- called ‘indigenisation’ (in Russian, korenizat-
siia),36 whether through intermarriages or by self- identification. At the 
same time, some natives abandoned traditional lifestyles or migrated to 
cities, other parts of Russia or abroad. Marina Kovtun, the Murmansk- 
born governor, noted that being a Murmansk citizen is a ‘trait of charac-
ter, of the soul’,37 pointing at multi- culturalism, on the one hand, and the 
values of national unity, on the other.
The workforce required to effectuate any industrial project and 
the fluxes of migration from such industrialisation have already incited 
several discussions on the complex socio- economic development of the 
region, the future of Siberian monotowns and workforce supply strate-
gies.38 The total deficit of skilled workers in the Russian Arctic, accord-
ing to official sources, amounts to 25,000 people a year.39 This number 
obviously does not cover the available migrant workforce or factor in 
infrastructure and auxiliary personnel as well as unemployed family 
members that breadwinners bring with them. The general migration 
trend, however, remains negative with the Russian north and east losing 
population to the western and southern regions with some exceptions 
(e.g. Yamal- Nenets Autonomous Okrug).
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Shift work and the expedition method of exploration in the Arctic 
have gained ground as strategies for cutting infrastructure costs in the 
most recent remote north Siberian projects (e.g. ‘Yamal LNG’, liquefied 
natural gas). They have made it more difficult to assess the size of the 
external element of the population and to evaluate the extent and type 
of social impact this has on indigenous communities and the natural 
environment.
The changing state of knowledge
The northern ethnic groups are divided into large indigenous groups 
(i.e., over 50,000 people) and small- numbered peoples of the north, of 
which there are 17 in the Russian Arctic as per the Law of 2015 on the 
Small- Numbered Indigenous Peoples,40 although only the latter have a 
special protected status. Assimilation of the indigenous population was 
a result of extensive economic migration to the north in the twentieth 
century and aggressive interference by the Soviet government in the 
economic, political and cultural practices (e.g. Resolution of the RSFSR 
Ministers’ Council of 1960 on ‘Additional assistance in economic and 
cultural development of the peoples of the North’).41 Nonetheless, the 
Soviet experience was not all negative:  ABC- books in local languages 
were first published in the 1930s; the teachers that taught in indigenous 
communities were recruited from the indigenous peoples; and nomadic 
schools, too, first appeared in the 1920s.42 Today, the nomadic form of 
education is being tested in Yamal and Yakutia, but special boarding 
schools still remain the most widespread form of primary and secondary 
education in the remote parts of the north.
The approach to ethnic policy- making in present- day Russia 
changed, but some of the problems (e.g. maintaining the balance between 
traditional culture preservation and culture- sensitive modernisation) 
still remain. In 2016, the Government of Russia signed a plan of action 
for the third and final stage of the Concept of Sustainable Development 
of Small- Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East 
(2009) for 2016– 2025.43 The Concept of Sustainable Development 
(2009) foresees a list of loosely- defined measures intended to improve 
the standards of living and update regulations related to state support 
of indigenous peoples (e.g. fishing and hunting rights, internet, ethnic 
tourism, transport services, power supply, employment stimulation, 
alcohol restriction and distance learning).44
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Quintessentially, the contemporary ethos of indigenous popu-
lation development can be found in the words of the Yamalo- Nenets 
Autonomous Okrug Education Department Director on nomadic 
schools:  ‘We must give parents and children a right of choice’ to stay 
in the community and live a traditional nomadic life or seek a modern 
life.45 This choice depends not only on the schooling system, but also on 
the state of the natural environment, limitations of industrial develop-
ment, and inclusion in the decision- making process and profit- sharing 
from the industrial use of land. The plan under the 2009 Concept is to 
be realised before 2025; however, a large amount of industrial construc-
tion is already under way.
Siberian (including Arctic) autonomous okrugs have been granted 
to the indigenous peoples since the 1930s to accommodate their right 
to self- determination; the irony is that the okrugs located within the 
oil, gas and other natural resource regions have attracted external eco-
nomic actors and political leadership that co- opted cultural identifica-
tion for the purposes of gaining political weight.46
Differences and similarities between the Canadian 
and Russian Arctic regions
Canada’s and Russia’s northern frontiers both experienced a period 
of southern discovery, geographic exploration, colonisation, resource 
boom and migration. Now, both face many of the same environ-
mental crises and some of the same political questions that arise as 
a result. The ideology that accompanied these endeavours often dif-
fered, yet both countries had dialogues with indigenous cultures and 
were transformed by them. Similarly, the mentality towards and the 
 relationship with the environment came full circle, starting from a 
perceived emptiness to the current recognition of the complexity that 
is essential for survival of not only the indigenous peoples but also for 
the entire human race.
Both Russia and Canada seem to have a vague definition of what 
the ‘North’ truly means to their country, geographically, politically and 
culturally. This stems not only from an historical distancing of the region 
and a preference for southern views, but from a more current recogni-
tion of the overarching impact that the ‘North’ can have in defining the 
country’s self. Both Canada and Russia are internationally recognised 
as being Arctic countries, often with the perception of them being coun-
tries of the ice and snow. This recognition and the assumptions of what 
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the Arctic is in the perceptions of others shapes the role of self that these 
countries have created.
Russia’s multi- ethnicity never experienced colonialism sui generis 
and, therefore, never had an emergence of the post- colonial discourse 
that has been seen in Canada.47 Although Canada’s north is also multi- 
ethnic, the settler identity struggle is still seen in modern day discus-
sions, both politically and culturally. Canada continues to strive for a 
‘North’ that manages to overcome the dichotomies that have presented 
themselves openly and often. The shifting political rhetoric in Canada, 
as well as the further inclusion of indigenous peoples on the territorial 
and also national scale should not be ignored. Russia, on the other hand, 
does not have open political confrontations between the centre and the 
north. But this does not mean that there is no problem of cultural dom-
ination – the fact that post- Soviet democratisation was insufficient for 
indigenous peoples to fully reclaim their traditional names is a telling 
example of the pressures that Russian society inflicts on its mostly small- 
numbered indigenous communities. Similar to the Soviet period, in con-
temporary Putin’s Russia, clandestine ‘grey’ politics  – such as threats, 
bribery of tribe leaders, ambiguous laws, whistleblowing, nepotism and 
more – is still practised in every sector where there is a conflict of inter-
ests, including indigenous rights to territories and natural resources, at 
least according to the indigenous leaders themselves.48
What is especially striking is that both countries seek national 
unity, through a strengthening of the vertical relations in Russia and 
the new federalism in Canada. For the latter, it means empowering the 
Arctic peoples, while fostering an openness for dialogue and multi- 
nationalism. For the former, it means tightening ties between the south 
and the Arctic through migration, development and government.
Different structures of the population between Canada’s and 
Russia’s Arctic raise issues of differentiated regional governance and 
direct versus remote influences of the south on the day- to- day life, iden-
tity and inter- ethnic relations. Arctic units in Russia are not monoethnic 
in the sense that several Arctic peoples can share the same region with 
sub-Arctic or non- Arctic settlers. Canada’s Arctic is difficult to define in 
a similar way due to the vast differences in the regions, both physically 
and culturally. While some regions may be predominantly Inuit or First 
Nations, many of the regions in the north have a wide range of Inuit, 
Métis, First Nations, non- indigenous, immigrant and other Canadian 
within them. This brings a host of problems and opportunities within 
it vis- à- vis the governance structures of the regions, for which solutions 
are being sought at the local, territorial and national level. For example, 
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Deline, a community in the Northwest Territories, has recently created 
the first combined indigenous/ non- indigenous government in the terri-
tory, which is designed to ensure that all people, those who are and are 
not Deline First Nations, are equally represented.49
There are similarities in historical approaches to education as a 
means of accelerated modernisation, which are not unique to the Arctic 
region, but the old habits in this area prove to be surprisingly tenacious. 
This can have lasting implications for the cultures that depend heavily 
on the transmission of knowledge from one generation to another as 
a means of developing bonds and constituting an integral part of the 
society. Furthermore, modern technologies, such as mobile phones, 
computers and snowmobiles, now widely used by the indigenous com-
munities across the two hemispheres, create a demand for new skill sets. 
Additionally, industrial development in the Siberian north may create 
other kinds of economic and cultural pressures on the local indigenous 
peoples.
The Arctic in the modern world often seems inseparable from its 
ruling state not only politically, but technologically too. For many, it 
may feel as though it is locked in the path- dependent trajectory of state– 
Arctic relations. In that sense, circumpolar fora that bring together 
Arctic states paradoxically recreate the same pattern. Thus, the concept 
of a single Arcticness, attractive as it is, is closer to the terra nullius (as 
the British saw Australia and Canada)50 than to the multitude of ‘Arctics’ 
created and re- created through continuous south– north interactions.
Learning from the continent- bound Arcticness
The Arctic has always been described latitudinally but rarely longitudi-
nally; yet, the places within it are often defined and shaped by their ver-
tical, north– south connections. The complexities of relations between 
the immigrants and the indigenous peoples in Russia and Canada  – 
shown through policy documents, national rhetoric and identity narra-
tives, among other media – tell a story of alternative Arctic futures.
The Canadian and Russian northern frontiers have gone through 
immense and drastic socio- political changes in the last 50 years, albeit 
for different reasons. In both cases, these changes impacted the soci-
ety and politics of the circumpolar region on local, regional and global 
scales. In more recent years, environmental changes, which span across 
the region, have led to very different social and political outcomes. Not 
all of the changes have been mentioned here, but books could be and are 
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written on the ever- shifting landscape that is politics and society in the 
American and Eurasian North, including territorial politics, devolution 
and the implications of colonisation and rapid modernisation on the psy-
che and lifestyle of the people.
Moreover, each subregion of the Canadian and Russian north has 
its own set of challenges, changes, opportunities and options, which 
are not always scalable. Some of these changes are more national 
in nature, while others are more global and ‘pan- Arctic’ in scope. 
Viewing the region in its north– south dialogue can uncover hidden 
tensions and path- dependent trajectories that cannot be addressed 
and resolved through a circumpolar Arctic paradigm alone. Viewing 
the region from a pan- Arctic lens also allows for the uncovering of 
commonalities, thereby reinforcing the challenges and opportunities 
that these Arctic territories face, in being influenced by different geo-
graphical locations and in being distinct in their identity from the rest 
of their nations and the Arctic at large.
In the context of the growing importance of Arcticness, there 
should be an awareness that persistent issues of continental divide and 
north– south arrangements can become more acute and yet are dis-
missed as a momentary obstacle in the global effort to ‘save the Arctic’. 
Although there are changes within the Arctic that are being felt across 
the entire region, this does not mean that the politics, societies and 
cultures within each continent are dealing with it in similar ways. It is 
therefore important that the Arctic itself does not become merely col-
lateral in the new political exchange between southern- based govern-
ments of the Arctic and non- Arctic states.
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Imagining the future:  
Local perceptions of Arctic extractive 
projects that didn’t happen
emma Wilson, Anne Merrild Hansen and elana Wilson rowe
Introduction
External imaginings of the future Arctic range from protected wilder-
ness to booming oil and gas province, and proponents of different visions 
frequently clash in global public arenas. At the same time, external per-
ceptions, whether pro- development or pro- conservation, frequently fail 
to reflect the realities of living in the Arctic, or to incorporate the views 
(and imaginings) of local inhabitants  – those most affected by Arctic 
resource projects.
The Arctic region does have significant resource potential. The 
United States Geological Survey estimated that 25 per cent of the 
world’s undiscovered petroleum reserves were to be found in the 
Arctic.1 The Arctic also represents around 10 per cent of the global 
nickel, cobalt and tungsten markets, 26 per cent of diamond gem stones 
and up to 40 per cent of the global production of palladium.2 Yet uncer-
tainty about the viability of natural resource projects is ever- present. 
Companies may be highly visible and a project intensely debated long 
before it is clear whether natural resource deposits, national- level 
negotiations and global markets will result in actual extraction for the 
market. Often local communities have very little information availa-
ble at this point and yet the very prospect of an industrial project can 
transform the way a local community imagines – and prepares for – its 
own future.
While the challenging work of seeking equitable, just and 
environmentally sound practices around natural resource projects 
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has been much studied, we know too little about the societal con-
sequences of anticipated but ultimately unrealised projects. In this 
article we explore three cases of Arctic extractive industry develop-
ments  – in Russia, Norway and Greenland  – where a highly antici-
pated extractive industry development has failed to take place. We 
consider the local expectations around the development and how the 
fact of it not taking place has affected local peoples’ perceptions of 
their future prospects.
What is characteristically ‘Arctic’ about Arctic extractive 
industries?
Given the overall theme of the volume, we reflect here on some of the 
commonalities of Arctic extractive industry development. Why does it 
make sense to review our three Arctic case studies in conjunction with 
one another?
One shared factor is the extreme sensitivity of the Arctic environ-
ment and the length of time it takes for damaged ecosystems to recover. 
By expanding further into the Arctic, extractive industry exploration is 
increasingly encroaching on isolated and vulnerable territories, often 
on indigenous peoples’ lands or in the waters where they hunt or fish. 
This environmental and social vulnerability has drawn extreme levels 
of global concern about the prospect of extractive industries expanding 
further into the Arctic, as indicated by the campaigns of international 
environmental non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and indige-
nous rights groups.3 The risks include climate change, which is a domi-
nant feature of global Arctic discourses.
Second, it may make sense to compare Arctic case studies simply 
because Arctic stakeholders themselves make these intra- regional com-
parisons. Three decades of post- Cold War ‘region building’ in the cir-
cumpolar north make it likely that Arctic communities look first to one 
another for lessons learned; likewise for companies and regional gov-
ernments in their planning and policy- making. Ever stronger links are 
being built between Arctic (and sub- Arctic) indigenous groups, sub- state 
regions and communities. Links are strengthened through international 
academic and civil society networks; increasingly strong international 
legal and regulatory guidelines, some of which are Arctic- specific, such 
as those issued by the Arctic Council; and increased use of social media. 
This having been said, comparative analysis between Arctic and non- 
Arctic regions is also extremely valuable.4
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A widely shared feature across the Arctic is the historical ten-
dency towards establishing single- industry or ‘one company’ towns 
(‘monotowns’ in Russia) at the heart of which is a single, dominant 
or ‘town- forming’ industry.5 Single- industry towns have often faced 
repeated boom and bust cycles related largely to the price of commod-
ities on global markets, and frequently leading to extreme poverty 
and social dislocation.6 This type of development push is sometimes 
interpreted in terms of centre– periphery economic development, 
associated with large states and colonial or imperial expansion, 
where the far flung corners of a polity provide raw materials to be 
processed and marketed in and for the imperial or national ‘centre’.7 
The government may have identified the lands where the resources 
are to be extracted as being ‘unproductive’, despite them being highly 
productive from an indigenous perspective.8 An overwhelming focus 
on extractive industries in the political economy and development 
planning is sometimes dubbed ‘extractivism’.9 In the Arctic context, 
this has been contrasted to the indigenous cosmologies based on sus-
tainable resource use with which extractivist policies and projects 
frequently come into conflict.10
As Arctic communities and resources have become incorporated 
into global capitalist markets, the focus has mostly been on large- 
scale high- investment development of internationally valued Arctic 
resources – oil, gas, minerals, timber and fish. This kind of ‘single point’ 
economic development encourages a continuation of the ‘single indus-
try’ vision of twentieth- century expansion, with bold versions of the 
future or efforts to ‘save’ the community via one grand project.11 Policy- 
makers in national capitals rarely envision an economic future for Arctic 
communities that is as complex and multifaceted as those anticipated 
for more southern towns and cities.
Moreover, the high cost of such ambitious, monolithic develop-
ment planning in the Arctic means that a drop in commodity prices 
might translate rapidly into the withdrawal of investment from expen-
sive and risk- laden Arctic environments. The oil price collapse of 
2014/ 2015 triggered the withdrawal of a number of oil majors from 
Greenland, while the rise of the shale gas industry in the United States 
drove down gas prices and contributed to the decline in investor 
interest in Russia’s Shtokman project (see case studies in this chap-
ter). In rare cases, a community has the opportunity to decide them-
selves whether or not an extractive industry development should go 
ahead. One such case, in Norway’s Kautokeino municipality, is also 
discussed below.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
IMAGIn InG tHe fUtUre 133
Any anticipated, yet unrealised, major economic development 
projects  – and the regulatory, stakeholder, business and scientific 
processes that attend them – can be seen as resulting in ‘unbuilt envi-
ronments’ of often invisible effects.12 In some cases, infrastructure is 
actually constructed without being used, or is used for only one or 
two exploration seasons, such as the abandoned oil industry harbour 
infrastructure built in the Greenlandic village of Aasiaat. After a brief 
review of methods, we turn to three case studies of such ‘unbuilt envi-
ronments’ in the Arctic, in Greenland, Russia and Norway respectively. 
We seek to explore and identify some of these effects, considering what 
might be characteristically ‘Arctic’ about them. We also consider the 
ways in which our analyses diverge, and how this illustrates the diver-
sity of Arctic experience.
Methods
This chapter draws upon three sets of field work, in Greenland, 
Russia and Norway. Semi- structured qualitative interviews were a 
key method in all cases. In Upernavik, Greenland, a total of 16 qual-
itative interviews were conducted in 2013 and 2014 in Kalaallisut, 
the Greenlandic Inuit dialect. The research focused on capturing 
the expectations and aspirations of people living in the area, so as 
to document and understand their perspectives and the potential for 
the possible recruitment of locals to work in the industry while also 
securing local benefits.13 In Murmansk, Russia, a set of 21 qualitative 
interviews were carried out (in Russian) in April 2013 with govern-
ment officials, company representatives, indigenous and civil soci-
ety representatives and a sampling of ‘everyday citizens’ who had no 
direct connection to the oil and gas industry.14 The research aimed 
to understand how the urban Arctic residents of Murmansk reacted 
to and understood an unrealised petroleum development, how they 
envisioned the future of the region; and how they judged the petro-
leum companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. In 
Kautokeino, Norway, a total of 26 qualitative interviews were held in 
2015 and 2016 with rural residents living close to a proposed mine 
site. The interviews were held in Saami, Norwegian or English, with 
translation into Russian or English for the benefit of a multi- national 
research team. The aim was to understand the extent to which inter-
national standards and guidelines on ethical performance in the 
extractive industries are implemented at the local level.15
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The case studies
Our case studies are linked primarily by the fact that in all localities a 
major extractive industry development was actively anticipated by the 
local community but ultimately did not take place. In the Greenlandic 
and Russian cases, this was for reasons beyond local control; in the 
Norwegian case it was a conscious decision made by the local munici-
pality. Two of the case studies involve rural indigenous communities, 
but the Russian case study is of a non- indigenous urban population in 
Murmansk – the world’s largest Arctic city. The Greenlandic and Russian 
case studies relate to offshore oil and gas, while the Norwegian case 
study relates to a proposed gold mine. Our aim is therefore not to draw 
direct comparisons or make scientifically grounded propositions, but to 
illustrate a range of local responses to a phenomenon – the unrealised 
project  – that has been covered very little in the academic and policy 
literature to date.
Upernavik, Greenland
Oil and gas exploration in Greenland has been taking place since the 
early 1970s without any commercial discoveries yet being made. 
After a general low level of activity, the beginning of the new millen-
nium brought remarkable increases in the global market price of crude 
oil (from less than 30 USD/ barrel to more than 100 USD/ barrel after 
2007) and a subsequent increase in the exploration interests of oil com-
panies in Greenland.16 The Government of Greenland (Naalakkersuisut) 
consequently released a hydrocarbon strategy for Greenland in 2002, 
announcing new licensing rounds for blocks offshore West Greenland 
in 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 2008, the US Geological Survey published 
assessments of large quantities of undiscovered oil and gas resources 
in the Arctic. The survey indicated that offshore areas between West 
Greenland and East Canada could hold seven billion barrels of oil, while 
areas offshore East Greenland were estimated to hold nearly nine bil-
lion barrels of oil. The presence of significant gas reserves was also esti-
mated in both offshore areas. Naalakkersuisut then released a second 
hydrocarbon strategy in 2009, which included a new licensing round 
in North West Greenland in the area of Baffin Bay in 2010 and a two- 
phased licensing round offshore North East Greenland in 2012 and 2013 
(Figure 12.1).17 The Baffin Bay licensing round led to seven new explo-
ration licences and the licensing round in North East Greenland led to 
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Fig. 12.1 An overview of active oil exploration licences in Greenland 
(from and used by permission of NunaOil A/ S).
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four new exploration licences. In 2010 and 2011, Cairn Energy drilled 
eight wells offshore Central West Greenland. However, all wells were 
declared commercially dry.18
In 2012, a consortium of oil companies with exploration licences 
in Baffin Bay drilled 11 so- called ‘shallow core holes’ to evaluate the 
area. A further four operating companies, including Maersk Oil Kalaallit 
Nunaat, ConocoPhillips, Cairn Energy PLC and Shell Greenland, held 
licences to a total number of five blocks in the Baffin Bay area. Seismic 
exploration and site surveys were undertaken here in 2012 and 2013. 
The activities were the most extensive in any area of Greenland to date, 
and all taking place in the sea off Upernavik District. The exploration was 
expected to lead to the production of oil and related industrial activities; 
activities that could bring significant change to the communities, both 
in terms of impacts on nature, the local economy and social structures. 
During preparation for the exploration programmes, the operating com-
panies were legally requested to, and did, undertake environmental and 
social baseline studies. They visited and engaged with the local commu-
nities to inform them about activities and to manage expectations.
In 2014, the Government of Greenland presented a new strategy 
on minerals and hydrocarbon resources. This strategy specifies selected 
areas to be announced for new licensing rounds or open door pro-
cedures including the areas of Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, west of Nuuk, 
Jameson Land, Nuussuaq Peninsula, South Greenland and South  West 
Greenland. But in 2014/ 2015, the oil price dropped and the level of 
activity in Greenland similarly declined. After some years of holding on 
to their licences, several operating companies decided to give them up 
in 2016. The licences to only ten blocks are still active in 2016, including 
those in Baffin Bay.
The uncertainty regarding whether industrial development related 
to oil and gas exploration and extraction will take place in the future 
and the potential for social change if commercial finds are made place 
the people living in the Upernavik area in a situation of uncertainty. In 
the following section, we describe how the exploration activities were 
perceived at the time, and how the locals coped with the uncertainty.
Local populations and livelihoods
Upernavik District covers 448 km of coastline in North West Greenland. 
The area includes the town of Upernavik with about 1,100 residents and 
nine smaller settlements with populations of about 1,700. The inhabitants 
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are, as in most communities in Greenland, predominantly Inuit by eth-
nicity. The main occupation in the area is hunting and fishing, which 
is practised both as a commercial and a recreational activity. Families 
travel to traditional or communally shared hunting, fishing and gather-
ing places along the coast, inlets and smaller islands.19 Hunting quotas 
in Greenland regulate the hunting of selected species, but, while some 
species, such as seal or Arctic cod remain abundant, other animals, such 
as narwhals and belugas, remain subject to government regulations.20 
Whale quotas are set by Naalakkersuisut annually and subsequently dis-
tributed to local districts where the municipal authorities decide on the 
allocation of commercial and leisure hunting licences.21 Other hunted 
species include seabirds, walruses, seals and polar bears.22 Commercial 
and subsistence fishing, as well as the hunting activities are considered 
important supplements to the economy for many households.23
Local expectations
In 2012 and 2013, when the licence- holding companies were gathering 
seismic data to map geological features of the sub- surface, a number of 
public consultations were undertaken and meetings took place between 
the people of Upernavik District and company representatives.24 
According to the interviews that we subsequently held with people in 
Upernavik District, they were very aware of the activity and the pres-
ence of oil companies and their plans. They did not, however, distin-
guish between individual companies but rather perceived the industry 
as ‘one’ entity. They did not seem very affected by the ongoing activities 
and in general they expressed relatively little interest in the industry. 
They did, however, express concerns regarding the potential influence 
of the activities on their (whale or fish) catch and were also curious to 
hear more about what kinds of industrial activities were going to take 
place. They were also curious to hear more from the companies about 
opportunities to work for or in the industry.
A representative of the municipal office in Upernavik provided the 
following explanation for why people were interested:  ‘The word “oil” 
has been mentioned many times, so there is a general feeling of under-
standing of oil being important, but the real physical understanding of 
what oil exploration is and what it means is not clear to people.’25 Some 
of the young men in the area expressed an interest in potentially sup-
plementing the income of their hunting activities with jobs in the oil 
industry in order to support the life they already lived. They expressed 
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a generally positive attitude towards the oil industry, which they saw as 
a potential facilitator of some of the changes needed locally to uphold 
their desired way of living in close connection with the land.
There were no high hopes in relation to the activities, but rather 
a curiosity and an interest from the locals. There were, however, great 
expectations in Nuuk among the government officials and politicians at 
the national level. It is also worth noting that expectations were much 
higher in relation to mining developments and the proposed construc-
tion of an aluminium smelter in the southern regions of Greenland, per-
haps because these activities are taking place onshore and potentially 
have a much more direct impact on local livelihoods.26
Reflections on the Upernavik case study
In Upernavik, the attitude of the locals and the pragmatic reaction to 
potential development could be seen as characteristically ‘Arctic’. The 
people of Upernavik were not very influenced by the ‘hype’ of the poten-
tial oil developments. They focused on what was known (birds in the 
hand and not in the bush) and held on to the importance of traditional 
activities, rather than dreaming about the future. In a similar way, the 
Inuit living in the small communities on Alaska’s North Slope after 
40 years of oil production still have a primary focus on traditional activ-
ities rather than on the potential for working in industry or changing 
or modernising their communities. This also means that local benefits 
in the Arctic are not necessarily obtained through skills training or the 
creation of job opportunities in the extractive industry itself (as has been 
the case in other parts of the world). Stronger and more sustainable 
communities are achieved instead by securing healthy living standards 
for people by providing the necessary infrastructure (housing, clean 
water, transport and supplies), and definitely not from paying out div-
idend cheques.
Murmansk, Russia
The Shtokman gas field, located in the Barents Sea some 600 km north 
of the shores of the Kola Peninsula, is one of the world’s largest natural 
gas fields. Development of the field had been discussed in earnest since 
the mid- 1990s. Anticipation on both sides of the Norwegian/ Russian 
border reached fever pitch around and after 2005, when cooperation 
 
 
 
  
IMAGIn InG tHe fUtUre 139
agreements to develop this field were signed by Russia, Norway and 
France, with Gazprom at the forefront. This triggered an avalanche of 
bids for field development27 and efforts of companies to profile their 
technical, financial and socially oriented capacities. Eventually Statoil 
and Total joined a consortium with Gazprom called the Shtokman 
Development AG in 2008. However, exploration never got off the 
ground, with the ‘shale revolution’ in the USA driving gas prices down 
in what had been a target market for liquefied natural gas from the 
Shtokman field.28
Great expectations
The interview findings were illustrative of the effects of extractive antic-
ipation in two key regards  – negative views on future prospects and 
changed understandings of potential extractive stakeholders.29 There 
are also, potentially, a myriad ways in which the Shtokman development 
may have had lasting impacts on the region outside of the ones identified 
via the interview set. Should the case study site have been located in 
Teriberka on the Murman coast, the impact of actual physical changes in 
the environment, including advanced infrastructure and changed bud-
geting or infrastructure planning, may have been more evident. One 
may also have found more individual decision  making directly influ-
enced by the prospect of the project (building choices, business plans, 
educational decisions and so on). As the case study presented here was 
focused on tracing the broader regional impacts of the Shtokman proj-
ect, in particular the expectations and recollections in the regional capi-
tal city of Murmansk, the impacts of anticipation remain more cognitive 
and collective rather than individual or material.
First, there was an impact on how respondents perceived the eco-
nomic prospects of the region. Some argued that oil and gas had remained 
entirely ‘virtual’, yet had still managed to have a negative impact on the 
region. Local respondents recalled overly optimistic personal spending 
and borrowing in the course of the build up to the expected project. 
Interviewees from business, NGOs and the public sector argued that 
housing prices had become inflated during the days of Shtokman mania, 
but not matched by employment and salary growth: ‘Just say the word 
Shtokman and apartment prices go up’, was a comment that several 
interviewees made.
Second, respondents’ experience with and perceptions of the 
petroleum companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts seem 
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to have catalysed change in some understandings among the broader 
web of stakeholders in the region. In other words, the Shtokman project 
likely changed perceptions of who can and should play a role in shaping 
major new extractive projects in the region and we should consider how 
those new understandings may play a role in future prospects as well.
On the whole, respondents had fairly strong recollections of 
the social policies and efforts of the international oil companies (e.g. 
Rosneft, Total and Statoil) that had vied for a position in the Shtokman 
project. Many interviewees had positive memories of international 
petroleum companies’ advance engagement in the region, such as sup-
port for business alliances and NGOs, youth engagement and musical 
and cultural events.
When it came to the environment and also the capacity of com-
panies to bring sustained long- term benefits to the region, however, 
several interviewees had developed a more sceptical understanding of 
‘new’ extractive actors (even though their operations never reached the 
stage where these benefits or risks materialised). Other respondents 
were uncertain about the actual outcomes of CSR, wondering if it had 
been just PR or empty words to satisfy company policy. One interviewee 
from the public sector put it this way: ‘We have CSR on paper only. I wish 
companies understood that they have a responsibility not only to their 
managers and owners – but to all of us who live here.’
Whether the interviewees had negative, positive or neutral recol-
lections of these concrete CSR practices, for nearly all the interviewees, 
the memories and current perceptions of the major economic actors that 
established themselves in the region during the Soviet period were an 
important conceptual touchstone. These longstanding industrial actors 
(mining and metallurgy, shipbuilding, nuclear power plants) were held 
up as the standard against which the social performance of the ‘new-
comer’ petroleum companies (both domestic and international) was 
judged. Interviewees from all walks of life warmly recited past and 
present benefits and services provided by the companies to their own 
employees  – entertainment and celebrations, travel, pensioner hous-
ing, specialised medical care, education and other family benefits. 
This renewed appreciation for existing industry can be seen as a last-
ing imprint of the Shtokman project and may be important in steering 
regional politics. How will these companies be treated in the future? 
How hard will they be pressed (or not) by regional government or the 
public on social and environmental issues as they arise?
In light of experience from the unrealised Shtokman project, 
the regional authorities interviewed described themselves as limited 
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in holding any large economic actor to account in social and envi-
ronmental matters. The possibility that companies can ‘re- register’ 
their tax home to another region was mentioned by three regional 
government interviewees as causing them to focus on providing 
‘hospitality’, ‘maximum comfort’ and ‘being appealing’ for business, 
rather than pushing for high social and environmental standards. 
Regional authorities saw their role in relation to oil and gas compa-
nies as especially problematic. In the words of one involved regional 
civil servant:
The development of this sector is carried out by companies of fed-
eral significance. Because of this, many of the strategic decisions 
about them are taken in Moscow. But there is a huge number of 
tasks that need to be carried out by regional and local levels, we 
have to create conditions for building of commercial objects, infra-
structure, roads … not least the right social conditions. We know 
the region best and a lot of these tasks can be carried out by us 
more efficiently and quickly.
Environmental organisations also saw themselves as important par-
ticipants in shaping industrial development in the region and over-
all felt that their engagement with companies had been constructive, 
even while they maintained a vigilant attitude toward the companies 
involved. They felt increasingly well- educated by the process of engag-
ing with petroleum companies new to the region, including being fur-
ther attuned to the international practices and standards that may serve 
as pressure points on companies (as they are important for companies’ 
access to international finance).
One interview was conducted with a representative of an indig-
enous Saami organisation visiting Murmansk. Here, the geographi-
cal focus on Murmansk city is limiting as most Saami organisations 
representing the approximately 2,000 Saami people in the region are 
headquartered elsewhere on the Kola Peninsula. This interviewee 
painted a worrying picture, arguing that the Saami had not been 
effectively consulted in terms of commercial developments and say-
ing they felt they had been affected by industrial development relat-
ing to the offshore in subtle ways but that it is hard for them to prove 
causal links (with the burden of causality left placed on them). Other 
interviewees were dismissive about indigenous interest groups, indi-
cating a divide in public engagement vis- à- vis the Shtokmann project 
along ethnic lines.
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Reflections on the Murmansk case study
Despite the project remaining unrealised, a cross- section of the public 
in Murmansk nevertheless possessed well- developed expectations and 
perceptions of the oil and gas companies that had jockeyed for posi-
tions around the Shtokman gas field. Interviewees were reluctant to 
engage with the concept of CSR that the companies had brought with 
them and instead referred warmly to a gold standard of past and present 
employee benefits set by the industrial complexes of the Soviet period. 
Interviewees also had clear perceptions of their own and others’ poten-
tial roles as stakeholders in managing an oil and gas future that had not 
come into existence. These findings suggest that the anticipatory prac-
tices around the Shtokman field have had lasting repercussions for how 
economic development and environmental risks are understood in the 
region and for shaping understandings of what kinds of stakeholders 
matter for large- scale economic development.
Kautokeino, Norway
In Norway, uncertainty around offshore oil and gas development has 
influenced national government efforts to revive its mining sector, which 
is focused particularly in Finnmark County in Northern Norway, where 
Saami reindeer herding is most intensely practised. Norway has opened 
no new mines in 30 years; therefore recent developments in Kautokeino 
and neighbouring Kvalsund have attracted great interest.30 While the 
Kvalsund copper mine may go ahead, the decision by Kautokeino to 
refuse a proposed gold mine has caused shock and questioning within 
Norway.
In September 2015 Kautokeino’s municipal council placed a four- 
year moratorium on discussions about whether or not to re- open their 
existing copper/ gold mine, known as Biedjovaggi. The municipality 
had twice rejected proposals by Swedish mining company Arctic Gold. 
Municipal leaders argued that reindeer herding is critically important 
for local livelihoods and the Saami culture, and they would prefer to 
protect and support the reindeer herding families who make up over 
half of Kautokeino’s population of 1,386.31 Mining is not the only threat 
to herding, although a map of exploration licences in Finnmark County 
reveals a land scattered with claims. It is one of many (cumulative) 
threats, including wind farms, roads, electric power lines, tourist cabins 
and hydropower projects.
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Kautokeino had experience of mining from the 1970s to the early 
1990s, when the previous copper/ gold mine was closed (for the second 
time).32 Today, Kautokeino has a budget deficit and one of the highest 
unemployment rates in Norway at 6.4 per cent, almost twice the national 
average of 3.3 per cent.33 Reindeer herding is the largest economic activ-
ity in Kautokeino, but it cannot provide for everyone.
The Kautokeino decision: how and why did 
the  project not happen?
Finnmark County has a special status supporting the rights of the indig-
enous Saami, who make up around 10 per cent of the total population. 
Kautokeino municipality is situated in inner Finnmark, which has his-
torically preserved traditional livelihoods and Saami language more 
than the coastal regions of Finnmark and has the largest concentration 
of reindeer herders in Norway.34 It is one of only two municipalities 
where the majority of the population is Saami and where the Saami 
 language is used by most people in daily life. The practice of reindeer 
herding is important for maintaining the language and is protected 
through the Reindeer Act (2007). Saami rights are also protected by 
legislative developments in the 1980s and 1990s and the establishment 
of the Saami Parliament in 1987.
Arctic Gold took ten years to obtain an exploration licence for the 
Biedjovaggi mine from the Norwegian government. They succeeded in 
2011 and invested heavily in exploratory drilling. The proposal was for 
an open pit mine, greatly expanding the footprint of the existing mine 
on land currently used as reindeer pasture. A clause in Norway’s revised 
Planning and Building Act (2009) allows municipal councils to decide 
whether or not to move forward with a mining project at the stage of 
environmental impact assessment (EIA). In April 2012 Kautokeino’s 
19- member municipal council, with a narrow 10- 9 majority, voted not 
to allow Arctic Gold to do an EIA. Those who voted against the mine 
argued that people were well aware of the impacts of mining from pre-
vious experience and did not need an EIA. A  further concern was the 
fact that a decision made after the EIA was completed could be chal-
lenged at the ministerial level in Oslo, thus taking power away from the 
municipality.
Following the 2012 vote, Arctic Gold challenged the legality of 
that decision; offered to carry out a social impact assessment (not man-
datory according to Norwegian law); and excluded the southern part of 
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the proposed mining area, which was most important for herding. They 
drafted an agreement with the municipality to support local business, 
culture and infrastructure. Arctic Gold’s CEO also offered a one- off pay-
ment of NOK 20 million and stated that a further ‘no’ would mean that 
Norway’s mining legislation was not working properly. He was labelled 
‘arrogant’ in the press: a picture of him in a Texan hat was circulated on 
social media and he was dubbed ‘the cowboy’. A second refusal came in 
December 2013, with a similar narrow majority (10– 9). Company rep-
resentatives admitted they had not realised the importance of reindeer 
herding.35
Arctic Gold indicated that a further attempt was possible after 
Kautokeino’s municipal elections in September 2015. However, the new 
council announced immediately that there would be no further dis-
cussion about the mine for the rest of their four- year term in office, as 
they wanted to focus on other things. The current moratorium is not a 
definitive ‘no’ and much remains to be done if the conflict is not going to 
emerge again.
Local perceptions and responses
One of the most striking observations from Kautokeino was the pow-
erful effect that the mere prospect of the mine had on the community. 
It exacerbated tensions along existing fault lines, with non- herding 
Saami claiming that the herders did not want the rest of the community 
to develop and revealing resentment at the legal rights that have been 
afforded the reindeer herders to date. A strong supporting voice for the 
mine came from the political party that was established to defend the 
interests of non- reindeer herding Saami following the enhancement of 
legal rights for herders. Views were not always clear cut, however, and 
pro- and contra- groups were also deeply intertwined through family 
and communal ties.
Another striking observation was the contrast in different ways of 
imagining the future, between the state and the community, and within 
the community itself. For instance, researchers at Kautokeino’s Saami 
University College have explored the chasm between the state vision 
of future resource development, based on grand economic projects 
underpinned by science and technology, versus the longer- term and 
historically rooted vision of the herders, based on customary practice, 
adaptive management and collective use of land, rather than  private 
ownership.36
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One positive reason for supporting the mine proposal was the 
potential for enlivening the local economy. Local residents remembered 
the previous period when the mine was open. At that time there was also 
a military camp, and mine workers and soldiers visited the community, 
people went out more, spent more money and the community was live-
lier. People also remembered that wages at the mine were higher than 
in other places locally.
A few local businesses would directly benefit from the re-opening 
of the mine, for example those that provide drilling services or specialist 
machinery. Kautokeino is heavily reliant on public sector employment – 
which is reportedly 70– 75 per cent of total employment (compared to 
the town of Alta to the north, which has more commerce and where only 
30 per cent of jobs are in the public sector). In Kautokeino, there are few 
shops and people regularly go shopping in Alta – a three- hour bus jour-
ney away – but are reluctant to set up their own shops. For some, the 
mine would be the answer to economic stagnation in the village.
One business respondent, however, observed that all the talk of 
the mine was draining positive energy and enterprise potential from the 
community:
It has such as psychological impact. The thought that this could be 
the solution. It’s like a grey cloud. Because young people want to 
stay. They want to go and get an education and then come back and 
use it. There is huge potential. We kill this potential with the mine 
question. I’m afraid of this more than the mining itself.37
In 2015, a local official closely involved with the municipal council deci-
sion pointed out that of Norway’s 428 municipalities only a few have 
mines: ‘The illusion that a municipality has to have a mine or it dies is 
not true. We can benefit from a mine but there are other opportunities.’38 
He emphasised the sustainability of the reindeer herding industry in 
Kautokeino and the fact that it is a large part of the reason why young 
people want to stay in the municipality. The official stated that the mine 
decision was primarily about Saami responsibility for traditional lands, 
and the need to respect international indigenous rights. Norway has 
ratified the International Labour Organisation Convention No.169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989); and supports the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), both of which require local 
level decision  making by indigenous communities relating to resource 
extraction projects. The official said there would be no further negotia-
tion with extractive companies unless there is dialogue between those 
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companies and the rights holders themselves. There has also been talk of 
setting aside the land permanently for reindeer pasture, but he observed 
that this would not be supported by many in the local community and 
would be a very complex process.39
Reflections on the Kautokeino case study
Despite support for indigenous rights in Norwegian legislation and 
institutions, the ‘extractivist’ economic model promoted by the state 
is at odds with herders’ own vision of the future. Progress in indige-
nous rights legislation moreover appears to have caused resentment 
in a mixed community where reindeer herders are perceived to benefit 
more from government support than non- herding Saami. For those who 
want the mine, it is seen as a ‘saviour’ project that will address problems 
that could be addressed in other ways, although these alternatives are 
poorly understood as yet. The municipality has much to do over the next 
four years to resolve some of these internal community issues and ensure 
that the land users are given adequate representation at the decision- 
making table, while others who feel disempowered or disadvantaged 
are also allowed the opportunity to have their views incorporated into 
future planning processes.
Concluding discussion
As Arctic cooperation continues to expand, most recently via the newly 
established Arctic Economic Council, attention to the limits of shared 
ideas and practices and the abiding significance of realised and unreal-
ised local developments remains essential. Otherwise, it may be difficult 
to understand the dispositions, policy trajectories, political processes 
and expectations that Arctic residents bring to future debates about cir-
cumpolar economic and social development. One conclusion we have 
reached in the course of our research around these case studies is that, 
as yet, the phenomenon of the unrealised project has been covered very 
little in academic and policy literature, unlike the notion of ‘boom and 
bust’ for instance.
This discussion explores the findings of our case studies from two 
angles:
• What do our cases tell us about projects that have not happened?
• What do they tell us about Arcticness?
 
 
 
 
 
  
IMAGIn InG tHe fUtUre 147
What do our cases tell us about unrealised projects?
The case studies presented in this chapter have illustrated some of the 
ways that extractive industry development (often assumed to be an 
unstoppable force) is by no means a guaranteed outcome, even where 
ambitious plans are in place and anticipatory actions well under-
way. Shtokman remains an unrealised oil and gas ‘megaproject’ and 
Greenland’s oil and gas industry has yet to get off the ground, while 
Kautokeino municipality has taken the opportunity to reject a proposed 
project that could undermine traditional lifestyles. Despite the fact that 
these projects have not gone ahead, all of the cases demonstrate the 
extent of local impacts from a development, even before it has actually 
started – something that is rarely taken into account in the analysis of 
industrial impacts on local communities.
The case studies have yielded some ideas about the different stake-
holders who can influence these processes and their capacities. This 
influence can happen at different levels, with the tension between ‘cen-
tre’ and ‘municipal’ levels evident in all cases. In Murmansk, the off-
shore developments also heightened local expectations about corporate 
responsibility practices, with long- established industrial entities com-
paring favourably with the ‘newcomers’. The study also revealed the 
importance of considering how local, international and regional stan-
dards and discourses brought in by media, international companies and 
circumpolar cross- border interactions combine to shape ‘unbuilt land-
scapes’ in novel ways.
The cases revealed that local communities are far from homog-
enous, even if all the local residents are from the same indigenous 
ethnic group, and the prospect of a new development can open up 
existing internal ‘fault lines’ within a community. For example, in 
Kautokeino, latent resentment about the benefits that reindeer herd-
ers receive from the state was intensified when non- herders perceived 
them as seeking to halt a potential alternative economic option for the 
community.
While in some cases, such as the Upernavik case, local people are 
not fired up by the ‘hype’ of a new project, in other cases, local hopes 
for profits from the extractive industries can be so intense that they 
crowd out the potential offered by other socio- economic development 
paths, as was the case for some residents of Kautokeino. The expecta-
tion of extractive industries may result in anticipatory activities such as 
the Government of Greenland developing and updating its hydrocarbon 
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strategy; or the artificial inflation of the housing market in Murmansk. 
And yet external forces might suddenly undermine development pros-
pects, leaving communities struggling to revert back to more self- 
sufficient modes of development.
What do our cases tell us about Arcticness?
Our case studies suggest a number of factors that could point towards an 
understanding of the notion of ‘Arcticness’. Sometimes these are better 
seen in terms of a cluster of factors that might come together uniquely 
in the Arctic; sometimes these are striking similarities that can be per-
ceived in different parts of the Arctic, although not in all communities 
throughout the region. Two of our case studies focus on small indigenous 
communities in isolated localities practising traditional livelihood activ-
ities and, perhaps, this is a dominant picture that many outsiders have 
of the Arctic. Yet the Murmansk case study highlights the fact that there 
are also city populations living north of the Arctic Circle. Meanwhile, 
the Kautokeino case study illustrates the challenges of modernisation 
in an indigenous community when only half the community practises 
traditional livelihood activities (subsidised by the state).
Extractive industry development can threaten people’s connection 
to the land – something that deeply defines existence for many Arctic 
residents, particularly those from indigenous communities. Some peo-
ple seek to keep their ties to their land and resource- use practices strong. 
For example, the Upernavik communities hold on to the importance and 
value of traditional activities, rather than dreaming about the future 
and the possible benefits that externally- imposed modernisation might 
bring them. This can be compared to observations of Inuit practices in 
Alaska, despite 40 years of oil production. It is also comparable to the 
vision of the reindeer herding community of Kautokeino, whose vision 
of the future contrasts with the extractivist economic model promoted 
by the state. Yet half of the Kautokeino community, like others across the 
Arctic, still sees extractive industries as the easy answer to a multitude 
of local issues, including youth unemployment, economic stagnation 
and the maintenance of local infrastructure and public services.
Arctic communities may be disproportionately exposed to the 
experience of unrealised extractive futures. This is often due to events 
that local people have had little control over, such as commodity price 
fluctuations, which may lead companies to withdraw from the Arctic 
first of all as it is one of the most expensive places to work. Sometimes 
 
  
IMAGIn InG tHe fUtUre 149
a project may be halted as a result of local voices making themselves 
heard in deciding against a development. Yet despite great advances in 
the understanding and defence of indigenous rights, this is uncommon 
in the Arctic. Our case studies portray the range of opportunities from 
mineral resource development, as well as the depth of uncertainty sur-
rounding every development, and the way that decisions, once made, 
may be thrown up in the air with a turn in commodity prices, or a new 
municipal election. As such, Arcticness might partially be defined by the 
regular experience of ambitious, single- industry plans for development, 
some of which come about and many that do not, but all of which leave 
their traces.
A key task for companies and policy- makers promoting their 
visions of the future is to communicate the fundamental uncertainties 
involved in realising them, and discussing the ways in which anticipa-
tion is not the same as prediction or certainty. For researchers and policy 
analysts, there is a need to explore further the issues surrounding the 
‘unrealised project’, including analysis of project impacts that take place 
before a project is confirmed (such as anxiety, community tension, unre-
alistic or heightened expectations, and the ‘crowding out’ of other future 
options); the different factors that may result in a project not being pur-
sued, including issues ranging from commodity price fluctuations to the 
different ways that communities are able to ‘say no’ to a project; and the 
range of different outcomes that might follow, be it economic decline or 
the emergence of local enterprise.
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Editorial Conclusion: Arcticness by 
any other name
Ilan Kelman
Does Arcticness convey power and voice from the north? Does it disem-
power, with an alien concept and artificial construct foisted on diverse 
peoples and regions who have little in common apart from living at high 
latitudes?
The chapters within this book open this conversation, dissect the 
concepts, put forth numerous queries and provide few answers. They do 
provide pathways towards responding plus indications of the variety of 
answers which exist. In problematising and de- problematising both the 
Arctic and Arcticness, they promote and dispute views from inside and 
outside the region, embracing and challenging multiple definitions.
Consequently, the diversity of the Arctic and of Arcticness 
emerges. Diversity which, perhaps, is so wide- ranging as to deny any 
graspable description or characteristics of what referring to the Arctic 
really means. Yet an undeniable materiality of high latitudes produces 
an environment  – including climate, geology, ecosystems, biota, air, 
water, land and ice – shaping life and livelihoods differently than envi-
ronments at lower latitudes.
While also displaying similarities. The comparative chapters illus-
trate this. High altitudes sport similarities with its anagram of high 
latitudes, as demonstrated by Tibet. Small, resource- dependent commu-
nities produce analogues between Greenland and Uganda. Other topics 
remain unexplored, such as high- latitude communities in the southern 
hemisphere, although those extend to a mere 55°S, far in distance and 
concept from many definitions of polar areas.
One consequence is that northern high- latitude communities are 
unique on Earth. Mountain communities might have similar climates, 
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but they do not enjoy the day– night imbalance witnessed throughout 
Arctic summers and winters. Nor do mountain communities (by defini-
tion) necessarily sit at low elevations, including sea level, as numerous 
Arctic communities do.
This level of similarity around the northern latitudes cannot by 
itself define a region. The multiple definitions of Arctic attest to the peo-
ples being more than their environments.
It is not even clear that all peoples living at high northern lati-
tudes share an assumption of being Arcticly similar. Many certainly 
do, entirely embracing the Arctic concept and seeking out those at 
matching latitudes. Others accept Arctic similarities without presum-
ing those to entail uniqueness from non- Arctic peoples. Many reject 
both premises, challenging the importance or differentiation of the 
Arctic from elsewhere.
No view is especially right or wrong. People are entitled to their 
perspectives and to act according to their own Arctic- related wishes. 
Then, what does it mean for Arcticness and what does Arcticness mean?
This volume’s contributions and contributors answer with mixed 
results on a solid baseline through a series of contrasts which are com-
plementary rather than contradictory. Notions of Arcticness are mate-
rial and emotional; products and processes; manufactured externally 
and coming from the people as who they are; an innate and prevalent 
trait of living in the region; and an assemblage according to what the 
assembler desires.
A danger coalesces of Arcticness being everything and nothing. 
It represents exceptionality and uniqueness  – just like everyone and 
everywhere else!!
Nevertheless, these apparent incongruities do not obviate the 
need, desire or utility of Arcticness. Arcticness permits expression of 
what is felt and seen from being in and from the Arctic, alongside what 
is felt and seen externally. It both gives and takes both power and voice.
It gives, as Hansen writes, through ‘interconnectedness of char-
acteristics and perspectives on quality of life’ summed up by Medby as 
the ‘quality of being Arctic’ which she then further interrogates. It takes 
through Naess’ expostulation of ‘exotification’ and through Tilling and 
colleagues’ concern about the scientification of the Arctic, which can 
never quite capture the connection they seek in their scientific work.
How do we avoid the Arctic being simply, in Duda’s words, ‘fea-
tured in outsiders’ collective constructs’, territorialised as per the chap-
ter by French and colleagues, or commodified as detailed by Wilson and 
colleagues? Why do we even wish to avoid these phenomena?
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Ultimately, as with any concept or idea, it is what is made of it, to be 
used, abused and misused as those with power choose. Arcticness lends 
itself to adages applied to so many other phenomena and processes, as 
ephemeral and operational, as theoretical and grounded, as entrenched 
and severed. Reminiscent of democracy, Arcticness could be the region’s 
worst descriptor – apart from all the others. Pilfering from participatory 
development discourse, the act of labelling with and as Arcticness could 
be an imposed tyranny. McCauley and colleagues propose Arcticness 
as a process rather than as a product – exactly as was done with post- 
disaster shelter two generations previously.
Arcticness is thus made to have traction and relevance beyond the 
Arctic, often by those seeking to appropriate and misappropriate the 
Arctic for their own purposes. The starkest example is the polar bear 
being conscripted to symbolise Arctic change, neglecting the peoples, 
livelihoods and communities who are affected by change far more than 
polar bears. Ice, snow and cold are important Arctic symbols, but not 
for their own sake – instead, for the peoples’ Arcticness, epitomised in 
Sheila Watt- Cloutier’s powerful statement about ‘The Right to be Cold’.
This power and voice from the north, defining themselves by 
themselves, is perhaps the key of and for Arcticness: how the Arctic is 
lived and experienced by peoples and communities along with the qual-
ities therein. The chapters in this book are experiential, beyond mem-
ory, meaning that by definition much is missing and much is disputable, 
because people experience and articulate differently.
Here, perhaps, lies the meaning of Arcticness beyond the Arctic: to 
take control of one’s own descriptors and explanations of oneself, to cre-
ate and express power and voice by one’s own definitions of oneself, and 
to grasp and tackle the challenge of others setting the agenda for one-
self – all happening inside and outside one’s own community. Opinions 
will differ. It can and should source strength rather than battle.
The same has been witnessed for islandness, ethnicness and engi-
neeringness among many other - ness- es. These reflections seek identi-
ties, qualities, groupings, connections and boundedness. The Arctic is 
no different, including with respect to the tumultuous environmental 
and social changes of contemporary times – and reaching back through 
millennia. Arcticness might seem to cleave by setting the Arctic apart, 
but in distinguishing what is or could be Arctic from what is not, a form 
of ‘Arctic without borders’ – borders across time and space – is sculpted.
Connections among indigenous peoples, natural resource-based 
communities, cold weather locations, mining towns and ocean- based 
livelihoods have all contributed to Arcticness. In otherising what is not 
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Arctic, bonds are forged through identifying differences which by defi-
nition delineate what are not differences. This inevitably bounces back 
to those being otherised who must similarly describe themselves partly 
through what they are and partly through what they are not.
Arcticness thus teaches how to define and accept one’s own - ness 
as distinct and partitioned from others, yet  also with similarities and 
boundary crossings. It is not even about iconising. Instead, it is about 
taking the power and creating the voice in, for and of the Arctic which 
for too long has resided outside the northern latitudes – to a large extent 
revealing an ‘Arctic of the oppressed’.
It is about creating an Arctic home for those living in this 
ever- changing home.
Whether or not ‘Arcticness’ is the most powerful and voiceful term 
remains to be seen. However it is labelled, and preferably with trans-
ferability across Arctic languages and cultures, Arctic experiences and 
qualities resonate far beyond the location and, from the authors writ-
ing here, it proffers knowledges, wisdoms and actions to the world for 
addressing today’s global challenges and opportunities.
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Afterword
Within Arcticness, outside the Arctic
vladimir vasiliev
What is the Arctic and what is Arcticness for a person living in the larg-
est Arctic region of the world, not living in the Arctic zone itself, but 
much more southwards, and still considering himself to be an Arctic 
resident?
I am a native Sakha. I was born and raised in Central Yakutia, in 
taiga area. I first saw tundra and the Arctic Ocean being an adult 27- year- 
old postgraduate student at the Yakutsk Scientific Center of the Siberian 
Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences. At the same time, from 
an early age, I was absorbed by the stories about brave polar explorers 
in an effort to understand what attracted people to such a harsh land, 
why, from olden times, they have so wilfully struggled through snow 
and cold into this, at first sight, deserted country, knowing that they may 
not come back.
I can confirm the words of all people who fall in love with the Arctic 
at first sight, that it enchants and keeps attracting you. Vast expanses, 
bright colours of tundra in summer, white land melting into the sky in 
winter, incredible glows of the northern lights, reindeer herds of many 
thousands, somewhat unreal and the absolutely ancient life of indige-
nous people in the reindeer- skin tents which seem to take you back 
thousands of years. Even the presence of some evidence of modern life 
such as newspapers, books, walkie- talkies and televisions do not hamper 
 perceiving the Arctic as a separate ancient world, as another civilisation.
At the same time, the Russian Arctic has had its periods of pros-
perity. In Soviet times, the Northern Sea Route functioned at full 
capacity and large- scale industrial projects of tin and gold mining were 
launched in the Yakut Arctic. The Arctic regions had much better sup-
plies of all kinds of commodities than those in Central Yakutia. The 
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young willingly went to work in the remote settlements, being confi-
dent that everything necessary would be provided for proper work in 
the Arctic.
The situation changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The development of the Arctic territories almost stopped. Only 
a few ships passed along the Northern Sea Route in summer, many set-
tlements were closed, people were leaving, and the only ones to stay 
were the indigenous people and those who did not see themselves living 
in other regions of the country, whose hearts had been chained by this 
harsh land.
Almost a half of Yakutia was in a very difficult situation. Immense 
distances and lack of funds in budgets did not allow the solving of all 
the problems at once, but the leaders of Yakutia have always paid great 
attention to the development of the Arctic zone. It was obvious from the 
very beginning that a single region was not able to tackle all the prob-
lems, and the first President of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Mikhail 
Nikolaev, actively established connections not only with Russian regions, 
but also with the foreign ones, in order to attract global attention to the 
development of the Arctic as a whole. For this purpose, he initiated the 
republic’s joining the Northern Forum international organisation and 
supported the establishment of the University of the Arctic and other 
international structures.
Being a biologist, I  wanted to make a contribution to environ-
mental protection in the Arctic. It is now pleasant to remember that 
I  was among the initiators and coordinators of the Integrated Arctic 
Expedition of the Yakutsk Scientific Center of the Siberian Division of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences in the 1990s. Within the frameworks 
of the expedition, we were able to collect a considerable amount of data 
and information on not only biodiversity and ecosystem functioning, 
but also on subsurface use, the status of indigenous peoples, traditional 
economies, the preservation of languages and culture. I hope that these 
materials were helpful in developing the republic’s new legislation and 
development programmes of different regions.
The experience I have received within the framework of the Arctic 
expedition still helps me. With my colleagues from not only Yakutia, but 
also from Russia and abroad, we have implemented a whole range of 
projects on environmental protection in the Arctic, support for indige-
nous peoples and climate change, involving the capacities of the Arctic 
Council, Northern Forum, UNEP, UNDP, WWF, Snowchange and other 
recognised international organisations.
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I believe that I have every reason to consider myself a resident and 
patriot of the Arctic, as I have devoted more than 30 years of my life to 
studying it and attracting support in different areas.
My family is also closely connected to the Arctic. My wife, Maria 
Krivtsova, helps me in implementing all projects, not only as an inter-
preter, but also as a coordinator. She is Russian born in Yakutsk but she 
is engaged in many international activities dedicated to the Arctic. Even 
our five- year- old daughter Sofia, although she has not been to the Arctic 
yet, has her own small reindeer herd of four reindeer – on the day she 
was born, Turvaurgin Chukchi community gave her a female reindeer. 
We have become good friends with the members of this and other com-
munities of the Lower Kolyma, as well as with the College of Northern 
Peoples. Through them, we continue our strong ties with the Arctic.
At present, being a member of the Government of the Sakha 
Republic (Yakutia), I  have many more opportunities for direct partic-
ipation in the development of the Yakut Arctic, and I  intend to do my 
best to change the life in the Arctic for the better. In Yakutia, 2014 was 
announced as the Year of the Arctic through the initiative of the Head of 
our Republic, Egor Borsiov. Such endeavours allow focusing on a specific 
topic, to evaluate the situation, to conduct high- quality analyses and to 
provide an integrated approach involving all available agencies. The 
Year of the Arctic resulted in the development of the Integrated Arctic 
Territories Development Program and the establishment of the State 
Committee for the Arctic Issues.
Today, life in the Arctic regions is changing rapidly. New commu-
nity facilities  – schools, kindergartens, hospitals, cultural and sports 
centres  – are commissioned. Large- scale work on developing indus-
try, attracting investments and improving the entire energy supply 
system is conducted. In 2015, the most powerful (1 MW) solar power 
plant above the Arctic Circle was constructed in Batagai settlement of 
Verkhoyansk region. Constructing a wind plant of the same capacity is 
planned in Tiksi. The population of the Arctic regions is growing slowly 
but steadily.
It is due to adopting a whole range of laws on supporting the popu-
lation, especially indigenous peoples, on the transition of planning and 
implementation of obligations to a programme- based method, as well 
as considerable improvement of medical services, the appearance of a 
telemedicine network, and improvement of communications systems 
(97  per cent of the republic’s area is now covered by cell communication 
and the internet). We see the revitalisation of the Northern Sea Route, a 
key significance in the development of the Arctic. That is why the Yakut 
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Arctic is not an economically depressed region anymore. It is a region 
whose population is optimistic about the future, in spite of the difficult 
global economic situation.
Work in the Arctic has changed my entire life. It has filled my life 
with dramatic events and vivid impressions. It has made me friends with 
lots of people from all over the world. I hope to be useful to the Arctic 
until the end of my life which, to me, is what Arcticness is about.
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